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INTRODUCTION

GYÖRGY CSEPÉLI, ANTAL ÖRKÉNY, FRANK T. ZSIGÓ

In the midst of events

It is estimated that in 2015 over one million refugees travelled into the territory of the states of the European Union, causing a crisis in the EU and on its peripheries. While Europe had experienced significant waves of inward and outward migration in living memory—e.g., the refugee waves caused by violent conflict in South-Eastern Europe in the 1990s—the 2015 peak and related wave posed a challenge for an EU that had only incorporated post-communist states as members eleven years previous. As such, a number of the countries highly affected by the refugee crisis in terms of administration and claims processing, humanitarian assistance and possible future integration were those that had little recent experience in facing such challenges. Furthermore, the societal response to the crisis revealed a deep divide within the EU regarding moral and legal obligations, the nature and protection of political communities and the execution of fundamental rights and values.

As a response to the recent wave of involuntary migration to Europe unleashed by global political, economic and environmental causes we organised a series of courses to be taught at CEU and ELTE in the academic years of 2015/2016 and 2016/2017. These courses were aimed at exploring the internal and external determinants of recent global migration to Europe. During the semesters researchers and experts shared their most important insights in their field with regard to migration and the refugee issue. Uniquely, the students were taken on field trips where they had the opportunity to meet refugee families in camps, unaccompanied juniors left alone by their parents and representatives of non-government organisations caring and serving refugees during their stay in Hungary.

Based on their learning experiences the students were asked at the end of the course to write a paper discussing some of the points listed below:

- understanding the various forms of new migration and refugee trends affecting Europe;
- the context of globalization and migration;
- political, social and cultural conflicts between migrants and host countries, including terrorism-related security policy challenges;
organizational contradictions with regard to national governments and the European Commission, the relationship between the state and the civic sector, and the potential of various civic activities;

the tools of successful social and cultural inclusion of migrants, the strengthening of social solidarity, and the role of collective and corporate social responsibility;

future trends of migration in Europe.

The best papers were collected and are presented in this volume. These papers offer a unique window of opportunity for social scientists to measure and evaluate a range of local phenomenon. For example, alternative theories of migration and integration can be tested and evaluated. As well, the response to the crisis of social institutions like those of the state, civil society and the media can reveal much about their flexibility and adaptability or firmness and rigidness. The reaction of such institutions to the refugee wave further offers an opportunity to study their stability and the execution of functions they are designed to carry out. Finally, the sets of stances and positions of host societies—be they potential integrators or transit overseers—offer us a view into some of the most basic values of these societies, including attitudes toward equality, humanism, community and justice.

The authors of this volume have undertaken the detailed study of institutional and civic responses to the crisis, largely in Hungary but also in Serbia, the United States and even the virtual sphere of the internet and social media. The first group of studies focuses on the civic and NGO responses to the refugee wave and its management in Hungary. Anikó Kenéz employs in-depth interviews to explore the reflections of a disadvantaged group of Roma in Hungary—one which has been affected by significant migration of its members to Canada—on the situation of incoming refugees and asylum seekers. Zsófia Nagy examines the efforts of the members of a small village in Hungary to oppose the placement of a refugee camp in their town. Zuzana Pavelková examines the approach taken by humanitarian activists in both Hungary and Serbia to the concept of the border. Rachel Surányi focuses on the attitudes and beliefs of the members of a Jewish faith group in their efforts to assist refugees staying at the Keleti train station in Budapest in the late summer of 2015. All four of these studies allow insight into the development of and shifts in values in the response to a novel crisis, and as such contribute to the deepening of our understanding of civic conceptions of justice and equality.

The next set of papers concentrates on responses to the crisis as reflected in the media. Eszter Szőnyi and Thomas Van Roey explore the use of twitter and particularly the #refugeeswelcome hashtag within twitter. Twitter’s simplification of messages and pervasiveness create a new communicative sphere in which citizens react to arising crises, and the study aims to reveal the logic and structure of such communication. Zsolt Szabolcsi uses the concept of moral panic to conduct a comparative analysis of the approaches of a number of Hungarian television networks in reporting the events of mid-2015. His findings reveal the attempts of state and non-state actors to influence public opinion on the refugee crisis. A study conducted and a film directed by Borislav Buljić, Gabriella Komoly, and Darko Majstorović use comparative methods to gain insight into media approaches employed in Serbia vis a vis Hungary. The authors find fundamentally contrasting approaches to reporting events, revealing
The volume concludes with Zoltán Csányi’s reflections on the modelling of well-being in refugee circles. The study is evidence of the fact that the 2015 crisis has not only affected policy and values in EU states, but is the instigator of changes to existing theories in sociology and political science.

Taken as a whole, the papers in this collection point to a crisis of values and conceptualizations of justice in those EU states directly affected by the critical events of 2015. On one hand, the crisis led to the crystallization of groups supporting pluralism, human rights and humanism. On the other hand, a perhaps unexpected result of the crisis—one clearly illustrated in many of the studies published here—was a coalescence of communitarianism at the national level, whereby efforts to control state borders are placed in a context of securing cultural homogeneity and maintaining existing culture. In such a normative environment, it is difficult to lay claim to objectivity or neutrality in social science study. What is certain, however, is that studies like those written by the authors in this volume are a step forward in the clarification of values inherent in a society’s ability to manage crisis.
“WE WOULD SEEK REFUGE TOO…”: HOW THE RESIDENTS OF THE “NUMBERED STREETS” OF MISKOLC THINK ABOUT REFUGEES AND THE REFUGEE SITUATION*

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To “fight criminality,” the city of Miskolc accepted a public security regulation in May 2014. According to this regulation people who live in “slums” can receive up to 2 million forints if they leave their “social housing” and buy new property outside the city. This regulation also concerned so-called “Numbered Streets”. These are the streets where Roma families live, generally in big families, who are poor and encounter discrimination in the labor market. Meanwhile, the Equal Treatment Authority declared that the city of Miskolc negatively discriminated against these citizens, and the city was obligated to pay a penalty and create a detailed resettlement plan. But the eviction process is still going on. Many people had to leave their homes and entire families had to move to apartments which were unaffordable to them or were in much worse condition. Since the families are afraid that if they become homeless, the child protection authority will take their children from them, many of them have already left their homes and moved to Canada and asked for refugee status. Currently you can’t find a single family on the Numbered Streets that isn’t concerned by this situation. Everybody has a relative, a brother or sister, a son or daughter, who lives in Canada now because this country received them to save them from the danger of homelessness. The main question of my research is: how do these people think about refugees and the refugee situation? I analyzed interviews from the theory of social representations approach.

Introduction

Since 2015, a new term has begun to dominate Hungarian public discourse: “migránsok” (migrants). Due to the refugee situation at Keleti Railway Station and the related measures of the Hungarian government—i.e., building fences along the southern border of Hungary—the media provided a wide variety of coverage on the acts of the refugees. However, this topic was introduced in the news in a way that presented those people who had to leave their homes in order to save themselves and their families from the danger of war and violence as a dangerous mob with bad intentions (Szabolcsi 2017; Bernáth & Messing, 2015; and also see “Democracy Reporting International,” 2016).

* The research that formed the basis of the paper was supported by the EU-funded Hungarian grant EFOP-3.6.3.-VE-KOP-16-2017-00007.

1 The choice of this word is telling, because the different terms imply different attitudes towards these people. While the Hungarian word “menekült” (refugee, from the verb “menekülni”, to flee) suggests sympathy towards them, the word “migráns” bears neutral or negative connotations.
This paper does not analyse how much Hungarian public opinion about refugees has changed, but—with the aid of semi-structured interviews—examines the way in which a certain group of people was able to cope with the contradiction between the picture drawn in the media and their personal attitudes, the latter of which directed them to accept and sustain humanitarian values.

In this research project, I have analysed semi-structured interviews. In the following, I will introduce our group of interview subjects, who have been in a very unique situation since 2014. Then, because we analysed the interviews using Moscovici’s (1961) approach, we will summarize the theory of social representation and one of the most well-known strands of this theory, the central nucleus theory (Abric, 1993; Moliner & Abric, 2015). Finally, after presenting the results of the analysis, I will try to draw conclusions and propose a direction in which we could develop the approaches utilized.

**The situation of the “Numbered Streets” of Miskolc**

With a small documentary-group, we have been conducting video interviews in the “Numbered Streets” of Miskolc since 2014. First, I will introduce the situation of this neighborhood.

In order to “fight criminality,” the city of Miskolc passed a public security regulation in May 2014. According to this regulation, people who live in “slums” can get as much as 2 million forints if they leave their “social housing” and buy new property outside the city. This regulation concerned the so-called “Numbered Streets” as well. These are the streets where Roma families live; there are generally big families, who are poor and feel discriminated against in the labour market. Meanwhile, as the Equal Treatment Authority declared that the city of Miskolc negatively discriminated against these citizens, the city was obligated to pay a penalty and create a detailed resettlement plan. The eviction process is still ongoing. Many people had to leave their homes, and whole families had to move to flats they could not afford or which were in very bad condition.

Since the families are afraid that if they become homeless, the child protection authority will take their children from them, many of them have already left their homes, moved to Canada, and asked for refugee status. Currently there is not a single family in the “Numbered Streets” that is not concerned by this situation. Everybody has a relative, a brother or sister, a son or daughter who lives in Canada now, because this country received them in order to save them from the danger of homelessness.

This research project explores how these people think about refugees and the refugee situation.

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2 With Edit Kőszegi and Máté Balogh.
The Interviews

In order to reveal the opinions of our interview subjects we conducted 11 interviews with 13 people. In the course of semi-structured interviews, we asked subjects to tell us about:

- who from their family was in Canada, and what they have heard about the conditions in Canada;
- their opinion about the refugee situation in general;
- their opinion about the fence along the southern border of Hungary;
- their opinion of the refugee-quota;
- danger to their workplace;
- the source of their information;
- their motivations, intention of moving to Canada.

Theory of Social Representations

The theory that served as a frame in the analysis of our interviews is the theory of social representations formulated by Moscovici (1961). Nowadays this social constructionist theory is well known in social psychology, and there has been much research inspired by it. According to this theory, “individuals and groups create representations in the course of communication and co-operation,” and representations help us to construct our common social knowledge. The fundamental function of social representations is to “make the unfamiliar familiar,” and there are two mechanisms to achieve this aim: anchoring and objectification. The first mechanism helps us to classify new ideas into pre-established categories, while objectification turns abstract ideas into concrete objects.

A fundamental structure theory within social representations is central core theory or central nucleus theory (Abric, 1993; Moliner & Abric, 2015). According to this approach, representations are organized in a dual system, because they consist of central and peripheral elements. While central elements are stable over time and are based on significant consensus among group members, peripheral elements are varying and unstable and show many differences among group members; thus, they represent the heterogeneity of the group.

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3 Developed by Jean-Claude Abric (1993) and the Aix-en-Provence group in France.
There are several studies dealing with social representations, and they use different methodological approaches, including qualitative approaches such as interviews and quantitative approaches, such as surveys.

Generally, studies using central core theory as a theoretical background during their analyses are surveys, because they need a sufficient quantity of data to attain valid results. Nevertheless, I analyzed the interviews to find central and peripheral elements of the social representation of refugees to figure out which part of this representation is the core-element, i.e., what ideas the residents of the “Numbered Streets” share about refugees.

**Central Core of the Representation of Refugees**

In order to define the central and peripheral elements of the representation of refugees I analysed the interviews to find out what the interview subjects mentioned first and which elements were mentioned by all of them.

I found that the central element was acceptance, the opinion that: *We have to let those in need come into the country, and we have to help those who need our help to survive.* Every interview subject mentioned this opinion.

There was another opinion that was the same in every interview: *children are innocent, and we have to help them unconditionally, and if somebody or something hurts them, it is unacceptable.* For example, in some interviews people described or mentioned images of children dead in the sea, with the purpose of emphasizing the cruelty of decision makers — *Why did they let them die?* — or their own empathy.

Children were also mentioned in connection with the fence, but this belongs to the peripheral elements of the representation of “refugees,” which I will discuss in the next section of my paper.

**Peripheral Elements of the Representation of Refugees**

According to the interviews, the most important peripheral element of this representation is the image of the terrorist. When in their first sentence the interview subjects say, “Let them come in… just don’t blow us up!” we can feel that the interview subjects associated the notion of refugees with the notion of terrorists, so these two phenomena are quite close to each other in their minds. However, to save these people and to be afraid of them at the same time is a contradiction. Therefore, in the interviews in which the picture of the terrorist appears, the struggle to dissolve this contradiction appears as well.

In one of the interviews, a woman who mentioned terrorism argued “we would seek refuge too, if the war broke out here,” and she repeated this sentence three times. Moreover, we heard this sentence from another woman in
another interview, so we can say that this opinion is commonly shared among the residents of the “Numbered Streets.” Therefore, in this case, these women tried to dissolve the contradiction by emphasizing empathy.

Interview segment\(^1\) No. 1:

S1: Well, yes, but if you look among them, they are not the same. It is as if a war broke out here, and people would leave. Or this is the same thing as when here they began tearing down houses, a lot of people’s houses were taken away, these people became homeless, and went to Canada as a refugee, so that they won’t lose their children, because their children would have been taken away into an institute, and they had to do something. It wouldn’t have been nice for these people either if they wouldn’t have been accepted when something happened in Hungary. So we shouldn’t handle these cases as one. Okay, tighten the rules, I agree with the government, it is obvious that the government is concerned about the country and the people, but I think, if somebody... Okay, we can’t filter them, but for example, if somebody is really a refugee with kids and with old people, well an 80-year-old woman and an 80-year-old man will not detonate a bomb, I think.

However, there is another “strategy” to resolve this contradiction: if the refugees do not deserve our help, then we can cope with our conscience, so if we emphasize the negative characteristics of immigrants we feel less pressure from this contradiction. But how can we do that? In one of the interviews, the subject told us some stories about immigrants who acted immorally. She mentioned, for example, a woman who hit her baby—a child who is the most innocent creature according to the views of the interview subjects. She also related a story that was built from various fragments from the news. It was not true, but it could be used to emphasize the bad acts of immigrants.

In this interview, one cannot help but note the usage of the words “refugee” and “migrant.” The choice of term seemed to depend on the context in which the word is chosen.

Interview segment No. 2:

S2: I don’t mind, let them come in. Just don’t blow us up! You get what I mean? Well, if there is a decent family... we go to Canada from here as well. How many people went to Canada! Well, it is good for the Hungarians when they are accepted, but Hungarians accept nobody! But it depends on the person, because... Well among these people, there are some who blow things up, and there are some who don’t, do you get me? The state has to sort them out. If somebody moves into the country, a decent family, a refugee family, well oh dear. It is good for Hungarians as well when they are accepted.

\(^1\) Interview segments can be viewed on Youtube: [https://youtu.be/h9GDZx-2z1w](https://youtu.be/h9GDZx-2z1w)
I: And have you heard about the fence that was built in the autumn or summer, what is your opinion about it?

S2: This is a good thing. I watch TV, well, what did they do there (at the fence)? They throw stones at the police, they shake the fence like crazy people. Small children got hurt because they threw them over the fence, imagine that. There is a video, Pisti told me, that there is a migrant woman, it is online, she wants to breastfeed her baby, and she is hitting her baby, a small baby, and she takes the baby’s mouth and she twists it so that it starts to bleed.

In this interview and in another as well, the image of the fraudulent immigrant appears. These “fake-refugees” do not come from the war zone or they are not poor. Why is it a problem that they are not poor? Because the residents of the “Numbered Streets” can feel empathy towards those people whose houses are ruined, and who escape from homelessness, and who because of this need our help. However, if the refugees have a lot of money the interview subjects regard them as frauds, and if the refugees cannot be trusted, they might as well be terrorists.

Interview segment No. 3:

S3: For example, I don’t know if you have seen this report, right Jóska, he pretended that he was poor and miserable, a refugee. They were in Pest already, and there were two nappies, and in one nappy there was poop, and the other nappy was full of money. So, are they refugees?

S4: Well, here no one can tell who is really in trouble, who should be accepted into the country, whatever minister he could be, he can’t find out who is a terrorist.

S3: We can’t tell whether he is a terrorist or not, because it was a set up, and we were sorry as well when we saw him on TV, he was so miserable and everything, give him refugee status and everything. Really, these people deserve a small apartment, well Pest is big and enormous, and they are somewhere else anyway, so give them a home, accept them, they have a small baby and other kids, too.

(...)

S3: Yes, well, but we don’t know who is and who is not (a refugee/terrorist), they pretend that they are poor. Of course, refugees from the war zone have to be accepted obviously, because it is war zone. But a lot of people don’t come from the war zone, they just pretend that they are from there, a lot of them get caught with fake passports, so it is obvious, we watch the news.
Conclusions of the Analysis

Those subjects who say that Hungary has to let every refugee who wants to come in into the country did not mention the phenomenon of terrorism. They watch the news, but they might not want to integrate the news into the refugee image that is in their mind. It is interesting to note that one of the families who shared this opinion went to Canada a few years ago, but they did not receive refugee status and thus had to come home. The other family—a man and a woman—who had a very strong opinion about the refugee situation, saying that we have to let all of them into the country, had a strong and negative opinion of the government and used the interview situation to underline and confirm how much they disagree with the government.

As we have seen in one case, a woman was afraid of terrorism, but she also said that we should let them in. In this case, she did not talk much about frightening examples but she emphasized similarity: “We would seek refuge too, if the war broke out here.” It seems this was a strategy to get over the contradiction between empathy and fear.

In other interviews, the subjects created new categories from known elements:

- “the evil immigrants” (for example, the woman who hit her baby);
- “the fraudulent immigrants,” who we cannot trust.

In these cases, it is important to emphasize that they are not refugees any more. They are migrants.

Overall, we can claim that those subjects who tried to harmonize the image of the refugees present in the news and their own accepting attitude had to face a cognitive challenge. It seems that those who believe that the refugees need help and see helping them as a moral obligation have to stop watching the news or at least ignore it so that they can avoid being confused.

Points of View

In his paper—like in several works in social psychology—Gordon Sammut (2015) examines the questions: “How do individuals orientate themselves in what appears to be plurality of perspectives? Why do they adopt one perspective and not another? And adopting a certain perspective, how do they then treat others who hold a different perspective?” (Sammut, 2015, p. 96) Generally, the social psychological answers to these questions contain the notion of attitude. According to Sammut, however, there is an alternative way for understanding how individuals orientate themselves. This was originally proposed by Asch (1952, 1987), who introduced the notion of point of view, but Sammut goes on and frames the nested model of social behaviour “that includes reference to societal dynamics, situational circumstances of orienting oneself amidst a plurality of views, as well as sociocognitive inclinations that individuals demonstrate in social relations” (Sammut, 2015, p. 96–97).
To create his model Sammut uses three notions: attitudes, social representations, and points of view. The theory of social representations is needed for constituting his model because this theory countervails the individualistic aspect of the notion of attitude by foregrounding the social rather than the individual. As Sammut writes: “While attitude is clearly a cognitive attribute of the individual even in its aggregate form—namely, public opinion—social representations are held to be intrinsically social.” (Sammut, 2015, p. 98) Nevertheless, Sammut emphasizes that these two notions are not sufficient to transcribe and explain social behaviour. Though an attitude represents an individual’s sum total evaluation of an attitude object, “[i]t does not, however, provide an explanation for why individuals resort to certain courses of action given a certain stimulus… Social representations on the other hand, describe context-rational behaviour that is deemed reasonable in certain circumstances… Social representations do not, however, explain why such context-rational behaviour may be adopted by some individuals but not by similar others facing the same circumstances.” (Sammut, 2015, p. 99)

To solve this problem, Sammut proposes completing the model with Asch’s notion of the point of view, because it can bridge the gap between the intrapersonal and the interpersonal. The point of view is able to connect the individual and the social spheres of psychological activity. Asch’s notion “constitutes an individual’s perspective towards a social object or event, oriented towards others’ perspectives,” and the points of view “enable individuals to participate in a mutually shared psychological field… In a systemic and relational context, each subject’s point of view is mutually intelligible. A subject is able to adopt a perspective and interrelate with others on the basis of it, because others can comprehend one’s point of view even if they can disagree with it.” (Sammut, 2015, p. 103)

In a nested model of social behaviour, social representations theory provides societal-level—and attitudes provide personal-level—explanations of social behaviour. An individual’s point of view implicates attitudes and it is implicated in social representations, so it contains the individual’s “actual perception of the event in a given situation and given the individual’s own inclinations (i.e., attitudes) and environmental factors.” (Sammut, 2015, p. 108)

**Conclusions**

One of the main similarities between central core theory and the nested model of social behaviour is that both of them work with “the disagreement” between individuals who belong to the same social groups in which they constructed their common social representations. According to central core theory, the peripheral elements of social representations assure the heterogeneity of the group, where they are accepted even if they represent the opposite sides of a certain opinion. On the other hand, the different points of view—in the nested model of social behaviour—are mutually intelligible and accepted like peripheral elements.

In my research, it seems that subjects maintained the same social representation of refugees and had similar attitudes toward them, but had different points of view. We can say that the peripheral elements of social representation of the refugees determine the different points of view. However—in this situation—the point of view
of a given person depends on whether he or she ignores the news on the “terrifying migrants” presented in the media or tries to harmonize them with his or her accepting attitude.

There are different points of view that consider refugees on different—global, national, and personal—levels. Metaphorically speaking, we can say that some people look at refugees from the perspective of war, some look at them from the perspective of their own experiences in Canada, while others look at them from behind the fence at the southern border or according to their monetary situation. Nevertheless, the common opinion of this community is that Hungary has to accept refugees, so this can be considered a common value; the norm is the duty of helping people.

It would be very instructive to study how different points of view relate to each other in a community like this, where common opinion is so unambiguous. Do members of the community really understand each other’s different points of view, as Sammut (2015) supposed?

With respect to future research it would be useful to find an answer to the following questions: How do conversations, exchanges of thoughts, and learning about new points of view on a certain topic influence social representations and attitudes? and how do all these affect whether someone becomes resistant or susceptible to the fear-inciting news published by the media regarding refugees?

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COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES: THE CASE OF A LOCAL ANTI-REFUGEE CAMP MOVEMENT IN HUNGARY*

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During the summer of 2015 an unprecedented number of refugees entered Europe, many of them taking a route that crossed Hungary. The impact of the events reached a number of spheres, such as regulation, policy making, domestic and international politics, where the securitization of migration has become a prominent reaction. At the same time, effects have also reached extra-institutional spheres, such as the emergence of a number of social movements reacting to the situation. These emergent movements raise a number of theoretically puzzling questions. This case study examines how a local social movement in Martonfa—opposing the building of a refugee camp and the arrival of refugees—developed during the summer of 2015. The aim of the research is to unpack the effects of a perceived threat to this local community. The movement ceased its activities after 50 days when the government withdrew its plans to build a refugee camp in the small village of Martonfa. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the effects of the social movement on the local community reach beyond this period. The paper first provides a possible theoretical framework for the analysis of such a movement. Then, the methodology of the research is explained. The findings of the research explain how the previously defined theoretical model can be applied to empirical data. Finally, a number of conclusions are drawn. When constructing the movement’s diagnostic frame, it is not the problem of the refugee but that of democratic decision-making that is heavily emphasized. In line with this, the prognostic action frame contains very few details regarding possible solutions or strategies to tackle the issue. The motivational frame centers on “calling to arms” possible allies and partners.

Introduction

During the summer of 2015 an unprecedented number of refugees entered Europe, many of them taking a route that crossed Hungary. The impact of the events reached a number of spheres, such as regulation, policy making, domestic and international politics, where the securitization of migration has become a prominent reaction. At the same time, effects have also reached extra-institutional spheres, such as the emergence of a number of social movements reacting to the situation. These emergent movements raise a number of theoretically puzzling questions.

* The research that formed the basis of the paper was supported by the EU-funded Hungarian grant EFOP-3.6.3.-VE-KOP-16-2017-00007.
The case study below examines how a local social movement, which opposed the building of a refugee camp and the arrival of refugees, developed during the course of the refugee crisis that unfolded in Hungary in the summer of 2015. The aim of the research is to unpack the effects of a perceived threat to this local community. The local social movement that emerged in Southern Hungary called Tiltakozás a martonfai-pécsi menekülttábor ellen (Tiltakozás a martonfai-pécsi menekülttábor ellen, 2015), lasted for approximately 50 days. It began on August 1, when locals from Martonfa, a village of 200 inhabitants, woke up one morning only to realize that the government had announced the placement of a refugee camp on the Martonfa shooting range, without consulting the mayor of the village about it. On the very same day a Facebook group was established and contentious activities began offline. Most importantly, a group of locals “occupied” the shooting range for 50 days, putting up tents and spending days and nights on the location. Other events—demonstrations, petitions, forums—were also organized, often with the aim of creating alliances and partnerships with a range of actors, most notably Pécs, a city and regional center near Martonfa. The movement ceased its activities after 50 days when the government withdrew its plans to build the refugee camp in the small village. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the effects of the social movement on the local community reach beyond this period.

The present paper first provides a possible theoretical framework for the analysis of such a movement. The methodology of the research is then explained. The findings of the research explain how the previously defined theoretical model can be applied to empirical data. Finally, a number of conclusions are drawn.

**Literature**

The approach the present paper applies the perspective of social movement theory to a local anti-refugee camp movement. Traditionally, within the scholarly literature on social movements, two distinct approaches have developed (Crossley, 2002): the first is often associated with American authors and applies a structural approach to social movements and includes theories such as rational choice theory (Olson, 1965), resource mobilization theory (Jenkins, 1983), relative deprivation theory (Morrison, 1971), structural strain theory (Agnew, 1987), and political process theory (Tarrow, 1994). The second strand is more associated with European authors and emphasises cultural aspects of social movements: academic discussion here revolves around questions of identity within a movement (Melucci, 1995), questions of framing (Benford & Snow, 2000) and issues of values, such as new social movements theory (Touraine, 1985). The aim of the present study is to apply the latter—cultural rather than structural—approach to the case of Martonfa, as examining the discourse of a movement is more fitting to such a theoretical stance. Within this approach, I focus on questions of framing in order to analyse how the members’ perspectives, understanding of the situation and messages developed over the course of time.

In the field of social movements, framing theories (Benford & Snow, 2000), influenced primarily by Goffman’s famous concept (1974), are used to understand the ways in which social movements and social movement actors create and use meaning, or how events and ideas are framed. In the study of social movements collective action frames are used to bring people together and incite them to action.
One way to conceptualize the above is to differentiate between three types of collective action frames, namely diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615). As Benford and Snow explain, diagnostic framing means that a problem needs to be identified by the movement. Such diagnostic frames often include a so-called injustice frame. Prognostic framing refers to the articulation of a proposed solution or at least strategic planning. Proposed solutions need to fall in line with the habits and ideologies of the movement. Finally, motivational framing provides a “call to arms” to participants, potential participants, and allies (Benford & Snow, 2000).

A precondition for successful movement action concerns both creating meaning within these frames and creating consistency between the three frames. The case study examines how these frames are filled with meaning and how inconsistencies within the frames are handled. While not central to the argument of the present paper, I also tentatively ask what the limitations of such a framing approach to social movements are.

**Methodology**

The case study below is part of a broader research project that aims at comparing a number of local social movements that emerged against refugee camps throughout Hungary: in Balassagyarmat, Martonfa, Szentgotthárd, and Körmend. This broader research consists of both offline fieldwork and content analysis of the online activities of the movements. The present paper, however, has a more limited ambition, namely the examination of the knowledge, discourse and activities produced by the Martonfa movement in its Facebook group.

Posts within the Facebook group are analyzed utilizing thematic analysis. Thus, one Facebook post is one unit of analysis. A total of 287 Facebook-posts were analysed—no posts were excluded from the process. The steps of thematic analysis follow those outlined by Braun and Clark (2006):

1. immersing oneself in the data;
2. generating initial codes;
3. searching for themes;
4. reviewing themes;
5. defining and naming themes.

The methodology of the present research follows these steps—and also relies on the concept of collective action frames when searching, reviewing and defining its themes. The findings follow this logic, introducing the different collective action frames—diagnostic, prognostic and motivational—and the themes they contain.
Digital methods carry with them a number of difficulties that needed to be addressed during the analysis. While they cannot be recounted in full detail here, it should be mentioned that data reduction and coding necessarily leads to loss of data in terms of losing the original context of discussions and the natural flow of the discourse. A more significant problem arising during analysis is the question of generalizability: to both a population and a theory. Therefore, significant limitations to the present study exist: it should be borne in mind that analyses of digital contents are suitable for exploratory research but should optimally be supplemented with other methods, such as fieldwork or on-site interviews.

Context

During the summer of 2015 the issue of refugees arriving to the European Union, and especially Hungary, became central on the political agenda. For a number of interrelated reasons, the number of refugees heading towards Europe and choosing the so-called Balkan route in this direction had been growing steadily in the previous years, and increased rather sharply in 2015. While the details and explanations of this increase are beyond the scope of this paper, a characteristic of this drastic change was that Hungary became an important transit-point for most refugees, the majority of whom passed through the country toward Western Europe.

In order to understand the Hungarian context of the refugee crisis the role of the Hungarian government cannot be overlooked. While the governing party’s (Fidesz) popularity is left unchallenged by opposition parties both in the polls and the voting booths, two important factors shaped the refugee-discourse in the Hungarian public. First, a number of interim scandals during the second half of 2014 caused a sharp but nevertheless temporary decline in Fidesz’ popularity. This explains the government’s political agenda-setting strategy in which external threats and enemies became central elements. Second, this strategy in fact preceded the so-called refugee crisis. Following the terrorist attacks against Charlie Hebdo offices an estimated two million people took to the streets of Paris on January 11, 2015. Among them was Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, who took the opportunity to offer his interpretation of the events in an interview: “We should not look at economic migration as if it had any use, because it only brings trouble and threats to European people…. Therefore, immigration must be stopped. That’s the Hungarian stance… Hungary will not become a target destination for immigrants,” he said. “We will not allow it, at least as long as I am Prime Minister and as long as this government is in power.” (“Hungary PM Orbán,” 2015)

Orbán’s words were echoed by a number of state officials and members of the governing party. The applied frame was very clear from the beginning: there are no refugees escaping the horrors of war, only economic migrants who jeopardize our jobs, our culture, and the so-called ‘Hungarian way of life’. A number of political and communications tools were applied to reinforce this message. The government set up a working group to handle the immigrant question (“Most aztán tényleg,” 2015), followed by a debate in the Hungarian parliament about the issue. This was followed by a so-called ‘national consultation’ in April, where each Hungarian voter received a questionnaire from the Prime Minister, including questions that asked: “Do you agree that mistaken immigra-
tion policies contribute to the spread of terrorism?” A month after this the government announced a major billboard campaign with three basic messages: “If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture!”; “If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our laws!”; and “If you come to Hungary, you can’t take away our jobs!” Given that the language of the billboards was Hungarian and they were mostly placed within Budapest, it can be presumed the target audience of the campaign was Hungarian voters and not the migrants themselves. A couple of days after this announcement the government also declared its plans to build a fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border (Reuters, 2015b).

The government’s offensive was not without its effects. According to a poll conducted in June, a majority of Hungarians agreed with the billboard-campaign’s statements (“Századvég: Az embereknek tetszik,” 2015). The findings of another opinion poll (“Csúcson az idegenellenesség,” 2015) showed that xenophobic sentiments had reached a record high, whereby 46% of those questioned stated that they wouldn’t allow anyone asking for refuge into the country—the highest level since 1992. Because negative sentiments in communication are usually stronger in changing attitudes these messages were more dominant in the anti-refugee campaign. Orban, however, also provided a more positive vision of Hungary, where homogeneity began to appear as a virtue and competitive advantage.

It is against this backdrop of political discourse and the very presence of refugees that the events detailed below took place. On July 31, 2015, a government regulation was published and announced by the government spokesperson, concerning the establishment of two temporary reception centers in Martonfa (Baranya county) and Sormás (Zala county). As the government ranked the building of these centers “investments of key importance for the national economy” their construction was deemed exempt from local consultation or notification procedures. This provided the legal justification for the government to bypass consultation with the political leaders or locals of Martonfa. This, however, created a paradoxical situation: while on the one hand the government was strongly invested in fear-mongering against refugees, the local objection against the reception center went against their goals.

Findings

Chronology of events

Before engaging in a detailed analysis of the messages and discourses of the anti-refugee camp movement at Martonfa, it is useful to look at the events as they unfolded from the perspective of the movement. The table below (Table 1) gives a short summary of this chronology.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 31</td>
<td>The government appoints the Martonfa refugee camp sans consultation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1</td>
<td>The Facebook page is set up</td>
<td>An open letter to the Prime Minister from the mayor of Martonfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstrations in Martonfa and Pécs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2</td>
<td>Forum – decision about camping in the shooting field</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 3</td>
<td>Online petition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 4</td>
<td>Townhall meeting in Martonfa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 5</td>
<td>Letter to the Minister of Interior from the mayor of Pécsvárad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6</td>
<td>Demonstration (traffic obstruction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 7</td>
<td>Demonstration in Pécs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 8</td>
<td>Motorcycle demonstration</td>
<td>Concert in the shooting field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 9</td>
<td>Offline petition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 10</td>
<td>Pro-Martonfa demonstration in Nagykanizsa</td>
<td>Helsinki Committee &amp; Menedék [NGOs] visit Martonfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 11</td>
<td>Cooperation with the movement against the NATO radar station in Pécs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 13</td>
<td>Demonstration in Martonfa (traffic obstruction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 14</td>
<td>Demonstration in Pécs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 23</td>
<td>Open-air religious service led by Lóránd Hegedűs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>August 24</td>
<td>Residential forum in Hird</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>August 26</td>
<td>Car/motorcycle demonstration in Pécsvárad</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>August 27</td>
<td>Road-blockade in Pécsvárad</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>August 28</td>
<td>Demonstration in Pécs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 29</td>
<td>Residential meeting in Martonfa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 4</td>
<td>Demonstration in Pécs (traffic disturbance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 6</td>
<td>March in Pécs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>September 9</td>
<td>Jobbik demonstration in Pécs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>September 10</td>
<td>Residential forum in Hosszúhetény</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>September 11</td>
<td>Pécs town hall meeting on migration</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>September 12</td>
<td>Demonstration in Pécs (traffic obstruction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 15</td>
<td>Government announces the cancellation of refugee camp in Martonfa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19</td>
<td>Family day in the shooting field</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 20</td>
<td>The demonstrators leave the shooting field</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Diagnostic frames**

With regard to the diagnostic frame, an analytically useful distinction is to differentiate between various threads of the problem, namely the discourses on refugees, on the village, and finally on the political context.

Two aspects stand out when members of the group discuss refugees: that of cultural incompatibility and that of deservingness. Many posts and comments refer to refugees as people who are not compatible with European, “civilized” ways of living:

The refugee shelter in Vámosszabadi is full of dirt. It would be naive to believe that our fate would be different, if the refugee camp would be built here… (August 2)

Not a single cigarette was thrown away in the Martonfa shooting range in the past 1,5 months. Compare this with what [amount of litter] the migrants left behind in a couple of days… (September 14)

When discussing the case of Petra László, the journalist who famously kicked a refugee, the members come up with different gender norms of Europeans and Muslims as an argument against the victim:

The poor soccer coach, that dirty migrant left behind his wife and daughters and only brought his son along, he can go f…k himself. He’s like the other Muslims, women and daughters mean nothing to them, they only use them as servants… (September 14)

The second refugee-related aspect, that of deservingness, is summarized in great detail in the comment below:

1. After months of walking and struggling, would anyone be in as good shape as these migrants?
2. Having walked and suffered thousands of kms would anyone be in the mood to run away from policemen? 3. Why are some migrants hiding their faces? 4. If they are running away from war and hunger, how come that they have hundreds or thousands of dollars and euros to pay for trafficking? 5. They can also afford smartphones and GPS… 6. I’ve just seen it on TV, a guy in Szabadka was walking around in such a nice white T-shirt, it was straight from the laundry… 7. The other day I saw pictures of migrants, armed with designer shoes, clothes, jewelry… How did they pay for these? They are running away from poverty… (August 3)

Part of the diagnostic frame is positioning the village as unique and as typical at the same time. The first is necessary in order to argue why it is especially unsuitable to host a refugee camp in comparison with other locations. This is done by referring to both quantitative (i.e., size of the village) and qualitative arguments.
“Baranya county [the administrative region Martonfa belongs to] is the second most densely populated region of the country. There is no military or border patrol securing the borders. If [the refugees] hide in the Mecsek forest, these intruders will never be found.” (August 1)

The facts: 2200 people live in Martonfa, we have 5 streets, a grocery and a pub. The village lacks a sewer system. We don’t have any railroads; the motorway is 30 kms away. The region lacks the language and other skills needed to host refugees. The competitive advantage of Martonfa is based on local agriculture – the guarding of the lands however is not secured. (August 2)

At the same time, however, the discursive construction of the diagnosis also has to resonate with wider audiences in order to win allies and partners for the case, which explains the need for more universal argumentation.

I hope that you are aware that this is not only about Martonfa. Do you realize that if they can force this on us without consultation, then this can happen to any place, at any time? (August 1)

To bridge the gap between the two strands of argumentation, the Martonfa movement posits itself as the watchguard of the nation. This is best captured in the main motto of the movement: “Martonfa today – the whole country tomorrow!”.

Finally, the political contextualization of the question emphasises democratic decision-making—or rather the lack thereof. Throughout the discussions the fact that the government never negotiated with locals or the mayor of Martonfa but instead announced its decision without consulting them is heavily stressed. This focus on unilateral decision-making facilitates the connection between claims of specificity and universality and between the different constituencies: locals of Martonfa and those of the wider region. While the case of Martonfa is special, this could happen to anyone.

In Slovakia, they hold a referendum on the reopening of the Bős refugee camp. In Hungary they decide without consultations, anti-democratically, and the village affected has to learn from the press that the decision has already been made without asking them. (August 2)

Democracy is over in Hungary... The time of dictatorship has come. (August 3)

We see that in their diagnosis of the problem members of the group stress that the “figure of the refugee” is culturally incompatible, and at the same time question whether those arriving are refugees at all. Location is central to the diagnosis: Martonfa is special in certain aspects, which is why it is unsuitable to host a refugee camp. Nevertheless, it is also similar to other places in Hungary. The latter part of the diagnosis is essential in order to embed the objection in a wider national context and win supporters beyond the local base. That the decision was made without consulting the locals and is therefore undemocratic is crucial to the diagnosis. In its attempts to
build a wider coalition including a range of locations and a range of political actors, this factor serves as a lowest common denominator to glue together these actors.

**Prognostic frames**

The prognostic frame serves to offer possible solutions to the problem in question, the arrival of refugees in our case. Interestingly, there is a significant lack of discussion related to possible solutions. The question is often handled with the tools of irony. A popular meme shared and liked by many people reads:

Martonfa doesn’t want migrants! The Pancho Arena is large enough to host 3.500 people, the average audience size in Felcsút is 1.089 – do you have any more questions? (August 4)

The above quote refers to Felcsút, the hometown of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, where a huge soccer stadium was famously built to host games of Orbán’s favourite sport.

Further ironic solutions offered are to move refugees to the Gypsy ghetto of Miskolc—a town in North-Eastern Hungary—or to “make life harder for Auntie Merkel” by “pushing” the refugees further west.

Notably, there are very few members who believe that the solution would be to send the refugees back home—pointing to the fact that members of the movement do not question the fact of war, but rather their own role in sharing its burdens.

In terms of what the prognosis for the locals and the social movement is, members believe that a wide coalition and persistent action would be the solution: that through their efforts they can first convince the government to consult with them and second, that this consultation would lead to the cancellation of the plans. The movement in its discourse is keen to look for clues in national and international politics about how the situation unfolds and therefore welcomes the plans of the government to build a fence on the Serbian-Hungarian border.

**Motivational frames**

The motivational frame can be summed up with the motto created by the movement: “Keep on Martonfa, wake up Pécs!” Therefore, the motivational calls, event descriptions and mobilization slogans most significantly aim at a target group larger than the inhabitants of Martonfa, i.e., locals of the region, most notably the residents of the large nearby city of Pécs. This is in line with the action repertoire of the group where numerous events are organized not in Martonfa but in Pécs instead.

Let’s meet at 5 and go to Pécs’s Széchenyi Square afterwards so that they too can see how democracy works today! (August 1)
Wake up Pécs! This issue is much more significant than the internet tax was! Where are you?… (September 4)

We have a growing number of programs: we have programs organized by civilians and programs organized by political parties alike. Everyone can find something that fits their preference. Now we especially speak to those in Pécs: hiding from your problems and ignorance are the worst possible choices, so we ask everyone to get informed!… (September 7)

Epilogue

Three months after the cancellation of the government’s plan to place a refugee camp in Martonfa and after weeks of inactivity within the group, the movement announced a year-closing event: a commemoration walk to the shooting range:

The Martonfa folk is small but strong. Dear All! The core members of the Martonfa campers plan to start a tradition by meeting on the last day of the year at 1 p.m. in front of the Martonfa church, from where we will walk together to our wonderful shooting range in order to 1. commemorate our struggle and praise the heavens for our success in defending our village 2. meet each other and talk for a little bit… (December 29)

The cancellation of the plan is celebrated and remembered as the victory of the locals and also forms the basis of a strengthened and renewed local identity: Martonfa-ness means something different at the end of the year compared to before, as a result of the social movement.

Conclusion

The above summary cannot give a full account of the discourse of the movement—nor can its findings be easily generalized. Nevertheless, they do point to a number of conclusions. We see that the action repertoire of the movement contains a wide variety of activities and stays colorful and rather intensive throughout the whole period. The actions undertaken are non-violent and stay within legal limits. This might be understood in terms of the wider goals of the movement, where alliance-building is central to members. The action repertoire contains mostly offline activities, while the role of social media and Facebook in particular is the promotion and documentation of the events. There are a number of messages that are central to the collective action frame constructed by the movement. While xenophobia is indeed present in this action frame, it is not central, and dehumanization of the refugees doesn’t take place. The action frame stresses that Martonfa is unsuitable: the village is small and lacks proper infrastructure for the hosting of refugees. The village intends to resonate by appealing to the interests of surrounding villages as well. It is not only a coalition of villages but an alliance of
different political backgrounds that becomes paramount: movements on the left, even pro-refugee NGO-s, are addressed by the members. This wide coalition partly explains why the refugees are not central to the diagnosis: the “democracy-frame” connects most actors in the field. The conclusion of the story brings about a sense of achievement—while the movement didn’t solve the problem, the events strengthened members’ internal solidarity and identity.

When constructing the movement’s diagnostic frame, it is not the problem of the refugee but that of democratic decision-making that is heavily emphasized. In line with this, the prognostic action frame contains very few details regarding possible solutions or strategies to tackle the refugee issue. The motivational frame centers on “calling to arms” possible allies and partners. This points to at least two broader conclusions. First, it seems that the movement—because of the small size of the village—intends to balance its lack of power by using online tools to address possible allies. This need to widen the constituency drives the aim to create frames that resonate with the wider public. Second, regarding the structural-cultural divide in social movement scholarship, the above findings reinforce that a cultural approach—framing theory—in itself is insufficient to explain strategies of the movement, as these are often driven by the resources available, or in this case the lack thereof. Therefore, connecting structural approaches—the investigation of resources for example—could enrich and add to knowledge of cultural approaches in social movement studies, even if they focus on discourse itself.

Bibliography


This paper looks into the phenomenon of (cross-)border activism emerging as a civil society response to the inability of states to provide a viable, humane response to the humanitarian situation resulting in the course of the "refugee crisis" of 2015-2016. It identifies (cross-)border activism as a potentially new, emerging social movement which can be understood in close relation to migrant activism, global justice and other civil society struggles. The paper argues that (cross-)border activism is distinct from other social movements in at least two respects: first, there is a strong bifurcation between "helpers" and "those to be helped," resulting in largely asymmetrical relationships on the ground. Second, the real or perceived exigencies of an immediate emergency situation lead to the prioritization of rather short-term goals often limited to direct humanitarian aid to persons en route. Considering, however, the continuum of possible interventions the notion of (cross-)border activism is capable of encompassing, the paper suggests a scale for positioning and further theorizing individual acts within the broader field: witnessing-assisting-disrupting. The paper argues that the ability and the willingness of individual activists to engage in certain types of (cross-)border activism but not others derives from their positioning vis a vis the state and the other activists on one hand and their understanding of the European border regime on the other. Ultimately, the paper argues that the ability of (cross-)border activism to establish itself in the long term as a broad, impactful movement will be dependent upon two factors: its capacity to shape a common understanding of the European border regime and its skill in defining the activists’ position within and towards it.

Introduction

Ever since the beginning of summer 2015, civil society has proven vital in providing assistance to refugees entering Europe on the so-called Western route. Every day, volunteers, human rights defenders and humanitarian workers filled the protection gap many of the states have proven unable or unwilling to cover. Their activities ranged from direct medical aid to provision of information, food or clothing. Albeit typically labelled as “volunteers,” the actors varied, as did their methods of organizations, level of institutionalization, goals or means employed.

With the emergence of the current, so-called “refugee crisis”, some have resorted to the term “border activism” to describe the actions of humanitarian non-state actors assisting refugees on the Western Balkans route. In the mainstream academic literature, however, a precise definition, and along with it a sufficient understanding of the term, seems lacking. Without it, any further research of the phenomenon seems questionable.
This paper attempts to fill the void by developing a basic framework for identifying and classifying different players—as well as their actions—who fall under the broad category of (cross-)border activism. The paper recognizes that any kind of classification bears the risk of being inaccurate, overly simplistic or at worst even arbitrary, with individuals or groups overlapping, fitting into multiple “boxes” or fluidly moving from one to the other. The paper argues, however, that positioning in a basic roster is important as it helps us understand the commonalities and differences between different “activisms”. The paper attempts to answer the following questions: first, how do the different players understand their role vis a vis the refugees on one hand and the current European migration and border regime on the other?; second, what are the typical actions and where are the lines for cooperation between the different agents?; and third and most importantly, are the differences irreconcilable or can they be overcome on the basis of a common, shared identity?

Given its brevity, the paper does not attempt at presenting the full spectrum of cross-border activism(s), nor does it aim at offering a final definition. Rather, it aims to lay down a solid basis for further research and to offer insight into how existing social science theories might help us frame and understand the activisms emerging in the course of the current refugee crisis at the Central and South-Eastern borders of the European Union.

**Methodology**

The theoretical underpinnings of this paper are based on mainstream theories of social movements on one hand and recent critical academia on migrant activism on the other. Where theory is to be matched with empiricism, I make use of my own experiences of being involved as an activist in movements assisting refugees for the past five years. I take into consideration in particular my two short-term voluntary stays in Belgrade and Idomeni in January and March 2016, respectively. Considering that my experiences are in no way representative for the whole movement, I further rely on the online presence of activist groups, in particular in social media, as well as news articles as secondary sources. For considerations of academic honesty, I feel it is important to stress that I am aware that my position and my own experiences may have shaped the way I view the issues under scrutiny.

**Terminology and delimitations**

This section provides an overview of the terminology used as well as the potential research limitations of this paper. It shall help the reader understand certain terms the way I understand and apply them for the purposes of this particular paper. Nevertheless, this section does not attempt at providing a decisive argument or a final definition for each and every one of the terms used.

**Support en route**

This paper focuses on assistance to individuals arriving in Europe on the so-called Western Balkans route, encompassing transit through countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary. Prior to the closure of the border between Greece and Macedonia, these countries served primarily
as countries of transit. Consequently, this paper focuses specifically on the assistance to refugees *en route*, i.e., while still travelling. As will be shown below, such assistance can take many forms and shapes. In this paper, I use the term “border” and “(cross-)border” activism interchangeably. Nevertheless, I use the latter in instances where I consider it important to stress that the activity at stake aims at or consists of assisting a refugee to actually cross a border. Support activities in the countries of final destination after refugees’ arrival are left out of focus of this paper.

The paper excludes any action involving any kind of financial transfer between the refugee and the actor under scrutiny for assistance or services offered. On the contrary, it encompasses primarily actions undertaken on a non-profit basis, in good faith and with the aim of assisting refugees. The author recognizes that the realities on the ground are far more complex and that, consequently, such delimitations are arbitrary and may lead to great simplification.¹ For the purposes of finding a roster for classification, however, some level of simplification and abstraction seems necessary.

Time-wise, the scope of this paper is limited to events taking place between spring 2015 and autumn 2016. Again, such limitation is admittedly reductionist for at least two reasons. First, albeit in less significant numbers, refugees from the African continent were arriving to the coasts of Greece and Italy since the end of the 1990s, without gaining much attention from the European public. Second, even when focusing solely on the current “refugee crisis,” its beginnings can be traced back to several years earlier—i.e., the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the years 2012 or 2013 (Tinti & Tuesday, 2016, p. 243). Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on the rather short yet intense one-and-a-half-year period between 2015 and 2016, as this is the time frame in which the term “refugee crisis” emerged and started to resonate in the media and the public discourse. The majority of the activisms I am looking at emerged likewise in this period.

**Activists**

A range of different terms has been used to label individuals assisting refugees on the Western Balkan route, ranging from “flight helpers” (Gkliati, 2016), “volunteers” and “humanitarian smugglers” (Tinti & Tuesday, 2016) to “traitors” (Culik, n.d.). In order to capture the multitude of activisms, this paper interprets the term EU “activist” broadly. From a legalistic perspective, an activist can be understood anyone falling under the category of “humanitarian non-state actor”. The paper focuses on actions of private persons, regardless of whether acting individually or as part of loose groups or well-established organizations. The term “non-state” is used to exclude actions by governmental officials or state agents. Derived from international law, the term similarly excludes private actors acting on behalf of the governments or whose actions are explicitly acknowledged by a government as its own. Thus, excluded are, for example, activities of private security companies who run detention centers in

¹ For example, in the absence of coordinated state action, there can be situations where activists start taking over the role of police in order to ensure organized border crossing. Or, to the contrary, state security forces may refuse to follow the orders of their superiors and use their position to actually help refugees to cross the border.
some of the European Union Member States. The term “humanitarian” is used to exclude players who act with the aim of harming or exploiting refugees or otherwise profiting from their situation.

**Refugees**

In this paper, I prefer referring to individuals arriving in Europe on the Western Balkan route commonly as “refugees”. Admittedly, the composition of arrivals can be best classified as “mixed flows,” including “refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants” (IOM, n.d.). Nevertheless, I consider the term “refugee” better placed than that of “migrant” for the following reasons.

First and foremost, the term refugee stresses the particular vulnerability of a specific category of migrants who have suffered or are at particular risk of suffering serious human rights violations. While acknowledging that migrants and in particularly migrant workers from countries outside of the EU often find themselves at risk of exploitation, trafficking or other human rights abuses, I argue that in the context of the current “refugee crisis” the term refugee captures the protection need better than that of the term migrant.

Second, applying the term refugee recognizes that the official recognition of refugee status in bureaucratic procedures is only declaratory and not constitutive for a person’s “refugee-ness”. From the perspective of public international law, for a person to be a refugee, whether he or she has been officially recognized as such by a state is irrelevant. In other words, a person is a refugee the moment he or she fulfils the conditions anchored in international (“Refugee Convention,” 1951), EU (“EU Qualification Directive,” 2011) or domestic legal instruments for identifying refugees.

Third, the statistics about the composition of arrivals and average recognition rates lead to the assumption that an important proportion of those arriving on the Western Balkan route last year were genuine refugees and will be recognized as such in the upcoming months or— depending on the length of the procedure—years. In 2015, Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans and Eritreans were the top four nationalities arriving to Europe, together representing 84% of the total Mediterranean arrivals (“Global Trends: Force Displacement,” 2015). All of these are either countries at war, characterized by generalized violence and human rights violations or, in the case of the latter, dictatorships.

Last but not least, from the perspective of persons working with individuals entering Europe, a clear distinction between refugees and migrants proves not only impossible but also redundant in practice but also redundant. When facing a person presenting himself or herself as a refugee, an activist will only hardly have the possibility, means, time or will to verify his/her claim. Moreover, he or she will also lack much of a reason to do so. Rather, the environment of an emergency situation will require the activist to assume the person he or she is facing is a refugee or, at the very least, at the moment of encounter in genuine need of assistance and support. The activist will thus typically act as if the person was a refugee.
As has been shown above, a range of practical, legal, statistical as well as moral arguments speaks in favor of referring to individuals arriving on the Western Balkan route to Europe as refugees. Moreover, I refuse to use the adjective “illegal” in relation to individuals and I also do not further categorize the nature of the entry or the stay of refugees. Any such classification is not only highly problematic from an ethical point of view.

**European border regime**

I use the term “European border regime” to describe the sets of rules, policies and practices on the level of the European Union as well as individual member states, which aim at controlling, regulating and managing the entry and, to some extent, the movement of third country nationals within the EU.

Adopting a critical approach towards such a regime of control, I choose to use the term “refugee crisis” in quotation marks. While the language of crisis has been instrumentalized in order to categorize the period under scrutiny, I find it important to stress that in my view it is not the refugees who are a “problem” to be “solved” or “managed.” Instead, I understand the current crisis rather as a crisis of bad policies, or a lack of coherent policies or a crisis of empathy in the EU (Gunesch et al, 2016).

**Literature review**

Migration studies have, themselves established as a self-standing academic discipline in the past couple of decades, followed by the field’s further diversification into subfields focusing on specific questions of citizenship, mobility, cosmopolitanism or multiculturalism and many others (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2013). Particularly the question of securitization and criminalization of migration has received significant academic attention in the past couple of decades. Likewise, a great deal has been written on the resistance against “immigration” policies, accompanied by the emergence and development of a refugee and migrants’ rights movement, including migrant activism or the European No Borders movement.

Meanwhile, despite the fact that the current “refugee crisis” has been unfolding for at least two years today, the majority of the literature seems to continue focusing on activities for, with and by refugees or migrants already *sur place*. Assistance to and actions taken by the people *on the move* remain uncovered in mainstream academia, with the gap slowly starting to close only in the last year (Stierl, 2016). In the following, I present a brief overview of selected theories of social movements and migration studies, which might pave the way when trying to academically analyze and categorize the phenomenon of today’s border activism. Given the brevity of the paper, I do not attempt to cover the entirety of the vast field of migration or social movement studies.

**Selected theories of social movements**

We may want to conceptualize border activism as a new, emerging social movement *per se* or likewise simply as a new layer of already existing struggles. In both cases, well-established theories of social movements might be useful when trying to extract elements which may help us understand what border activism is, what
its individual components are and what its relationship with other kinds of movements or activisms and state structures might be.

McAdam defines social movements as “those organized efforts, on the part of excluded groups, to promote or resist changes in the structure of society that involve recourse to non-institutional forms of political participation” (McAdam, 1999). According to Blumer (1939), social movements can be viewed as “collective enterprises to establish a new order of life. They have their inception in the condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme or system of living.” Kornhauser (2008) claims that “[m]ass movements mobilize people who are alienated from the going system, who do not believe in the legitimacy of the established order, and who therefore are ready to engage in efforts to destroy it.”

Gerlach and Hine (1970) identify five factors which “must be present and interacting before a collectivity of whatever size becomes a true movement.” These are: (1) a segmented organization composed of individual units; (2) face-to-face recruitment; (3) personal commitment separating the activist from the established order; (4) an ideology codifying the movement’s values and goals and (5) an existing or perceived opposition (Gerlach and Hine, 1970).

And finally, following Tarrow (1994), social movements are “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow, 1994, p. 2). The basis of all movements is then “contentious collective action, …which takes many forms—brief or sustained, institutionalized or disruptive, humdrum or dramatic. Most of it occurs within institutions on the part of constituted groups who act in the name of goals that would hardly raise an eyebrow. It becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others” (Tarrow, 1994, p. 2).

Selected theories of migrant activism, autonomy of migration and mobile commons
Border activism can be placed at the intersections of refugee rights, migrant activism, no-border, global justice and possibly other movements. It seems hard to trace the exact origins of the use of term “border activism.” However, it appears that the term can be linked to critical scholarship centered around the International E-Journal for Critical Geographies and, at latest, a 2010 meeting of the Association for Borderlands Studies conference (Kramsch, 2010). It is in particular Nick Gill (n.d.) who uses the term consistently, often times in plural as “activisms,” and who also applied it most recently to the context of the current refugee crisis. The term “border activism,” however, appears to be condemned to certain circles, labelling themselves “critical,” yet has not really entered mainstream academia. Alas, this discrepancy could also be due to the fact that most of the scholars who actually use the term appear to understand it as somewhat self-explanatory without the need to ever clarify it in the first place.
The literature on migrant activism distinguishes between, among others, “integrationist approaches” of migrant support groups and an “autonomy of migration” approach. The integrationist approaches are grounded in critical citizenship studies. With their focus on citizenship as main analytical category, they bear less significance for the analysis of the current refugee crisis, let alone the study of refugees on the move.

On the contrary, the scholarship on “autonomy of migration” might be a potentially good starting point for considerations of who can be an activist. It places in its focus the “subjective practices, the desires, the expectations, and the behaviors of migrants themselves” (Mezzadra, 2012). It is in particular the “mobile commons” approach which can be particularly fruitful when examining the current “refugee crisis”. It precisely takes as its starting point migrants on the move, or “transmigrants” (Papadopoulous & Tsianos, 2013). Papadopoulous and Tsianos (2013, pp. 192-93) identify several dimensions of mobile commons, including: the knowledge of mobility, the infrastructure of connectivity, multiplicity of informal economies, forms of transnational communities of justice and politics of care. According to them, care is the most important aspect of mobile commons and may include “mutual cooperation, friendships, favors that you never return, affective support, care of other people’s relatives and children, transnational relations of care, the gift economy between mobile people” (Papadopoulous & Tsianos, 2013, p. 192).

Furthermore, insights from literature on “border interventions” and immigrant protest might be useful when considering the different types and strategies of border activisms. Tyler and Marciniak look at immigrant protest and stress the resistance against the regime of control in them. They define as immigrant protest “acts’ against the exclusionary technologies of citizenship which aim to make visible the violence of citizenship as regimes of control” (Tyler & Marciniak, 2013).

The actors’ position towards the regimes of control seems a valuable point of observation as well. While the integrationist approaches bear less overall significance with regard to the current “refugee crisis,” their critique might prove valuable when assessing current border activism. Typically, it has been argued that the integrationist approaches, while to some extent resisting the current border regime, risk “remain[ing] captured within the existing legal frameworks” (Tyler & Marciniak, 2013, p. 148).

**Analyzing border activism(s)**

Following on the theoretical basis delineated above, I argue that (cross-)border activism is an emerging social movement which is distinct from migrant activism given the specific context within which it is taking place. The border activism context is crucially shaped by two factors: First, the fact that persons with particular protection needs find themselves still *en route* to a place they consider a safe heaven. Second, it is shaped by the amplitude and duration of arrivals, which further exacerbate or mediate the perception of the situation as an “emergency”.

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(Cross-)Border Activism on the Western Balkans Route to Europe: In Search of a Definition

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Given the limitations of this paper, I further focus on two aspects of border activism which might be well analyzed with the help of existing theories and which, given their relevance for the possible development of a new movement, might be worth researching further: (1) actors who can and do label themselves activists and the (2) the clusters of activities. Below, I show how the nature and/or the perception of the situation as an “emergency” creates asymmetries which first, translate into distinctions between “helpers” and “those to be helped” and second, crucially influence the scope of possible action for all actors involved. This in turn increases the demand for one-dimensional humanitarian aid to the detriment of other types of intervention, including decisive, common political action.

**Activists: volunteers, aid workers. And refugees?**

When defining activists as humanitarian non-state actors, this paper deliberately opted for a rather broad and vague category. While a typical idea of an activist is that of an independent volunteer or humanitarian worker, the question poses whether refugees can and should be considered as part of this category, as well.

From the autonomy of migration approach, one could argue that already the act of migration as such, i.e., the arrival to Europe, can be considered a form of activism. Studies show that majority of the refugees did not wish to come to Europe in the first place, yet decided to do so as a response to the prevailing conditions in the refugee camps and urban areas in countries like Lebanon, Jordan or Turkey (Dearden, 2016). Besides, from a migrant activism point of view, them being on the move can be understood if not as a form of activism, then possibly as a form of protest or resistance. By being on the move, refugees expose and render visible the regimes of control to which they are confined (Conlon & Gill, 2015).

Moreover, the view that refugees are to be understood as activists in the current refugee crisis can be supported when considering the mobile commons approach and its care and knowledge aspects, as stressed by Papado-poulos and Tsianos. It has been widely evidenced that, for example, knowledge sharing in particular via social media and the possession of smart phones played a key role in navigating refugees on their journey. In this regard, it might be worth considering the perspective of the refugees themselves. There is at present not enough research to sufficiently evaluate whether refugees view themselves as activists when migrating or not. While a view on refugees only caring for and supporting each other might be too romanticizing or generalizing, the range of instances of care and mutual support one could witness cannot be neglected either. The reality is that some refugees always support others, disrupting narratives of passivity and victimhood.

Meanwhile, activist networks focusing on direct humanitarian aid might argue that a clear division between the “helpers” and “those to be helped” is necessary in order to ensure the aid worker’s complete impartiality and thus legitimacy. Aid workers or volunteers might thus sometimes rather view refugees as clients, as passive recipients of aid, instead of seeing them as either partners in a common struggle or fellow activists fighting their own struggle.
At the same time, the asymmetry between the two groups is inherent, as the refugee-activist position towards the state he or she aims to transit is without doubt more vulnerable than that of a non-refugee activist. And yet, previous research shows that the asymmetries can be to some extent overcome by the practice of solidarity on the part of non-refugee activists. For example, when in Calais non-refugee activists started camping alongside the refugees, they became an irregular element in the eyes of the state, comparable with that of the migrant (Rigby & Schlembach, 2013).

It can be concluded that refugees can be understood as activists alongside volunteers and humanitarian aid workers in the current refugee-crisis. While the inherent asymmetries can be to some extent overcome, both activist groups might be willing to take upon themselves different levels of risk, depending on their position toward each other and toward the state on whose territory they operate.

**Types of activities: between witnessing, assisting and disrupting**

The types of activities that can be viewed as border activism vary widely. Departing from the literature on migrant activism and social movements, this paper argues that most of the activities can be generally situated on the scale between witnessing, assisting and disrupting.

Under witnessing I mean instances where activists collect and eventually pass over testimonies of what they saw “at the borders”. The forwarding of information can take many forms, be it through photographs, personal stories, newspaper interviews or artistic performances. Although this role might seem rather passive, it can prove important in collecting shared knowledge and possibly a shared narrative about the “refugee crisis”.

In the present “refugee crisis,” social media has played a crucial role in creating and spreading such knowledge. And while migrant narratives have been observed as a practice of resistance for some time, it is precisely social media that opened new spaces for participation for refugee activists as well (Caraccioli & Wright, 2015). The flip side of the coin is that it has also opened up space for large-scale privacy violations and potential state surveillance of activists and refugees by state authorities. Moreover, the general moral implications of publishing or not publishing pictures of refugee children surviving in undignified conditions would definitely deserve more attention and debate from both academia and the activists themselves.

Under assisting activism, I understand instances of direct support to the refugees, be it through the provision of medical aid, information, food, clothing, hygienic items, legal advice, train tickets, a ride, a place to sleep, or any other kind of support. One particular aspect of assistance which could be an interesting object of further study is activist-organized management of large groups of people, so-called crowd management. For example, when the crisis was at its peak in autumn 2015, Czech volunteers loosely organized in a group called “Czech Team” took charge of ensuring an organized transfer of refugees across the border between Serbia and Croatia. Typically, these activists claimed they had the impression of being forced to replace the police and other state organs, which proved non-functional in the given situation (“Europe Please Act,” n.d.). At the same time, they also believed
that the crowd management was necessary in order to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable. From an academic perspective, the issue is intriguing. We are facing a paradoxical situation in which activists by their very presence question state capacity to effectively regulate border crossing and at the same time, in instances where the state-organized control of the borders fails, they themselves assume the role of regulatory agents.

In contrast, with disruptive activism I refer to instances where activists challenge dominant discourses, practices or regulations. A typical form of disruptive activism would be protest. However, I argue that disruptive activism can also mean discourses as such, in particular in instances where they challenge the dominant narratives which homogenize refugees or present them as a danger. Meanwhile, the space for collective disruptive activism is crucially shaped by the asymmetries mentioned above. In situations where the refugee’s primary concern is to move further ahead or where the situation escalates into a wide-spread humanitarian crisis—as was the case in autumn 2015—the space for collective action involving refugee and non-refugee activists will be drastically reduced to the provision of humanitarian aid. On the contrary, the space for the political re-emerges mainly at times when the refugee decides to discontinue the journey or is forced to do so by the policies of the transit state.

Moreover, one should not neglect other, more radical forms of action going beyond mere protest. These could be, for example, the appropriation of technologies enabling refugees to cross the border irregularly (Gill et al, 2014) or non-refugee activist aid to refugees in irregular border crossing (Landry, 2016) or even material destruction of border fences (“Artworks, First Fall,” n.d.). All these acts can be understood as activities aiming at disrupting state control, and in my understanding, constitute a potential form of border activism.

To conclude, this section has shown that border activism can take a variety of shapes. In the final section, I will show that the classification of the activities on the scale between witnessing-assisting-disrupting is less conditioned and influenced by the activist’s position vis a vis the state and more by his or her understanding of the European border regime.

Understanding of the European border regime

The last section of this paper shall analyze whether border activism is codified around a clear set of values and goals, identified by Gerlach and Hine (1970) as one of the characteristics of a movement. Following Blumer (1939), I look into whether border activists aim at establishing a “new order of life.” Considering Kornhauser (2008), I look into border activists’ view on the legitimacy of the established order, in this case the European border regime, and try to estimate whether they are “ready to engage in efforts to destroy it.”

In migrant activism, activist organizations were for a long time typically considered a counterweight to the state, with the human rights agenda and discourse being instrumental for their cause (Briones, 2011). Similarly, in the context of the current refugee crisis, activists, including refugee activists, often resorted to the language of rights and international obligations in order to render legitimacy to their actions.
Moreover, a critical approach towards the “European” management of the “refugee crisis” was possibly one of the preconditions and the triggers in the non-refugee activists’ decision on whether to go to offer assistance in the Balkans. Admittedly, the willingness to come to the Balkans during one’s holiday break must imply a somewhat more critical approach toward the European border regime. However, the readiness to engage in long-term political activism aiming at the disruption of the regime seems to vary greatly among the different activist groups.

It is only natural that in the context of the highest emergencies of summer and fall 2015, most of the activists focused on providing direct humanitarian aid to persons in immediate need. As the demand for direct assistance was high, there was at the same time in practice only very limited space left to think about any “new order of life.” Meanwhile, a range of non-refugee activists still understand their role as possibly merely humanitarian workers. The reason they come to volunteer is precisely that they feel alienated from the present system, or at the very least the fear-mongering in their home societies (“Europe Please Act,” n.d.). And yet, in the long-term, they would also be ready to leave regulation of the openness or closeness of borders completely up to politicians.

In contrast, certain humanitarian organizations did manage to adopt a more principled and clearly political stance. For example, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have shown several times that they have the willingness and possibly also the capacity to influence political decision makers. Following the adoption of the EU-Turkey deal, MSF refused to accept further funding from the EU, hereby clearly challenging EU policies and the European border regime. In this regard, the MSF illustrate that established organizations can overstep their role as mere “humanitarian” agencies and become (disruptive) activists (Scott-Smith, 2016).

To conclude, can we thus say that both the witnessing-assisting and the disrupting type of activism can simply co-exist one next to the other? Following Tarrow’s understanding, one could argue that what is important is not the differences between the different kinds of activisms but rather the existence of sustained interaction between the different activist groups and a common understanding of each other as allies. In contrast to Tarrow, I argue that while the two named activisms could easily co-exist in the beginning of the crisis, developing a common understanding of and position towards the European border regime will be decisive for the movement’s development in the future.

**Conclusion**

This paper has shown that (cross-)border activism is a potential, new, emerging social movement which can be understood in close relation to migrant activism, global justice or possibly other movements. Border activism is, however, distinct from previous movements, due to the nature of the situation to which it reacts and the context in which it takes place.

The border activism context is crucially shaped by two factors. First are the asymmetries between “helpers” and “those to be helped” resulting from the exigencies of an immediate emergency situation. These are structurally
different than situations of long-term systemic disadvantage, discrimination or exploitation which are the typical trigger factors for classical migrant rights groups. Second, border activism has thus far been characterized by rather short-term activities, which arise from the humanitarian character of the situation and are often reduced to acts of direct, humanitarian aid to persons en route. Despite these limitations, refugees can legitimately be regarded as possible border activists, bearing in mind their particular vulnerability and asymmetrical position vis a vis other, non-refugee activists.

Furthermore, the notion of border activism encompasses a variety of actions which can be typically classified on the scale between witnessing-assisting-disrupting. The ability and willingness of different actors to engage in different types of activisms derives from their position vis a vis the state and the other volunteers on one hand, and their understanding of the European border regime on the other.

Ultimately, the ability of the movement to establish itself in the long term will depend upon its ability to shape a common understanding of the European border regime and to define the border activist position within and towards it.

**Bibliography**


INTERFAITH HELP JEWISH VOLUNTEERS AND HELPERS DURING THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN BUDAPEST*

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In the summer of 2015 the refugee crisis intensified and reached its peak in Hungary. As it was preceded by a harsh anti-refugee campaign sponsored and created by the government, this issue already divided the population. Because the government only gave a minimal amount of support to arrivals, many Hungarians and non-Hungarians residing (or visiting) Hungary volunteered to help in different ways to accommodate their needs, while others were inciting against “economic immigrants”. This paper focuses on Jewish volunteers whose help can be subsequently defined as interfaith or intercultural action. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the general Islamophobic/anti-Semitic atmosphere in Europe often overshadows Jewish-Muslim relations; thus, Jews helping (mostly) Muslims—as was the case during that summer—caught my attention.

Keywords: refugee crisis, interfaith, Jewish, philanthropy

Introduction

In the summer of 2015 the so-called “refugee crisis”\(^1\) intensified and reached its peak in Hungary. As it was preceded by a harsh anti-refugee campaign sponsored and created by the government\(^2\) (for a detailed review of Hungarian events, see Appendix 7.1), this question already divided the population. As the government only gave a minimal amount of support to the arriving people, many Hungarians and non-Hungarians residing (or visiting) Hungary (Szurovecz, 2015) volunteered to help in different ways to accommodate their needs, while others were inciting against the “economic immigrants”\(^3\).

Even though the scope of helping (thousands of volunteers and several organizations) cannot be perceived as extraordinary, the phenomenon itself, together with other factors in Hungary, make it unique. These factors include high xenophobic sentiment, the previously mentioned anti-immigration campaign (Thorpe, 2015) and the general context in which the aid took place (low civic participation, etc.). This phenomenon was previously analysed at length by TÁRKI (Simonovits et al., 2016). However, this paper sheds light on a specific aspect: the

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\(^1\) I do not prefer this term. However, it was widely used in public discourse. The term has been highly criticized (Roth, 2015).
\(^2\) The first anti-immigrant speech took place after the Charlie Hebdo terrorist act (“A kimaxolt morális,” 2015)
\(^3\) This term is frequently used by Prime Minister Viktor Orban in his speeches. (For example: “Orbán: Gazdasági bevándorlóknak,” 2015; “Orbán Viktor: A bevándorlók nem csak,” 2015; Ablonczy, 2015)
help of Jewish volunteers, which can be subsequently defined as interfaith or intercultural action. As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the general Islamophobic/anti-Semitic atmosphere in Europe often overshadows Jewish-Muslim relations, Jews helping (mostly) Muslims—as was the case that summer—caught my attention.

First, I will summarize the international background of Jews helping or supporting refugees. This will be followed by the Hungarian Jewish communities’ actions. Then I will elaborate on my research and present my findings.

Examples of interfaith help

Jewish-Muslim relations are heavily burdened, and this conflict goes back centuries. This paper aims at presenting some positive examples of Jews helping (mostly) Muslim refugees, despite this historical background.

One initiative in the US—which did not remain invisible—saw more than 1250 rabbis sign a letter in support of welcoming refugees after Donald Trump called for banning Muslims from entering the country and some governors were preparing to close their states’ borders to refugees. The letter referred to times both when the US offered refuge for Jewish refugees fleeing persecution (at the beginning of the 20th century) and when they the USA did not (in 1939), which is cited as “a stain on the history of our country – a tragic decision made in a political climate of deep fear, suspicion and antisemitism” (“1000+ Rabbis sign,” 2015). Alongside the Holocaust motive was a Biblical quote: “You shall not wrong or oppress a stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” (Exodus 22:20-23). Both motivations appear in my interviews.

Another example from the international sphere is the help of an Israeli NGO, IsraAID, a non-profit and non-governmental organization. To fulfill its goal the organization “has been helping people all over the world overcome extreme crises and has provided millions with the vital support needed to move from destruction to reconstruction, and eventually, to sustainable living.” IsraAID operates in 31 countries struck by disasters or catastrophes, but its presence in the refugee crisis is regarded as a “unique challenge” as help is provided to people coming from countries with which Israel is at war (like Syria and Iraq) or have hostile relations (like Pakistan) (Gavin, 2015). In an interview one of the members found this argument irrelevant: “You are meeting fellow human beings,” she said. “You see agony and pain, you see a need, then what does it matter where the person is from?” (Gavin, 2015) Humanitarian aid is the third motive appearing in my interviews.

A more recent motivation also appears: the ADL and the Creative Action Network opened an exhibition combined with a donation drive where artists from all over the world tell their stories. The products can be bought and the money will be used to help refugees (“ADL and Artists,” 2015). The motto of this initiative—as it was

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4 The US President quoted the HIAS initiative twice in his speech and eventually the refugee restrictions were not implemented.
5 See: [http://www.israaid.co.il/](http://www.israaid.co.il/)
launched around Pesach, which is a holiday where Jews tell the story of Exodus, i.e., how Jews escaped Egypt—is “we were strangers too,” referring to biblical times (at least according to the description).

There were other smaller initiatives as well, such as the Montreal Jewish and Muslim community uniting to help Syrian refugees, some instances in England, Sholem Aleikum’s initiative of Viennese Jews, the North Charleston school’s co-managed project with JDC and Centropa, Mark Zuckerberg’s post on Facebook and Salaam-Shalom in Germany (Arnold, 2015; Herwood, 2015; “Shalom Alaikum,” 2015; Ludwid, 2015; “Zuckerberg, in Facebook post,” 2015; “Salaam-Schalom Initiative,” 2015).

Research

In this chapter I summarize the results of my research, starting with the description of the methodology, followed by the answers of my interviewees organized along three main motives which were touched upon in the first section.

Methodology

The interviewees were found using the snowball method. I asked many acquaintances if they knew people of Jewish origin (or identity) who helped during the refugee crisis, and then by using maximum variation sampling (Patton, 2002) I selected a small group of people from the potential interviewees who differed by age, gender and religious/ethnic background (based on what I knew about them). The concept of being Jewish is debated. In this research project, the emphasis fell on their self-identification: those who considered themselves Jewish were included into the sample. The research was based in Budapest because most of the Hungarian Jewry (hence the Jewish organizations) is based in Budapest (Kovács, 2002). As the main goal was to explore the widest array of ways and various motivations for helping, I did not require a representative sample. I also decided to use some of the published articles on Jewish volunteers to widen the scope.

The length of the interviews ranged between 25 and 59 minutes and they were semi-structured (with guiding questions). The interview started off with an introduction where the interviewee presented him or herself by talking about family background and its Jewish relations, the profession of the parents and him or herself. The second part delved into the refugee crisis: what exactly they did, how often and where, what their main motivation was, what they think about the responsibility of Jewish organizations (mainly the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities, from now on: MAZSIHISZ, and the Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation, from now on: EMIH) and how they perceive their actions. As a closing question, I asked them how they think the refugee crisis should be solved.

A recent research project claimed women are easier to be found among volunteers (Kende, 2015).
One of the biggest limitations of qualitative research is non-generalizability. However, as this study does not aim at giving an overview of the distribution of the answers, but rather highlights different motives, this methodology seems suitable. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to construct a representative sample, as the population is unknown (i.e., we do not know how many Jews with what kind of socio-demographic characteristics were helping during the refugee crisis).

**General overview of the interviewees**

As seen in the table (see Annex 7.2), the interviewees come from different backgrounds and experience their Jewish identity in different ways. In most cases assimilated family background means either the interviewee found out (or realized) about his or her Jewishness later, or that it was simply not a topic at home, both of which are typical of a certain group of today’s Hungarian Jewry (Erős et al., 1985). Jewishness is an important part of the present day identities of every interviewee. In some cases, this meant they were (or still are) very active in Jewish (youth) organizations, or simply are surrounded by Jews and Jewish values, while some of them practice the Jewish religion.

The scope of helping and volunteering also differed: there were some who only helped once or twice, while some volunteered from five to ten times and again some spent most of their time at train stations (or where they were needed). (For a detailed overview see Appendix 7.2.) Almost all interviewees went beyond direct social action and made (or organized) donations.

**Results**

The most important findings of the analysis of my interviewees’ answers are below, supplemented by findings from different reports and other interviews (which are available online) with volunteers who are openly Jewish.

**How it all started**

Following the structure of TÁRKI research, I start with the crucial moment: what was the first trigger? There were two factors influencing this. Either someone had to live in those areas where the presence of refugees escalated, and/or the person had to read the news to be informed about the crisis. From my interviews, I gathered that seeing refugees live or on the news had the same effect—at first.

I rather follow public events and politics and it was pouring into us. And I saw on forums that people started to move and do something. And I saw—surely there were other smaller groups—but what was really visible was Migration Aid and BK, Let’s Help Refugees and for me Let’s Help Refugees came in handy, I saw many acquaintances there that do something and then some. There were possi-

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7 Groups helping refugees, initially organized via Facebook.
ilities to send donations, which is the most comfortable way for the couch revolutionary, like myself (laughing), but there was a moment in August when I felt that I have to do more. (Interviewee 5)

My motivation was that every disadvantaged person who is in need can build a better life for themselves with my help, I support them and I try to help if it doesn’t hinder me. My inner feeling is that if I can help to stop the suffering of suffering people, I do it. And when I was at Köztársaság\textsuperscript{8} square, I saw that there is need. Actually, to be honest, the situation wasn’t that harsh, when one went down to Keleti subway, one could be shocked or surprised. Especially as a pediatrician, the children’s status and condition was that which sensitized me. And when I saw them, I decided to do this in an organized manner. To secure medical care especially for children but for everybody who is in need, which can help in their miserable situation. (Interviewee 4)

The latter quote includes something that was also mentioned in TÁRKI’s report: a special empathy towards a specific group of people, in this case children. Here is another example:

Yes. I thought about women and children. Even with women I had [fear] but—it was stronger that I have to help. And I helped in a focused way. (Interviewee 11)

One aspect of fear is the reaction towards something new as implied in the word “xenophobia”. During the refugee crisis it intensified partially because of successful fear-mongering by the government (see above and/or Appendix 7.3). Being afraid or reluctant at first was observed among some of the interviewees. The general Jewish-Muslim atmosphere prevailing in Europe, and in the world in general, certainly strengthens the already uneasy relations between the two groups. As Slomó Köves\textsuperscript{9} said, within the religious communities known by him, the urge of helping is combined with a huge amount of fear (Kránicz, 2015). This is what Interviewee 11 (a religious female) struggled with as well (see the quote above). However, she added: “I would definitely not take any of them into the flat.” Another quote:

I got slowly engaged because I was afraid of them and I felt a distance from the situation but there was the point when you couldn’t walk on the streets of Budapest without feeling you were in Egypt or I don’t know where, some Middle Eastern city, in the high heat, the smells were really harsh and everything was a bit Middle Eastern. And I got linked very slowly. I had this feeling in me: “poor them, how bad it can be for them.” I didn’t actually follow the news, I didn’t pay attention to what’s going on with them. I didn’t read the news. I was like I have a lot of things, this is what’s going on, I’m really sorry but I have a lot of things to do. And then in a circle of friends it came up that they adopted a family for a night. And they were talking about this, it got to me. (Interviewee 3)

\textsuperscript{8} The square used to be called Köztársaság tér (Republic Square) but the government changed it to Pope John Paul II Square. During the refugee crisis its nick name was Afghan Square because several refugees stayed there.

\textsuperscript{9} The founder and president of EMIH.
Interviewee 7 was not only fearful at the beginning, and only a bit later did her opinion turn around. Some of the quotes above also reveal the importance of friends: they can be a pressure point.

Another important factor which was found in the TÁRKI research (Simonovits et al., 2016) as well is the existence of previous volunteering experience. Interviewee 8 had volunteered once in her life, but because it was with immigrant children and it was an amazing experience, it helped her in this situation. Many of my interviewees were active members of the Jewish community (whether as a member of a youth organizations or a regular camper and later counsellor in a Jewish international summer camp, etc.) and as Kovács and Forrás-Bíró (2011) highlighted, most of the organizations and events are organized with the help of volunteers, easily leading to another volunteer work. Another explanation for this is that one of the core values of Judaism is philanthropy and these Jewish organizations are mostly leftist communities where these values are taught.

So we had this frustration from our organization’s side that it doesn’t do anything and obviously our whole Jewish education, which is Szarvas10 for us and which is Jewish school for others, donations and helping others played always an important role in it and we indeed had a feeling that up to now, this kind of time didn’t test to what extent we can help those who are in need. (Interviewee 1)

Motivations

Nagy (2013) states several arguments concerning why states should help refugees. Even though they are mostly about the macro level, some of them can be transferred to the micro world. I divided the motives into three main categories which partially overlap with TÁRKI’s findings. The first and most common motive found is humanitarian aid. Coinciding with universal egalitarian help in Nagy’s writing, it is based on sharing a common trait: being human. The second is closely related but a bit more specific to background: it is the understanding of the others’ situation thanks to sharing a common fate. In the case of Jews this can be related to the Holocaust as well as to a general feeling/experience of being persecuted. In TÁRKI’s finding it was mostly about Muslims who could identify with the Arab/Muslim refugees—because of the common language, background, etc. This aspect corresponds to group identity in Nagy’s reasoning. Instead of political activism, which was the third category in TÁRKI’s research, I uncovered Jewish values and beliefs. Jewish philanthropy is a well-known concept and is part of many traditions. One of these is the oft-mentioned: tikkun olam. This expression refers to repairing the world and one way to understand it is to offer a donation, but it can also be done by volunteering. The other oft-mentioned base for Jews was a biblical quote which also became a frequently used tool in the media as well as on social media11 to encourage Jews to stand up for refugees (Greenblat, 2015). These coincide with what Nagy refers to as religious arguments. All these categories can overlap, of course. Here I provide a detailed overview of all three.

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10 Szarvas is city where the international Jewish summer camp takes place every year. According to estimates, 8,000 Jewish children and adults from Hungary took part at least once in his or her life in this camp as a participant. (Sasha Friedman, JCC)

11 For example: http://www.hias.org/passover2016
Humanitarian Aid

Helping out of empathy is probably the most encompassing reason of all. Voluntary help cannot be offered without this, but it might not be the only reason. Here I chose those quotes in which the interviewee did not connect humanitarian help with his or her Jewish values, but in which he/she only wanted to give the refugees some of their dignity back.

Simply it was bad to see that the poor ones coming, they don’t know where they are, they don’t know where to go, without any info, without translation and an interpreter going through the whole country. (Interviewee 10)

Children… They have no idea what will happen tomorrow… This is what hurt me the most. (Interviewee 7)

Tikkun olam, tzedakah and beyond

As mentioned above, several Jewish values can be associated with helping. Philanthropy is considered a core value of Judaism, which can be understood through tikkun olam, or the reparation of the world. Since it coincides with the previous motivation, here I emphasize those answers where the interviewee explicitly identified their motive with a Jewish value. The more tangible understanding of philanthropy is donation itself, or tzedakah:

Jews—according to the Halacha— are obliged to give ten percent of their (net) income to the poor (“Tzedaka,” n.d.). This overwrites all the other commandments. Interviewee 11 told me that when she donated, she directed her money to the crisis. On a more abstract level, here are some explanations:

There is an Orthodox understanding [of tikkun olam] to make the world better, and it has another understanding which is much closer to me which doesn’t only say that Jews are obliged to help Jews but it is their task to make the whole world better and mostly this [was my motivation]. (Interviewee 1)

I helped and I learned and it seems logical and I believe in it that we don’t do only a concrete thing when we do something but it means something more in a bigger sphere. (Interviewee 11)

Depending on the interpretation, this motivation can be partially identified with a broader understanding of the concept reciprocity, which is one of the reasons discussed in Nagy’s article (2013). Reciprocity is when we help in the hope of being treated the same way later (not necessarily by the people we helped):

To create a minimal level of comfort for them… To me what counts the most is if when someone talks to me and calms me down, that I understand something, so I tried to focus on communication.

12 Jewish Law
13 “Tzedakah and acts of kindness are the equivalent of all the mitzvot of the Torah” Jerusalem Talmud, Pe’ah 1:1.
So for them to see that I’m here, an eighteen year-old girl, a random blondie and I welcome them and I am happy to talk to them. I just wanted to show that I am not here to feel pity but to help and to manage. I didn’t pity them, I was just there for them because it would make me feel good as well in a similar situation if one of them was there. (Interviewee 6)

Remaining with reciprocity, another oft-cited refugee-welcoming biblical quote (Greenblat, 2015) is related to Jews having been refugees in the past: “You shall not wrong or oppress a stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” (Exodus 22:20-23) As this quote is not only connected to the Judaist tradition but also to the Christian, Pope Francis quotes it when he openly and repeatedly welcomes refugees (“Message of his Holiness,” 2016). This quote can be used as a commandment, creating the basis for a Jewish value. Further, it can be regarded a trigger for empathy.

More sources can be found in Judaist tradition for helping the other, such as “The laws of priority in giving refer solely to communal monies, whereas individual donations can be given to anyone we deem to be in need” (Responsa of Rav Moshe Feinstein, Yoreh Deah 1:144) or “Thus said the LORD: Do what is just and right; rescue from the defrauder one who is robbed; do not wrong the stranger, the orphan and the widow; commit no lawless act, and do not shed the blood of the innocent in this place” (Jeremiah 22:3). However, these were not referred to by anyone.

Holocaust, community of fate — “We, Jews, cannot turn our heads away”

When the interviewees said something along the lines “as Jews” I could not always decide what they meant and thus I asked some clarifying questions (or the interviewees would elaborate on it by themselves). One of the meanings was related to having a common fate: being persecuted. This argument is called historical identification in Nagy’s reasoning. Even though Jews have not been the most privileged ethnic group for centuries (e.g., Wistrich, 1994), the concept of having a common fate can refer to both ancient/biblical times and to more recent persecution, namely the Holocaust. Since the first was analysed above, here I will focus on the more recent.

There has been a debate worldwide over whether the Holocaust can be compared to other tragedies (e.g., Moses, 2005) or whether it is a unique phenomenon (Bauman, 1991). This issue came up during the refugee crisis in both the international (e.g., Zeitz, 2015) and the Hungarian context (see below). The reason for this comparison was not only the fact that Jews became refugees during and after the WW II, with many similarities in their situations: many specific instances from the Hungarian context reminded people of those times. One of them was when the Hungarian train company, owned by the state, closed the doors of the wagons on the refugees (Medvegy, 2015). Another was when refugees were deceived: they thought they would be able to go West by train when Keleti train station (Szurovecz, 2015) was opened, but instead they were taken by bus to refugee camps (Nagy, 2015). The last example did not place in Hungary but rather close by, when the Czech authorities started to write numbers on the refugees’ arms (“Számot írnak,” 2015).
The attempt to compare was addressed by a statement from the MAZSIHISZ and the EMIH (separately) where they expressed their sorrow and added: “at the same time the Jewish religious communities find it groundless and refuse the comparison of the Holocaust and the present day Hungarian situation. Comparison with the Holocaust is a grave irresponsibility and we believe it is a kind of relativization of the Holocaust” (“EMIH és MAZSIHISZ,” 2015). As the Holocaust plays an important factor in the Hungarian Jewish community (Kovács, 2002, p. 144) and because there was only one instance where this statement was clearly refuted (by Ádám Schönberger, the director of MAROM\textsuperscript{14}) (Schönberger, 2015), I asked my interviewees what they thought about these statements. It may be important to add that MAZSIHISZ and EMIH are the two (out of the three) federations which officially represent the Hungarian Jewish communities (based on religious understandings of Jewishness\textsuperscript{15}) and their role is ambiguous (Rubin, 2016). However, most of them agreed to refute comparisons. For example: “The Holocaust and this refugee crisis cannot be mentioned on the same page because they don’t do systematic genocide, I agree with this.” (Interviewee 8) But the evaluation of the Jewish community’s (and federations’) presence in the crisis was rather diverse. I will come back to this later.

The motives triggered by common fate were rather frequent, which can be explained by the strong role of the Holocaust in Hungarian Jewish identity (Kovács, 2002, p. 144). In his interview Róbert Békési tells us how the lives of these humans got to him because his family experienced horrible events as well (Halmos, 2015). Zsuzsa Fritz, the executive director of the Bálint House (Jewish Community Centre), wrote in her article: “We are all newcomers in a way. Our parents, grandparents were usually fleeing from something bad in the hope of a better life” (Fritz, 2015). Finally, some examples from my interviews:

If the last couple of years was good for something, it was the motivation of a couple of people and mine as well. The other thing is more historical as well, that the religious or Jewish community was never welcome and now there is a rather big community which is not accepted so there is a similarity… And this has to be dealt with. (Interviewee 2)

We Jews cannot turn our heads away. I felt it was so symbolic. The family also asked why I help. I felt that if we turn our heads away now, then we do the same as the majority did at that time and now we are the majority and how lucky we are that we don’t have to go through this, we are not fleeing from war. I also told the children how good it is that we live in peace. (Interviewee 8)

András Léderer, who was similarly a very active volunteer in the field, pointed out two motives combined: the Holocaust as the basis of our common fate and philanthropy as a Jewish value:

\textsuperscript{14} A member of MAROM international. Their headquarters is in Auróra, which is mentioned throughout this paper and is an important part of Jewish everyday life.

\textsuperscript{15} Jews are accepted only as a religious minority in Hungary. There was an initiative to make it a national-ethnic minority but it failed due to several reasons (Miklósi, 2011).
I help because as a Jew, my most important, personal conclusion of the Holocaust is that I cannot passively watch groups who are left alone consciously by the state. Besides, we can never close our eyes because that’s how our story started as well. With a bit of exclusion, a bit of humiliation, being left on our own; we know exactly how it ended. My starting point is that so many people died only because no one offered help. Now the refugees are here, they also need help, so it is my duty to help. One of the biggest mitzvah (good deed) is when we do not get direct compensation for it (Horváth, 2015).

And finally a great example for the mixture of motives from my own interviewees:

Jewishness played a role not only because of discrimination and persecution: there were many helping stories in my family. Many people were hiding us, we got food, there were many things like this during the war which saved my grandparents and aunties. And this is definitely part of this thing but—but I hope I didn’t do it because of this. I have this hope that it would have been defined in me anyway: it’s summer time, I had a couple of days when I was free, I like people, I like to talk, human stories interest me, they are there, I can help, why not? I hope this is rather a human-human meeting and not that I come from here and to get into cultural things. I think. (Interviewee 3)

I would like to mention two other reasons for helping. As they were only marginally present in the answers, I did not place them into any of the categories above. One is to help improve the evaluation of Jews by others. This can be done by showing that we are Jews. Interviewee 9 expressed this as follows: “I went there, as a Jew I appeared there. I am a rather typical Jewish face, they saw it.” Interviewee 10 was wearing a Jewish necklace throughout the whole period (and since it was a hot summer, it was rather visible). The idea was for others to see that Jews helped in a time of crisis and maybe later the refugees will remember this and carry a positive story about them. Another aspect is that helping can be beneficial to the volunteers themselves (see for example Tabassum et al., 2016). As Interviewee 3 said: “Beside being cool to help, those who were reluctant to help, including me, we forget how much it gives us emotionally.”

Views on the responsibility\textsuperscript{16} and actions of the Hungarian Jewish community

As we can see from 7.2 and 7.3 (see Annex), most of the Jewish donation events took place in a later phase of the refugee crisis (and this was true for other religious communities too (Rab, 2015)). This was clearly criticized by some of the interviewees. One of the organizers of the MAZSIHISZ Youth Council’s donation said the following:

\textsuperscript{16} Responsibility in the sense that Jews have to help refugees and not that it is their fault.
Before, I didn’t feel what is happening and when I came to Pest\(^\text{17}\), I saw. I called one of them [from MAZSIHISZ Youth Council] to do something: anything, collection, but I think it’s very bad that the Jewish community didn’t do anything. I think there was some kind of collection before, in Auróra or I don’t know. So it wasn’t my idea how handy blankets would be but there was an example from which we took it and I thought—many of us thought to do this and as soon as possible. We had this idea on Wednesday and we did it on Friday. It was a very good experience for me because a lot of donations came from the community. This was the first time that the Jewish Community, MAZSIHISZ, did anything in relation to this and was visible. I think we showed an example to the bigger community that we all have to take a stand not politically but socially, charitably we have to stand up. I was ashamed that nothing happened up till now. (Interviewee 2)

Besides timing, another issue came up, namely the general responsibility and role of Jewish organizations in helping. Evaluations on whether MAZSIHISZ and EMIH did enough or should have done more differed. Interviewee 1 (another organizer of the MAZSIHISZ Youth Council) believed that they should have done more and they would have, but that possibilities were limited:

Other religious organizations helped more than MAZSIHISZ because it didn’t help much. But it happened not because they didn’t want to but because they have no possibilities and it’s a problem… It’s a mistake that a church which operates freely for twenty-something years in Hungary didn’t create a charitable organization because then obviously, I don’t know, resources and energy could have been allocated there. So… by the time we got to the point of participating in this aid, we were already rather frustrated that because of this MAZSIHISZ didn’t do much. There were one or two statements but otherwise they weren’t too active in this question. (Interviewee 1)

Without criticizing the organizations, Interviewee 5 emphasized the role of Jewish individuals who stood up. She also mentions the late awakening and she definitely thinks Jews have a responsibility:

There has to be and there was, I think. They could have awoken earlier but I know that there were individual initiatives, I know that in the Frankel [synagogue rabbi Verő] Tomi organized collection. I know that [rabbi] Zoli Radnóti, Bet Shalom organized as well. Maybe the Orthodox, I don’t know whether it was the Lubavitch or the EMIH but I know there were initiatives there as well. I think they have. Exactly because—I think there was a debate about it in Bálint House and I think rabbi Darvas said—he quoted this as well—no matter what we think about the consequences, terrorism touches more Jewry or they are more sensitive to these questions but the basic principles were emphasized and tikkun olam and that empathy is different with groups who… so I think definitely. Definitely. And it is not a coincidence that Israel Aid was there at the border. I think Israel feels it as well, even if not within. But I think Jews have responsibility in this.

\(^{17}\) He was in Szarvas beforehand.
Interviewee 9 thinks they did enough: his problem was rather about the different organizations within the Jewish community:

MAZSIHISZ did a collection. This is an important thing. They managed to get a big amount of donations (checks online). And the president of MAZSIHISZ, András Heisler took part in this as well. It is an important thing that they sided with it and helped, which is important because the government is on the other side. EMIH didn’t do much, they only gave 2 boxes of medicine. (After checking online.) They said they gave 2.000.000 HUF worth of medicine to them... MAZSIHISZ took part more. They have good communications in the federation and the rabbis quoted that you were a foreigner as well. The Torah writes this and it is important. Anybody can be in such a situation. Jews were in this situation as well and they welcomed them.

Most of the interviewees agreed that Jews have responsibility. Interviewee 3 stated: “I think this is the least they can do. It [the help of the Jewish community] wasn’t that visible for me. I only saw that the Bálint House is doing a collection.” But regarding the acts of the Jewish community, opinions differed. The reasons are various: first, there are several organizations and, for an outsider, who belongs where and what they do can be confusing; second, how much they are informed about these events from the media is left to chance as they were not well covered in all cases.

Challenges and conclusion

Even though I focused on the positive aspects of the refugee crisis, the picture is much more shaded. Most of my interviewees have concerns (and fears, as illustrated above) and the Jewish communities (throughout Europe) undoubtedly faced a difficult situation. The question is where they draw the line, where they want to put the emphasis: on the fear of terror or first helping people in need. Many interviewees mentioned something similar:

Whatever I think about the political aspect, I’m not a specialist and as a civilian, as a Jew, it is my duty to help and participate in this type of crisis. You can always deal with Anti-Semitism and organize Purim parties, it is cool and important for the community, but when such a huge issue comes not even to your door but your living room, then I think you cannot show indifference and you cannot not help because there is a tiny… every issue is complicated but you cannot not help because “I’m afraid that in 50 years something [will happen].” You cannot not help because there are three conditional things which if they correlate, there will be something [bad]. (Interviewee 1)

As mentioned above, I asked what they think the solution is, and many of them believe that one of the keys is to have a good integration policy.

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18 The interview was conducted via skype, hence the interviewee had a chance to google things we discussed.
Kibic\textsuperscript{19} interviewed some of the figures of the Hungarian Jewish community when MAZSIHISZ asked for the government’s help for fear of terror (which happened in November: after the Paris terror attack but also after the Hungarian borders were closed and hardly any refugees came through. See Appendix 7.3) (Dezső, 2015). Marcell Kenesei, director of the Centropa Foundation, said:

I would not find it a problem to ask for the government’s help even while they disagree in certain topics,\textsuperscript{20} if the security risk indeed existed. However, there is no real danger behind MAZSIHISZ’s decision because there are hardly any refugees in Hungary… It would be more important for the Jewry to react to such a situation based on values, because based on its own historical experiences they should understand it more when people need to flee. (Ádám, 2016)

He goes on:

The Hungarian Jewry was supposed to step toward a more humanitarian direction. I strongly expected MAZSIHISZ to offer its help to refugees and to stand up for them much more unambiguously as the most important representative of the Hungarian Jewry… With this step, they rather supported the propaganda of the government which is trying to instill fear of refugees in people.

Ádám Schönberger (see above) judges the role of MAZSIHISZ similarly; according to him the policy of MAZSIHISZ is mostly focusing on Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust and this act fits perfectly into this narrative. He also thinks that requesting help was not needed because the Hungarian Jewry is not likely be attacked soon and Muslim refugees are not present in Hungary anymore. He believes that society should face and fight all the related problems and the Jewish community should be part of this fight, but not the ones to create fear “because not many want to share a fear-based identity” (Ádám, 2016).

This article aimed at showing some examples of the complexity of Jewish aid and explore some of the motives in-depth. As the sample is rather small and not representative, some other motives might be missing—although it is possible that all are covered. However, the proportions of each motivation cannot be known from this small research project. Two things can be concluded: most likely motivations do not exist on their own: they strengthen each other. Further, we can hypothesize the Holocaust motive is rather central and it can be explained by its general presence in the narrative of the Hungarian Jewry.

\textsuperscript{19} A Jewish cultural journal.

\textsuperscript{20} To mention two: the Statue at Szabadság square (Lengyel, 2014) and the statue of Hóman (an Anti-Semite) (“A Homán-szobor,” 2015).
### Annex 1

**Refugee-related events chronologically**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (2015)</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 January</td>
<td>The first relevant official statement related to immigration into Hungary: Prime Minister Orban’s speech in Paris after the commemoration ceremony of the victims of the Charlie Hebdo terror attack: economic migration is bad, Hungary will therefore not provide asylum for economic migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Preparations begin for the so-called “national consultation” on immigration initiated by the government (mailing a questionnaire to all Hungarian adults to survey their opinions on immigration). Increasing number of anti-immigration communiques by politicians in the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>“National consultation” on immigration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Government sponsored anti-immigration billboard campaign nation-wide; a counter campaign is organized by a fringe political party with pro-immigration messages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-30 June</td>
<td>The formation of new voluntary grassroots organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 July</td>
<td>The Hungarian government starts building a fence along the Hungarian-Serbian border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-8 August</td>
<td>The opening of transit zones at railway stations in Budapest with volunteers and grassroots providing street social work and aid for asylum-seekers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August</td>
<td>71 dead migrants are found in a van in Austria close to the Hungarian border, obviously en route from Hungary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29 August</td>
<td>Negotiations about a central transit zone in Verseny Street, Budapest, controlled by the Municipality of Budapest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end of August / early September</td>
<td>Increasing tensions at Budapest railway stations, where thousands of asylum-seekers are waiting for the opportunity to travel on to Germany. Tensions are increased by the hectic reactions of the Hungarian authorities and the state railway company (at one point no asylum-seekers are allowed to get on trains leaving for Germany, including those with valid tickets; later it is again possible to get on the trains for a few hours, but then all international trains leaving for Germany are canceled for a few days; on September 3 a train leaves Budapest Keleti railway station with asylum-seekers who were informed they are heading for Germany; the train, however, is stopped at the Bicske reception camp (Hungary), with asylum-seekers feeling cheated and trapped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6 September</td>
<td>Right after the train incident at Bicske on September 3, asylum seekers at Budapest Keleti railway station set out to walk to Austria on the M1 motorway. In response, the government provides buses for the asylum-seekers to transport them directly to the Austrian border from the motorway as well as from Keleti station. A statement is made by the head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, Cardinal Peter Erdős, justifying the limited involvement of the church in the crisis, in stark contrast to statements made by the Pope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 September</td>
<td>Petra László, a camerawoman at a right-wing Hungarian TV channel, trips refugees running from the police in Röszke (Serbian border).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“The battle of Röszke” takes place between police and asylum-seekers after the closing of the Hungarian-Serbian border. The migration flow heads towards the Hungarian-Croatian border.

The Hungarian-Serbian border is closed down.

Repercussions of a speech by Prime Minister Orbán saying “the government has given financial support to the NGOs”; the volunteers and grassroots protest as they have in fact not received any state funds; the prime minister meant only those established charity organizations that were commissioned by the government with the aid activities at the Croatian and Austrian borders after 15 September.

The fence along the Hungarian-Croatian border is completed, the border is closed: the end of mass inflow of asylum seekers and migrants into Hungary.


Annex 2

Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Jewish background (of family)</th>
<th>Jewish identity (now)</th>
<th>Mode and amount of help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>Neolog tradition keeper</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Organizing donation – one occasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>Assimilated, paternally Jewish</td>
<td>Active, brought tradition back to family</td>
<td>Organizing donation (once) + volunteering (6 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>Assimilated</td>
<td>Used to be active, not any more</td>
<td>Volunteering – Intensely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>Assimilated</td>
<td>Active, brought tradition back to family</td>
<td>Volunteering – Intensively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>Assimilated</td>
<td>Active, brought tradition back to family</td>
<td>Donating several times + volunteering a couple of times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>Assimilated, paternally Jewish</td>
<td>Important part of identity</td>
<td>Donating several times + volunteering 5-6 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>Assimilated, paternally Jewish</td>
<td>Important part of identity</td>
<td>Donating once + volunteering 4-5 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>Assimilated</td>
<td>Became important through children</td>
<td>Donating several times + volunteering 10 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>Assimilated</td>
<td>Religious (neolog)</td>
<td>Organizing donation (once) + going to Keleti twice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Converted, religious (neolog)</td>
<td>Volunteering for the whole period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>Neolog tradition keeper</td>
<td>Religious (orthodox)</td>
<td>Donating twice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3

Dates for organized donations in Budapest

- July 10, 2015: MAZSIHISZ in front of Dohány synagogue – initiated by an individual

- Available from August on: donations in Auróra + accepting refugees

- Beginning of September 2015: EMIH medicine to Nyugati

- September 4, 2015: MAZSIHISZ Youth Council collecting donations in the Frankel synagogue, in Scheiber Sándor high school and in Bálint House, given to “Let’s help refugees” group

- September 11, 2015: Kibic in Bálint House

- November 1, 2015: rabbi, priest and imam pray together for the victims and peace

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\[\text{Kibic (2015, September 2) Adománygyűjtés menekülteknek! [Donation for refugees!]}\]

\[\text{Kibic (2015, September 9) Adománygyűjtés: takarókat, sátrakat gyűjt a kibic a rászorulóknak. [Donation: Kibic is collecting blankets, tents for the ones in need.]}\]


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#REFUGEESWELCOME: IDENTITY DISCOURSES ON TWITTER DURING THE EUROPEAN ‘REFUGEE CRISIS’

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The aim of this paper is to examine how Twitter was used as a forum of self-expression during the peak of the ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe at the beginning of September 2015. More than 900 tweets using the hashtag #refugeeswelcome were analyzed over a two-day time period, based on three main themes: the construction of national and European identity, reflections on the role and responsibility of a country or the European Union and the use of Twitter as a tool for social activism. The research shows rather positive sentiments among those using the analyzed hashtag and noteworthy willingness for activism. Both positive and critical opinions were observed concerning national identity and one’s own nation, highlighting examples to follow from other countries as well. Despite this, European identity was not reflected on very frequently; tweeters were overwhelmingly critical towards European leaders and the European Union. At the same time humanitarian values, human rights and transnational identity became salient throughout the analysis. This paper studies a recent social phenomenon, through a 21st-century source of analysis, and it serves as a starting point for further research concerning identity discourses and activism on social media during the recent refugee crisis.

This paper aims to examine how Twitter was used during the height of Europe’s “refugee crisis” in the autumn of 2015. Through the analysis of more than 900 tweets using the hashtag “#refugeeswelcome” on September 1 and 2, 2015, we explore how people in Europe reacted when the influx of refugees suddenly became very visible and tangible. We focus in particular on the construction of national and European identities and the use of Twitter as a tool for social activism. September 1 and 2, 2015, can be considered the peak of the refugee crisis that swept Europe during 2015. On September 1, Hungarian authorities closed off Keleti train station in Budapest for the thousands of refugees camping outside. Outrage soon grew as all trains bound for Western Europe were suspended (Nolan & Connolly, 2015). A day later, the dead body of the three-year-old Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi was found on the shores of a Turkish beach (Smith, 2015).

Those and other closely related events caused a major uproar throughout Europe. It seemed the European Union and nation-states were incapable of and unwilling to handle the stream of refugees, causing people to sleep on the streets and babies to drown at sea. In the meantime, more welcoming voices could be heard. Particularly in Germany and Austria, people gathered under the slogan ‘refugees welcome’ to try and assist refugees on their troublesome journey to Western Europe.
The slogan also found strong resonance in social media, most notably on Twitter. #refugeeswelcome was to become one of the most influential hashtags of 2015, according to Twitter itself (“Most Influential, #YearOnTwitter”, 2015). It was used in various ways to gather support for the cause of refugees. The response was enormous. When Harry Potter author JK Rowling voiced her opinion using the hashtag, her tweet was retweeted more than 25,000 times (Rowling, 2015). In mid-September all football players of Germany’s first and second division carried patches with “We’re helping, #refugeeswelcome” to show their solidarity (AP News, 2015). Eventually even the US White House started to promote the hashtag in an effort to increase goodwill towards refugees (Pope, 2015).

This of course poses questions about the impact of social media on activism and humanitarian aid. “Hashtag activism” has been coined as the term that describes internet activism through the use of Twitter hashtags (Carr, 2012). As humanitarian aid organizations are slow to capitalize on social media (Cone, 2012), it seems it is up to grassroots movements to make use of the full potential of social media. The Huffington Post marked several advantages of hashtag activism: its broad audience, the possibility of fair and balanced news coverage, its platform for advocating against injustices and its international involvement and accessibility (Khan-Ibarra, 2014). Some critics argue that hashtag activism actually induces a form of ‘slacktivism’ whereby people passively support a cause without getting physically involved (Hodges, 2014).

However, it may be, the events that occurred in September of 2015 showed that there was a lot of grassroots activism to be found throughout Europe (Raptopoulos, 2015). We will analyze this willingness to help through focusing on the construction of European and national identities. Hereby we aim to contribute to the growing literature on constructions of European identity that has emerged in recent years (see for instance: Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009), and offer insight into the power of social media in shaping activism.

Methodology

The analysis presented below is an exploratory research of a current global phenomena. The focus of the research is social media, but rather than looking at the effect it has on people or social actions, our main interest is how people reflect on the events of the refugee crisis within a surface of everyday self-expression (Shirky, 2011). The main question is how people relate to the events of the crisis and what the general sentiments are, not only toward the refugees, but towards the situation and the debate around the issue of the refugee crisis. We used Twitter for the analysis for two main reasons: first, it is easier to search for information thanks first and foremost to the hashtags—in contrast to Facebook, where closed groups were (or are) used by experts or volunteers discussing the matter of helping refugees—; second, while Facebook was used more frequently to ask for or offer help, Twitter is rather a forum for expressing sentiments and opinions in relation to the refugee crisis as well (Coyer, 2015). To have a narrower scope of analysis we looked at the hashtag “#refugeeswelcome” to see general views and attitudes of people. Another important aspect of why we chose this approach is that the hashtag was also used world-wide and became very popular in a very short period of time (Twitter, 2015).
From the large dataset of the posts using the hashtag #refugeeswelcome on the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} of September, we analyzed a sample of 932 tweets—526 from the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 406 tweets from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of September. The sample was selected in line with the three main topics of analysis: 1) reflections of own national identity, the role, (the issue of) the responsibility of the country or nation in the situation; 2) reflections on European identity, the role, (the issue of) the responsibility of Europe in the crisis; 3) the presence of offering or asking for help within the tweets. The relevance of the first two topics lies in that the massive flow of refugees and migrants brought up a number of sentiments concerning national identity—not only nationalist sentiments but also non- or anti-nationalist feelings (it was and still is in most countries the cause of opposition of the right and left wing in political debate). It also raised the topics of European values, cultural heritage and identity to the forefront of discourses and debates. The question of responsibility and the role of Europe, the European Union or each nation was also a frequent topic of public debates (Vick, 2015). The third point was included because the question of help was the initial starting point of our research and—even if Twitter is used less for making direct contacts (with volunteers or refugees)—if it is present in any form, we wanted to look at what these forms of help are in this context.

For the analysis of #refugeeswelcome on Twitter on September 1-2, 2015, we propose the following hypotheses: 1) given the positive nature of the hashtag itself we expect that people using it have a positive attitude toward refugees; 2) we assume that people reflecting on the question of responsibility (either national or European), would be very critical toward the countries or governments which offer a more conservative approach toward refugees; 3) we expect tweets to be reflective of the events of the crisis, specifically the incidents happening on the day when subjects post on Twitter. Furthermore, we assume that many tweets from outside Hungary would express comments on the Hungarian events.  

**Analysis**

The larger data set of posts consisted of many different themes which are not analyzed in the framework presented above. However, without mentioning them we cannot place our narrow analysis within the wider context of #refugeeswelcome on Twitter. Therefore, the topics and examples below show the recurring messages people posted out to the world.

The most frequent theme was about morality and humanity to take refugees in to different countries. These were based on human rights, questioning where the humanity is in people and stating that everyone deserves the right to live and be safe. The phrase “no human is illegal” also appeared many times, just as commonly as the very affectional sentence: “nobody puts their children in a boat unless the water is safer than the land.” (Twitter, 2015) The second theme was more personal, with two frequent type of posts: one put forward the idea of a

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1 The analysis has its methodological limitations: the sample chosen might not be representative in numbers, but even with this amount of posts it is possible to identify patterns and trends. Although we cannot draw definitive conclusions, we can show that there are certain patterns present within the data that should not be neglected and which also require further examination.
reversed situation whereby one would have to find refuge in another country; the other includes personal stories of family or friends who used to be refugees. The third theme consisted of those tweets that expressed negative or critical views on accepting refugees. One of the more negative approaches was, for example: “we’ve already taken millions of immigrants”. The rather critical subjects were raising questions about what happens if refugees are let into the country.

These themes already show the varying attitudes in this question. Throughout our analysis we expected to find more positive sentiments toward refugees, since the examined hashtag already reflects positivity. This was supported by the data: 60% of the tweets had a positive attitude, while 30% were critical, which means that they criticized the situation in any way—whether criticizing one’s government for not taking any action or criticizing the liberal viewpoint of letting refugees in the country. The results can be seen in Figure 1.

**Figure 1:** General sentiments toward the refugees and the situation \((N=932)\)

In Figure 2, we can see the frequency of each topic mentioned in tweets, and as it very clearly shows, some kind of help was included in the posts. Reflection on national identity was the next most frequent topic, followed by opinion on other countries (which is very closely related to the opinion about one’s own country). Last came those tweets related to European identity. In the next sections, we present our analysis of these categories.
Help

Although voluntary helpers communicated with each other mainly through Facebook (Coyer, 2015), it seems that Twitter saw its fair share of activism. One out of every four tweets analyzed had to do with individual people showing their willingness to engage positively in the refugee issue (see Figure 3). This means a significant proportion of the people using #refugeeswelcome, actually did it to rally support for the cause of refugees.

Given the fact that most refugees wanted to reach Germany from Hungary by train, three cities and their respective train stations came into the center of attention of everyone wanting to assist refugees in their journey: Budapest, Vienna and Munich. Especially the latter two were often mentioned on Twitter. #refugeeswelcome was often accompanied by #Vienna and #Westbahnhof or #Munich and #Hauptbahnhof or #Hbf. Another closely related hashtag was #trainofhope, which together with #refugeeswelcome came to symbolize the receptive responses in Austria and Germany.
In some cases, the hashtag was used directly to call for action and help refugees at the designated train stations. Information was spread about what kind of assistance was needed and when new trains would arrive. Very rarely people also offered their help directly through Twitter. Especially towards the end of the day, people used the medium to voice their satisfaction on the help delivered and to thank fellow volunteers. Furthermore, there were calls for gatherings and rallies in support of refugees in several cities around Europe; like Osnabruck, Ljubljana, London, Belfast, Birmingham, Essen, Edinburg and Stuttgart.

Sometimes the appeal for activism was rather general. This is where the concept of ‘slacktivism,’ as outlined in the introduction, appears. People were calling for help and assistance for refugees, but it was not clear how they actually were contributing. In other cases, users urged their own governments to be more supportive of the issue. This is particularly apparent in the case of the UK. On September 2, hours before the pictures of dead Aylan first appeared, British prime minister David Cameron stated: “taking more and more refugees is not an answer” (BBC News, 2015a).

After the shocking images of the boy on the Turkish beach reached the internet, Twitter users in the UK reacted fiercely. Blaming their government for a lack of empathy and benevolence towards refugees, a petition quickly spread, urging the UK government to accept more refugees. More than one out of three tweets related to helping was actually advocating the signing of this specific petition. The campaign seemed to have some success, as two days later Cameron announced the UK would accept “thousands” more Syrian refugees (BBC News, 2015b).
National identity

28% of the tweets in the sample dealt with some aspect of national identity (see Figure 2). This included both positive and negative sentiments towards one’s own nation, which highly depended on where the post originated. Germans and Austrians were generally proud of their country or nation and mentioned several positive events such as the demonstration in Austria or the “refugees welcome” signs on the German football games. Vienna and Munich were highlighted several times, either in hashtags or simply mentioned in the post. These sorts of positive examples were also mentioned in tweets from other countries, where it was a way to express criticism, or to show what example should be followed. Other mentioned good examples were Airbnb offering housing for refugees in Germany and Icelanders letting refugees staying in their homes. The latter was mentioned several times in tweets from the UK and Ireland. Within the UK, from England, the Scottish example was brought up as well, opposing Nicola Sturgeon to David Cameron—as good example to bad example.

In the United Kingdom, from where the vast majority of tweets were posted on September 2, the dominant attitude was very critical toward the country, the UK government and David Cameron himself. His public statements that day and the (low) number of refugees accepted brought out temper and emotion in a number of people: “I’m so ashamed to be British tonight”; “I’m embarrassed because of my PM”. But there were positive or proud posts as well: “Brit public is waking up. Finally feeling that not everyone is an inhumane, intolerant racist.” Another example is where someone posted that he is proud of the British people signing a petition so quickly (i.e., the petition mentioned above that was shared almost a hundred times out of the thousand in our sample). It is also important to mention that these tweets in many cases were calling for action. Action of the nation, everyday people or in most cases the government was addressed by: “Act now!” or “Step up!”.

One of our hypotheses was that we expected the tweets to reflect on the events in Hungary. In contrast with our expectation there were barely any reflections on the Hungarian incidents. Of the 932 tweets there were less than 10 mentioning Hungary. These few varied, since some were criticizing Hungary, a few were quite neutral (just sharing news), while there were positive examples as well—it was tweeted more than once that volunteers at Keleti welcomed refugee kids with cartoon screenings.

To summarize, most of the tweets concerning national identity were from the UK, Germany and Austria, and the clear pattern was that in the UK the posts were rather negative about the country or the nation, or sometimes just about the government, while in Germany and Austria the posts were more positive toward their actions, their cities and their nations. Good examples were tweeted from every country, not only from those where events took place, and many people called for action, addressing politicians or the whole nation.
European identity and humanity

Although the European Union was and still is a much-debated topic within the refugee crisis, this seemed less apparent on Twitter. Less than one in every ten tweets voicing an opinion on the issue commented on Europe or the EU. Still, some general conclusions can be drawn from these statements.

First of all, with 66% of the comments on Europe being critical, people on Twitter seem more critical toward Europe than toward their own country. People accuse Europe and its leaders of inactivity, while thousands of volunteers are helping out at train stations. One commenter from Greece put it this way: “Do not forget: the governments of Europe rely on volunteers to take on their burden and make them look good.” According to many people, this lack of political action leads to violations of human rights and is against European values. Just as national governments were urged to take more action, these appeals were also voiced against Europe as a whole. This underlines the fact that people understood the influx of refugees as a European problem that should be sorted out collectively and not by individual states.

A similar proportion of tweets reflected not so much a European but a ‘humanitarian’ or ‘global’ identity. A call for a humanitarian approach to the refugee crisis was often heard. The hashtags #humanity and #humanrights popped up several times in support of this argument. An Austrian commenter voiced his satisfaction over what he saw at Vienna train station; “Faith in human race has just increased - Ein gutes Land”, thereby alluding to both his national and ‘human’ identity. Others stressed the fact that we are all human, refugee or not: “We belong to one another. We lose our humanity when we fail to help one another.”

Conclusion

Although we acknowledge the limited scope of this research, some interesting and thought-provoking conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the hashtag #refugeeswelcome gathered mostly positive reflections on the refugee issue, voicing willingness to help and critical reflection on national and European government inaction. Although Twitter can hardly be considered the primary locus of activism and help-gathering during the refugee crisis, it turns out more than 25% of our sample actually included some sort of activism. #refugeeswelcome proved to be a useful way to gather information on helping and a good way to push campaigns advocating for more receptive refugee policies.

Second, it turns out the hashtag was often used to positively reflect on one’s own national and local identities. Especially in the case of Germany and Austria, users found (national) pride in their country helping refugees and this was reflected in a good amount of tweets about the positive German and Austrian examples of helping refugees. These examples were also widely shared outside the countries from which they originated. Especially in the UK, people used these examples to voice criticism against their own government’s lack of action.
Third, although reflections on European values and identity make up a rather small proportion of the total of
tweets analyzed, it turns out commenters are considerably more critical toward Europe. People blame Europe
for not taking action and for disowning its common values. Closely related, people think of themselves as part
of a ‘humanity’ that spans borders and even continents. This transnational identity makes them highly critical of
nationalistic and protectionist actions going against humanitarian values and human rights.

To conclude, we argue that #refugeeswelcome poses an interesting locus for reflections on identity and activism
and therefore deserves further research. The limited scope of this paper can therefore be a starting point for fur-
ther exploration in the field of identity discourses and activism on social media during the recent refugee crisis.

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MORAL PANIC IN THE NEWS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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The previously unknown category of the migrant has become the centre of Hungarian political rhetoric since August 2015, when the topic of migration stormed into the Hungarian media. Several competing representations aimed to fill the empty category of the migrant with meaning and content. This competition for the framing of the migrant reflects a political struggle. The paper aims to compare two different media representations of the migrant by focusing on the 6 pm news presentations of the two main polarities of the Hungarian media landscape (MTV1 and RTLK) in 2015 and 2016. The main focus is on the representation of the first peak of the migration crisis at Keleti Railway station, Budapest. The research, however, also covers a one-year period on the framing of relating events on migration. The method of the analysis is based on the five criteria of moral panic, namely audience involvement, hostility, disproportionality, volatility and consensus. The research concludes that the two main polarities create contrasting representations of the category of the migrant. While the news of MTV1 depicts migrants as homogeneous and threatening actors to the idealized order of society, the news of RTLK counter-frames this presentation by emphasizing the diversity of difficulties that a long journey of migration involves. These representations implicate existing power relations manifested in the two main polarities of the Hungarian media landscape.

The panic over migration might not end until at least 2018, when the next national election distributes power among existing political parties in Hungary. The political rhetoric on migration has recently been re-articulated by the spokesperson of the Hungarian government, according to which “the migration crisis is the direct consequence of the existing underlying power relations of global capital” (“Március végével megszűnik,” 2017). Not surprisingly, migration is in the center of a narrative that links existing constructions of threatening agents into a network of hostility. The representation of threat has an influential emotional effect on voters and these emotions can be mobilized for political purposes.

Migration has existed for some time, long before such mobilization started. The number of registered asylum-seekers in Hungary has steadily increased since 2012. In the first quarter of 2012 this number was 457, while one year later, in 2013, it increased to 2.322. In the last quarter of 2014 the number of applications was 28.631 and, in the third quarter of 2015 a significant increase resulted in 109.175 applications (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2016). Regardless of the tendency of an increasing number of asylum-seekers, people in Hungary received no information about migration and the phenomenon remained unnoticed until communication campaigns started to construct and frame migration.

Migration was redefined as a threat and magnified in mass media news broadcasts. Mass media, as Bourdieu claims, has the capacity to construct social reality through representations (Bourdieu, 1991). Although migration, based on its circumstances and intensity, can be seen as critical, media broadcast shapes events in accordance with desired images. The severity of migration appears in a desired quality and quantity, defined by editors,
reporters or news directors who set the narrative and discourse of events (Schudson, 2000). The news, therefore, is the result of a more imbedded institutional framework that defines the system of media production and the desired communication of social reality (Couldry & Curran, 2003). The construction of the migrant in relation to its social reality, therefore, reflects the intention of the actor who has the power to identify and fill this empty category with meaning and content.

The category of the migrant in Hungary resembles Simmel’s concept of the stranger. Simmel defines distant social groups or, as to use his term, the stranger as the “union of nearness and remoteness, which every relation between men comprehends.”1 Accordingly, while the stranger, such as the migrant, is part of the community for a period of time, it is still remote, distant and excluded as a result of its distinctness vis a vis the in-group. Beyond this, the stranger is also vulnerable because it is too they are too distant—in linguistic or cultural terms—to identify discourses and articulate them in a way that can be received by the majority society. Therefore, the stranger has no capacity to influence discourses projected on them. Due to the new appearance of the stranger, it is an empty category and no meaning or quality is attached to it. Therefore, the possibility of attaching values to this empty category is open. The way in which this empty category is defined, however, shows the intention of the definer.

Moral panic theory describes the way in which an empty category can be turned into a threatening other. Moral panic theory, according to Cohen, is based on the idea that a group of people can be identified as a threatening out-group that is framed as if it endangered the idealized order and fundamental values of a society. As a result, intense feelings of hostility and panic occur as a reaction from the members of the majority (Cohen, 2002; Kitzinger, 2000). Subsequently, action to discipline the threatening, deviant group is taken. According to Critcher, the action to discipline the deviant group by the majority is in fact a way of repairing them. This approach, however, seems to provide authorization to the majority to act for the betterment of a group without the consent of this group. Such an approach can easily become counterproductive. Hier highlights that the disciplining of a threatening, deviant group by the majority, generates a greater group cohesion. His argument is that the disciplining action in fact results in the articulation of ingroup values and the clearer definition of group boundaries. This idea leads to Hall’s observation that the disciplining of the deviant is rather an instrument. As Hall argues, the action to discipline utilizes the deviant group for the mobilization of fears and for the regeneration of societal unity for political purposes. (Kitzinger, 2000; Hall et al., 1976).

This paper focuses on the representation of the recently occurring phenomenon of migration in Hungary. The main question of the research is the extent to which migration is represented in the frames of moral panic. To what extent do news broadcasts construct the migrant as the threatening other posing a significant threat to the idealized order and values of Hungarian society? Assuming that migration is framed as deviance in news presentations, the research focuses on the 6 pm news from a comparative perspective. Parallel broadcasted news from the two main poles of the Hungarian media landscape, the Hungarian public service television channel

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1 Italics as Simmel’s men is interpreted as humans (Simmel, 2009).
called MTV1 and RTL Klub, which is part of the RTL Group, is analysed. The research focuses on a period from August 28, 2015, to October 3, 2016, when migration strongly dominated public discourse. The aim of the research is to identify dominant discourses of news presentations through the lenses of moral panic theory.

Based on the results of the study, MTV1 strongly contributed to the construction of moral panic through news representations of migration in the examined period. RTLK, on the other hand, was reactionary to the presentations of MTV1 news. While MTV1 presented hostility, threat and, through different stages of representation, linked migration to further agents of hostility, RTLK presented a more humane aspect of migration that involved showing images concerning the causes of migration, personal stories or emotions of victims. Therefore, RTLK counter-framed MTV1, which constructed an abstract category and a distant perspective on migrants. However, the success of RTLK is questionable. Based on the results of the quota referendum on October 3, 2016, a unification of political supporters of the right-wing might have been achieved.

The projection of threat in our social reality – a theoretical framework

Moral panic can be seen as an intention to fill up an empty category with content and qualities. Moral panic, according to Cohen’s theory, emerges as a result of a phenomenon linked to a group of people that is perceived as a threat to the idealized order of society (Cohen, 2002). The moral, therefore, refers to fundamental values and order in society, while panic shows the intensity of reaction and fear of the threatening phenomena (Cohen, 2002). Elements of intensity, temporality and periodicity are also part of moral panics, according to Rohloff and Wright. They point out that moral panics are always present (Rohloff & Wright, 2010), while Hier (2016) claims that moral panic is a “volatile short-term manifestation of long-term moral regulation processes.” Moral panics are, therefore, intense, rapidly occurring and reoccurring campaigns targeting social groups by labelling them as threatening and deviant.

Moral panic theory has been widely used. The first application of the concept was carried out mainly by critical sociologists, such as Cohen and Young, who applied it to youth subcultures, such as punks, skinheads, goths, hippies and so on (Rothe & Muzatti, 2004). Critical sociology in the 1960s and 1970s challenged the way in which moral entrepreneurs aimed to label individuals and groups as deviant in the US and Britain (Klocke & Muschert, 2010). In the 1980s and 1990s this deconstructionist approach was followed by studies that went beyond and focused on adult manifestations of deviance and criminal behaviour, such as drug scares or AIDS (for a full list of studies see Klocke & Muschert, 2010). Terrorism has also been in the focus of moral panic since the 9/11 attacks (Rothe & Muzatti, 2004), as well as human rights violations targeting, for instance, homosexuals in Ghana (Tettey, 2016). Due to the increasing usage and application of moral panic theory, its theoretical coherence has undergone advancement and revision in the 21st century (Klocke & Muschert, 2010).

One of the reasons for the emergence of moral panics in some circumstances can be the implementation of regulations for the stability of values within society. Hier highlights that moral panics occur as a historical/structural phenomenon, due to a process of deteriorating values and loosening group cohesion. He argues that elites or
interest groups, as a result, aim to generate legitimization for launching new regulations. Therefore, as he claims, common identity, incorporating values and behaviors, emerges as a marker of group boundaries. Moral panic, according to him, turns into a project of integration when these boundaries become looser. It generates the pressure of conformity and moral standards by the regulation of the deviant in times when group cohesion loosens (Hier, 2016). In this framework, moral panic is a tool for stability and balance in a risk society that serves the process of regulation.

Critcher’s approach of strengthening group cohesion or Hier’s idea of generating attention for policy change can both be suitable concepts for moral panics under particular circumstances. His synthesis of risk society, governmentality and regulation in his case study on drunk people, however, differs from Hier’s framework. Critcher implies that moral panics are instruments of power to repair the deviant (Chricter, 2008). Policies, therefore, aim to include the excluded groups by encouraging action to lift the deviant up from their state. Even when this paternalistic approach is technically functional, the idea of repairing the deviant group can become counterproductive when applied to culturally distinct groups.

The regulation for strengthened group cohesion or the attempt to generate attention for the necessity of policy for the solution of certain groups to fit into the majority might be suitable concepts for moral panics under particular circumstances. However, the primary function of moral panics can also be political. Kitzinger (2000) points out that moral panics rather entail the disciplining of deviant groups and the regeneration of societal unity. While Hier and Critcher imply that the achievement of societal unity is based on the inclusion of the deviant through the pressure of conformity and repair, in the case of instrumentalization the deviant group is, instead, excluded and rejected. In this case, unity is achieved only within the majority. This corresponds with Hall’s observation that in times of crisis, when social tension is present, the use of an easily targeted group can generate social cohesion through the mobilization of existing fears and insecurities (Hall et al, 1976). In times of moral panics, the “silent majority’ is won over to the support of increasingly coercive measures on the part of the state, and lends its legitimacy to a ‘higher than usual’ exercise of control” (Hall et al, 1978). Significant institutional changes, such as to the constitution of a state, are authorized by this silent majority. Repairing or civilizing the deviant group in this case is not a priority. Even more, it would reduce the chance of their instrumentalization for political purposes.

Media plays a significant role in the instrumentalization of groups. Media has the “capacity to intervene in the course of events, to influence the actions of others...by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms” (Thompson, 1995). Therefore, as Curran argues, media is the “concentration of symbolic power in specific institutional spheres” (Couldry & Curran, 2003) that can be utilized for political projects, such as the purpose of moral panic. Even in the case of autonomous media organizations Hall observes that “the media tend to reproduce the definitions of the powerful” (Hall et al, 1978) by representing the social reality constructed by primary definers, such as police or government officials (Klocke & Muschert, 2010). As a result, media turns into a secondary definer that amplifies the distorted image of a threatening group (Klocke & Muschert, 2010).
The production of news can be seen as a representation of the embedded power relations of mass media. News by definition aims to deliver distant events to the audience and, thereby, provide experience on reality. The delivered events are, however, not raw material. As Herman and Chomsky point out, events pass through a process of selection and edition. Broadcasting, as they claim, is preceded by the editing of presented discourse of these events (Herman & Chomsky, 2002). Schudson (2000) also highlights that the discourse of news is based on the preferences and perception of publishers, editors or reporters, whose voices mirror the desired narratives of their appointers, such as government officials or owners of media companies. Therefore, news production is certainly embedded into the existing power relations of the symbolic production of social realities. Consequently, events of moral panics are shaped in accordance with the power structure that defines the desired framing.

Media landscapes, however, can turn into a platform of struggle over the construction of social reality. Access to symbolic power is limited, but not in all cases monopolized. Actors, if they have the capacity, can generate parallel or even competing constructions of realities. Klocke and Muschert (2010) claim that the targeted group can resist if the media landscape is more fragmented and articulates their narrative. Therefore, a counter-campaign is possible by counter-framing the moral panic narrative.

For the analysis of narrative, the literature on moral panics makes a distinction between process- and element-oriented analytical frameworks. Cohen’s original approach to moral panic was the process-oriented framework. This analytical framework has five stages; 1. behaviors are defined as a threat to societal values; 2. media recognizes and depicts the threat; 3. concerns arise; 4. authorities and politicians call for a strong solution; 5. social institutions and regulations change (Cohen, 2002). This approach might be suitable for the test of the existence of moral panic. However, a study on the media representation and communication of moral panic would certainly stretch beyond the original limits of Cohen’s framework.

The element-oriented analytical framework created by Goode and Nachman seems to be more applicable for the current study. Goode and Nachman identify five criteria of moral panic that serve unification through the instrumentalization of the deviant group. The first criterion is involvement of the public that can be measured through, for example, media thematising and coverage of the topic. The second criterion is the establishment of hostility towards the threatening group and the perception of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction. The third criterion is consensus among the majority population that the identified group poses a threat to public morals and order. The fourth criterion is disproportionality, which involves the exaggeration of the threat. The final criterion is volatility, which means the sudden appearance and disappearance of threatening groups from the people’s sight (Goode & Nachman, 2009). Media can play a significant role in the establishment of all these criteria.
A glimpse into the Hungarian media landscape in times of migration

The Hungarian media landscape underwent a significant transformation prior to the migration crises. According to Bajomi-Lázár (2013), the new institutional structure of the media “may be defined as a strategy aimed at extracting from the media resources such as airtime, frequencies, positions and money, and channeling them to party loyalists in order to reward them for various services.” The redistribution of media power started with the Media Act of 2010, which led to two major transformations. First, it established the Media Council and NMHH\(^2\) with a high level of authority over media institutions. Second, it merged the dispersed public media institutions into one central public service foundation (Bayer, 2011). The concentration of a high level of authority and massive funds into a single institution, which is chaired and led by an appointee of the Prime Minister, was followed by the suspension of media subsidies previously given to privately run TV channels (Dull, 2016). Subsequently, by March 2015 the new media landscape had evolved. This landscape was dominated by public service TV channels with directors appointed by the Media Council. The public service TV channels, although apparently operating as autonomous institutions, seem to have the potential to articulate the political rhetoric of the actual government.

One TV channel that to some extent challenged the reality constructed by the new mass communication channels of the Media Council was RTL Klub (RTLK). The channel is part of the German RTL Group media corporation. After the introduction of advertisement tax regulations, RTLK started to launch anti-governmental news presentations from 2014 (Bednárik & Csuhaj, 2014). Although, the regulation on advertisement taxation changed and an agreement was reached, RTLK news remained moderately critical of the government. In the emerging migration crisis, therefore, RTLK counter-framed the reality constructed by MTV1 and represented the opposition position in the question of migration.

After the establishment of new public service mass media channels on March 15, 2015, migration began to exist in the social reality of the Hungarian people. The number of migrants steadily increased from May, 2015, while billboard campaigns framed migrants as hostile and alien (“Elfogott migránsok száma,” n.d.; “Kiderült milyen feliratok,” 2015). The Prime Minister of Hungary announced the construction of a fence on the Serbian border on June 17, 2015, with a goal of completing it by the end of summer 2015 (“Orbán: a fizikai határzár,” 2015). Meanwhile, the number of migrants in a highly visible spot at Keleti Railway Station started to increase. The location turned into a camp with services provided for people who found themselves stuck in this location. Train services were suspended and live broadcast presented the conditions evolving in the surroundings of the station. The mismanagement of the situation resulted in a chaotic environment, lack of communication between the police, migrants and local members of NGOs. After an unprecedented attempt to transport migrants—without their consent—to the Bicske camp by train, migrant groups started to march on roads and highways toward Austria. The first peak of the migration crisis ended on September 4, 2015, when buses were ordered to transport migrants to the western border of Hungary and allow them to freely walk to Austria.

\(^2\) National Media and News Authority [Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság]
The second crisis started to peak after a razor wire fence sealed the Serbian border on September 14, 2015. The role of the police in the increased tension is unclear. A crowd of people in front of the border crossing gate at Horgos that included children and families was dispersed by the police using tear gas and water cannons. After the fence was built on the Serbian border, migrants were diverted to Croatia from Serbia and several thousand people passed the Hungarian border until border control was also enforced on the Croatian border by Hungarian authorities. Given the lack of live broadcasts from the Croatian border, public awareness of migrants crossing from Croatia was minimal.

After winter, on March 9, 2016, 1500 soldiers were ordered to the southern border and Hungary declared a state of emergency (“Breaking News: Hungary Delares State of,” 2016). However, due to the EU agreement with Turkey and with Balkan states, the number of migrants arriving in Hungary significantly dropped. The route of migrants altered and people were already being pushed from the Greek borders back to Turkey. On October 2, a referendum was held on EU quotas. The referendum was announced much earlier, in spring 2015. Therefore, media coverage had previously framed the referendum in a variety of ways. The competition over the interpretation of the meaning of the referendum overrode its long and strongly criticized question.

### Research methods

The research is structured by the five criteria of moral panic and focuses on the analysis of news presentations of the two main poles of the Hungarian media landscape. The aim is to compare and contrast the presented level of involvement, hostility, disproportionality, volatility and consensus on the theme of migrants in the 6 pm news broadcasts of MTV1 and RTLK. MTV1 is the news channel of the recently state-established public service foundation media network, supervised by the Media Council. RTLK is the Hungarian branch of a German media corporation and often articulated narratives opposing government policies and legislation.

The research relies on the textual data of news blocks that were analysed in light of visual representations. The main source of audio-visual primary data was the online database provided by Nemzeti Audiovizuális Archívum [National Audio-Visual Archive] (NAVA). The website provides access to all the content that MTV1 and RTLK has broadcast. Furthermore, TV channels also provided information on viewership of the 6 pm news for the seven-day period before September 5, 2015.

Time periods analysed for the research vary for different criteria. Due to their distinct characteristics, criteria of moral panic are not always analysed in the same periods. For involvement and hostility criteria, the research

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3 The question of the EU quota referendum was: Do you want the European Union to be able to mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the approval of the National Assembly?

4 Data was collected from the Nemzeti Audiovizuális Archívum [National Audio-visual archives]. This online source can be accessed on the following link: [http://nava.hu/musorujsag/?date=2015-09-03&fixed=true&chns=101%2C104](http://nava.hu/musorujsag/?date=2015-09-03&fixed=true&chns=101%2C104) accessed 3 January 2017.
focuses on the seven-day period before the first migration crisis peaking on September 5, 2015. The constructed attributes of the migrants are carried over for a one-year period until the quota referendum on October 2. Therefore, the criteria of disproportionality and volatility are analysed in the period between September 14, 2015 and October 3, 2016. In this period, the 6 pm news sessions of each Monday presented in MTV1 and RTLK were selected because Monday news might involve more content due to the weekend. This weekly examination of news presentations involved 56 news sessions for each channel. The fifth category of moral panic theory, consensus, is analysed through the news session broadcasted on the day after the quota referendum. Therefore, it focuses only on the 6 pm news presentations of MTV1 and RTLK on October 3.

News presentations are broadcast concurrently, however, program length is different for the two channels. MTV1 news is mostly 26 minutes long, while the RTLK news is between 47 and 53 minutes. The news of RTLK has two parts divided by an advertisement session. Political content on RTLK, however, is almost entirely presented in the second part of RTLK news. Thus, the program was essentially the same length, but 30 minutes later than MTV1 news. The content of the first part of RTLK news is mostly apolitical.

The involvement criterion focuses on the media thematization of migrant-related topics and audience involvement in the news sessions. Through this criterion, the length of migration coverage within the political content of news sessions is measured. First, the political content is selected and, second, migrant-related themes within the political content are identified. Content is considered political if any relevance to recent political events or topics is identified. Audience involvement, furthermore, is measured by the viewership of the examined 6 pm news. Data for the viewership was provided by TV channels based on the data collected by Nielsen Media Research.

The hostility criterion focuses on the qualities attached to the category of the migrant in the seven-day period before the first peak of the migration crisis. This criterion is analysed in three subcategories. First I examine group homogeneity of migrants and the establishment of an *us* and *them* polarity. Second, I consider the presented goals or aims of migrants that are used as an indicator of their value, intention or quality. Third, the level of presented threat posed by migrants, based on the presented level of organization and attitude towards the host culture is analysed.

The disproportionality criterion examines whether the representation of migration is proportionated to the potential threat they might generate. This criterion is examined by the analysis of the length of migration-related topics in news presentations, in comparison to the length of other topics. The priority news presentations grant migration-related topics over other topics in news sessions is compared to the number of people who were identified as migrants by the Immigration Office of Hungary at the time of the news presentation. The length of media coverage in comparison to the number of migrants aiming to enter the country shows whether the real and the presented threats are proportionate.
The volatility criterion aims to identify a change tendency of migration-related topics in a longer time frame. The examination of this criterion aimed to analyse patterns along which migration-related topics change. This involved the identification of dominant narratives and the presence of migration-related topics in different periods in relation to other political topics.

The focus of the criterion of consensus in this research is somewhat different than in moral panic theory. The consensus criterion of moral panic focuses on the extent to which the threatening group generates a feeling of hostility among the majority society. Due to the limited scope of this research, this criterion could not be measured. An indication, however, on the consensus about the migrants as a category can be derived from the quota referendum held on October 2, 2016. The result of the quota referendum provides an indication of the extent to which MTV1 and RTLK shaped social reality through news presentations. Therefore, beyond the result, the interpretations of the results in the 6 pm news on the day after the referendum was held are also analysed.

Beyond the consensus criterion, the research has some further limitations. Due to the limited resources and scope of the research, the viewership could only be measured for the one week period before the first peak of the migration crises. From September 14, 2015 to October 3, 2016, viewership was not analysed. The main reason for this is the lack of free access to data on viewership from 2014. Furthermore, two Monday news evenings were not accessible due to technical difficulties with the NAVA website. In these cases, the Tuesday presentations were used as close proxies to the Monday sessions. On one occasion, the whole week was unavailable due to unavailability of the digital library as a result of maintenance work. The week, as a result, is missing from the study. Moreover, the scope of the study did not involve other TV channels from the media landscape, even though other actors could widen the spectrum of representations.

**The attributes of migration in the news**

Findings on the involvement criterion show that the political content significantly increased from August 29 to October 4, 2015. Figure 1 shows that political content on August 29 (Sat) was 15 minutes on MTV1 and 19:43 minutes on RTLK. This increased gradually towards the peak of the migration crisis at Keleti Railway Station. On September 5 (Friday) political content increased to 23 minutes on MTV1 and 41:40 minutes on RTLK. A sharp increase can be observed on September 3 (Thursday), due to the live broadcast of the Prime Minister’s speech from Brussels on MTV1 and the Bicske transportation, broadcast by RTLK (Boda et al, 2015). As a result, news sessions spilled over their usual period. Consequently, political content increased toward the peak of the migration crisis in news presentations.

The percentage of topics on migration in the political content of news presentations shows the increasing importance of the crisis at Keleti station and the increased involvement of the audience. Figure 2 shows that after a Sunday decline on August 30 (Sunday), MTV1 coverage on topics of migration show a steady increase. Coverage increases from 50% to the full length of the news session. Figures show that the percentage of migration-related
topics in the news on RTLK sharply declines on Sept 1 (Monday), when figures for MTV1 increase. Figures for RTLK stay below the figures of MTV1 until both increased to 100%. Although some level of fluctuation occurs, both news broadcasts prioritized the involvement of the audience in the case of migration in the one week period before the first migration crisis peaked.

Figure 1: Political content in news presentations (min)

Figure 2: The percentage of migration-related topics (%)

The figures on viewership also show the involvement of the audience. According to viewership measurement by Nielsen Media Research, viewership significantly increased from August 29 to September 5, 2015. For instance, figures showing the number of viewers who watched at least one minute of the broadcast tripled in the examined period. The average one-minute viewer, for instance, of the 6 pm MTV1 news was 44,836 on August 29, 2015. A steady increase reached 135,445 by September 5, 2015. The RTLK news shows similar trends in the increase

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Data was provided by MTV1 and RTLK channels based on Nielsen Viewership measurement.
of viewership. Consequently, audience involvement significantly increased in the examined period—the seven days before the first peak of the migration crisis.

The findings of the research reveal the establishment of the hostility criterion in the seven-day period before the first peak by framing the category of the migrant as a group of a homogenous others in MTV1 news presentations. MTV1 news presents the category of the migrant in a singular way. First, migrants are depicted as homogenous units that are led by a person or a group of people. Second, live reports from different locations, such as Keleti Railway Station, frame migrant groups as a discrete social and cultural unit. The presenter of a live report observes the praying group as an outsider and predicts the intentions of the group. She says:

[migrants] would like to break through the police line and get into the main entrance [of the station] because more and more of them gather here.⁶

The presentation shows images from an outsider perspective defining viewers’ perspective accordingly. Furthermore, the presenter assumes and articulates negative intentions without well-founded reasons.

RTLK news shows a variation of migrants, discrediting the singular migrant category presented by MTV1. RTLK provides a familiar concept of a guest worker migrant by presenting a road accident. The block shows a family that regularly migrates from Kosovo to Berlin for work.⁷ The block highlights that the locations, activity and identity as a migrant are part of a usual, legal and accepted phenomenon. This depiction possibly overlaps with many Hungarian guest workers who live and work, for instance, in Germany or in the UK. Furthermore, RTLK regularly presents interviews with migrants, providing insight into the individual feelings, desires and aims of migrating people. Therefore, RTLK promotes a nuanced image and a variety of migrants that generates empathy toward and distinction between migrants.

Beyond being framed as homogenous others in MTV1 news, migrants are also presented as hostile by linking the category to the value of dishonesty based on migrants’ assumed goal. Migrants are claimed to achieve the extraction of economic benefits by moving from their countries to Europe. News presentations appear to undermine the idea that people are seeking refuge from warfare. Instead, MTV1 promotes the concept of economically driven migration. Even the identity of Syrian refugees from war torn areas is questioned in the comment of the news presenter:

It is important to question what will happen with Syrian refugees because, in Turkey, fake Syrian passports are produced on a large scale. In this way, economic immigrants try to disguise themselves as refugees and get into the EU.⁸

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⁶ See 2⁰ September, 2015 (Wednesday) from 05:39 to 6:20 minutes in MTV1 News.
⁷ See 2⁹th August, 2015 (Saturday) from 09:20 to 11:35 minutes in RTLK News.
⁸ See 1⁰ September, 2015 (Tuesday) from 10:08 to 10:34 minutes in MTV1 News.
On the other hand, RTLK emphasizes a different perspective on migrants, demonstrating their suffering and their reasons for escaping war-torn areas. This representation depicts them as victims of warfare. Presentations show that on the escape route to Europe they encounter suffering. A news presentation shows the personal story of the dead child who was photographed on the coast of Turkey. The story shows pictures of warfare and emotionally stimulating images of people migrating through roads and sea. This depiction, therefore, shows that the goal of migrants is not the exploitation of economic benefits but rather the search for safety and security.

The treatment of migrants as criminals, according to the hostility frame created by MTV1, is justified by their presentation. Migrants are framed by MTV1 as organized groups that deliberately disregard the rules of the host culture and therefore have to be treated by the police as criminals. A reporter, during a live presentation, highlights:

The majority of immigrants perceive the Hungarian procedures as coercive… We have just been by the passage where a group of a dozen African immigrants were waiting for the disappearance of the patrolling police.\(^9\)

This statement frames migrants as non-cooperative and not trustworthy, implicating the justification of their treatment as criminals. During the presentation, visual elements frame migrants in the Röszke camp as jailed. According to the news presentation,\(^10\) a group of immigrants broke out from this camp in an organized fashion at the same time as other rebellions in distant locations in Hungary. This implies their cooperation and communication with each other.

Migrants are pictured as violent and aggressive groups by MTV1. Migrants are depicted as a mass of inflowing people involving significant security risks, such as murders who target members of the host society. MTV1 News warns that the Hungarian border is under attack by migrants who arrive in increasing numbers.\(^11\) The presenter highlights a killing of a couple in Sicily, Italy, by an immigrant from the Ivory Coast:

The young man lived in a welcoming centre where the police arrested him. The elderly couple was killed for mobile phones and cash in their home… Their daughter declared that the leadership of the country is responsible for the tragedy as they take migrants in indiscriminately while they are incapable of providing protection.\(^12\)

The presentation of the crime appears to highlight the threat and the moral obligation of the government to provide for the protection of the locals and at the same time equates migrants, asylum-seekers and criminals.

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\(^9\) See 29th August, 2015 (Saturday) from 3:00 to 5:50 minutes in MTV1 News.

\(^10\) See 4th September, 2015 (Friday) from 13:38 to 14:06 minutes in MTV1 News.

\(^11\) See 1st September, 2015 (Tuesday) from 13:23 to 17:20 minutes in MTV1 News.

\(^12\) See 31st August, 2015 (Sunday) from 09:55 to 10:22 minutes in MTV1 News.
RTLK, on the other hand, highlights that pointing to migrants as sources of danger is an invalid claim. RTLK stresses that migrants are heterogeneous groups, including families, children and vulnerable people. A news presentation aims to highlight the existence of many children and their families among migrating people. This view on the migrant category discredits the homogenous image of organized, aggressive and violent groups from which the host society should keep a distance. These pictures increase the likelihood of a more empathetic view on migrants. Moreover, RTLK points out that the underlying reasons for the behaviour of migrants that led to the rejection of cooperation is, in fact, the result of the inadequacy of the police forces to communicate properly and organize sufficient services. For example, according to RTLK news, no adequate communication was offered about the reasons for stopping train service to Germany; information was provided only in Hungarian. Accordingly, RTLK highlights that rebellions, marches and the rejection of cooperation by groups of migrants are subsequent results of the mismanagement of the situation and the inconsistency that characterized decisions during the first peak of the migration crisis.

The findings of the research show contrasting patterns in the disproportionality criterion between MTV1 and RTLK. The topic of migration was presented for significantly longer in the MTV1 news compared to the RTLK news in the examined period from September 14, 2015 to October 3, 2016. The topic of migration was significantly more dominant in MTV1 news than in RTLK news. The average length of migration-related topics in MTV1 news was 10:03 minutes, while, it was 3:52 minutes in RTLK news. Therefore, MTV1 presented migration-related topics over 36,6% of the total news sessions in the examined period with RTLK at 14,5%. Furthermore, these MTV1 News presentations often linked migration to terrorism, while migration and terrorism were clearly distinguishable themes in RTLK News.

News presentations on MTV1 kept the topic of migration on the agenda throughout the whole period. As Figure 3 shows, after the last quarter of 2015 the length of the topic of migration dropped slightly but firmly kept the same length until August 2016, when campaigns for the quota referendum started to increase the length of migration-related topics in MTV1 news. Only some special events, such as the Euro Football Cup or the Oscar Gala, interrupted the lengthy coverage of migration. These events grabbed public awareness and dominated the news agenda in early February, June and mid-August. The length of migration-related news is significantly higher on November 17, 2015, July 25 and October 3, 2016.

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13 See 1st September, 2015 (Tuesday) from 29:20 to 32:09 minutes in RTLK News.
14 Football European Cup in June 2016; Son of Saul Oscar Award Ceremony in early February; Olympic Games in mid-August 2016; The legislation changes on Sunday closure in early April.
In each case an exceptional event, such as terrorist attacks or the referendum on migration, increased news coverage.

RTLK news, on the other hand, seems to show the inverse of the tendency in the presentation of migration-related topics. Presentations on migration are rather short, unless news on legislative changes, international events, and war or terrorist attacks increase the length of presentations. Even in the last quarter of 2015, migration-related topics were presented for shorter timespans than in MTV1 news. In 2016 the length of these topics significantly dropped or, in many instances, completely disappeared. By the end of the examined period in August 2016, migration-related topics also increased in RTLK news due to the upcoming quota referendum. However, the length of these news blocks is still significantly lower than in MTV1 news.

While migration was presented in a variety of lengths in news broadcasts, the number of migrants significantly dropped. As Figure 3 shows, a massive fall in the number of migrants identified by the Immigration Office of Hungary can be seen in October 2015, when border control was firmly enforced. According to the Hungarian Immigration Office, from January to September 2015, more than 175,000 people were identified as a migrant seeking refuge. The number of people trying to enter in the last quarter of 2015 dropped to 1,172. In the first quarter of 2016, 7,182 were registered, with 15,309 in the second quarter and 4,386 in the third quarter (Hungarian Immigration Office, n.d.). Therefore, based on the data on the number of migrants, Hungary became significantly less affected by the impact of migration.
The length of migration-related topics in the news, however, did not change in relation to the decreasing security risk. As the number of migrants decreased and Hungary was less affected by migration, the security risk caused by the uncontrolled inflow of people also decreased. The decreasing security risk, however, did not have any effect on MTV1 news presentations. MTV1 news, with some interruptions, kept on presenting migration as threatening and hostile to the idealised order of Hungary. Migration was presented in a fashion similar to that of 2015, when significantly more migrants were travelling through the territory of Hungary. Consequently, while the real risk decreased, news broadcasts by MTV1 kept on presenting an increased level of threat caused by migrants and, thereby, communicated hostility and significant security threats posed by migrants.

Although migrants were more distant from the life of Hungarian people, the presentation of migrants in MTV1 news still showed hostility and threat. Migrants and migration are dominantly shown in relation to threatening attributes. The most common associations of a threatening attribute of migrants are terrorism, jihadism, cultural difference in relation to fundamentalism and the suppression of women. Terrorism, for example, is often linked to migration in news blocks, even though most commonly convicts are second- or third-generation citizens.

RTLK, on the other hand, clearly distinguishes migration and terrorism. RTLK news highlights that migrants and terrorists have distinct qualities and attributes. A presentation communicates that the tension among migrating people is often increased due to their uncertainty about terrorists hiding among them. This phrase implies a distinction between the two categories and counter-frames the equating of migration and terrorism. Themes related to each category are present as distinct blocks in presentations. Terrorist attacks are linked to ISIS while migrants are depicted as victims of war-stricken areas.

The findings of the research for the volatility criterion show different tendencies. Contrary to previous moral panic cases, MTV1 did not echo the topic of migration after its disappearance but, rather, constantly kept the theme on the agenda of the news. On the other hand, migration in the news of RTLK was nearly non-existent from early 2016 to mid-July, when the quota referendum campaigns started. Therefore, the topic of migration varies in different times of the year for the two poles of the media landscape. However, the tendency of keeping it on the news agenda or removing it almost completely characterizes the type of volatility that can be observed. Nevertheless, how the topic changes in relation to the actual context of the changing situation of migration becomes visible.

Based on the dominant framing in MTV1 news presentations, moral panic on migration has three stages. In the first stage, the threatening category is constructed. As shown above, during the discussion of the hostility criterion, news presentations depict migration as a threat to public order, morals and legal mechanisms in Hungary and frame migrants as a unified, homogeneous group with a clear aim. In the second stage, presentations grant authorities the potential to act, which articulates the views of these primary definers. MTV1 articulates arguments for solutions and, at the same time, shows images of hard working police and military officers. Presentations dominantly focus on the construction of the razor wire fence and on the heroic work of the police and military. In the third stage protection is implemented. Presentations imply that migrants are pushed back to the
Balkans. Dominantly, presentations show captured and ejected migrant stories and the Serbian and Macedonian situation of chaos, due to the closed Hungarian border.

In the succeeding stages, moral panic on migration is reiterated and constantly kept on the agenda. In the fourth stage, a new threatening agent appears in presentations. The Hungarian government is being judged for its solution and presentations focus mainly on conflicts with EU and neighboring states. Presentations show, for instance, Angela Merkel’s argument, her declining support and German problems caused by migrants. In contrast to this, the argument of the Hungarian Prime Minister is presented. This stage implies a conflict for the protection of the Hungarian solution to the inflow of threatening groups. In this framing, the EU turns into an agent aiming to eliminate the protective measures of the Hungarian government. In this framing, the EU is against the Hungarian values being threatened by hostile groups. In the fifth stage presentations communicate that the threat is pushed even further away from the Hungarian borders, implying that the protective measures of the Hungarian government were successful. News blocks, showing that the EU has struck an agreement with Turkey and the Balkan countries, imply that the Hungarian solution is adopted by the EU. Furthermore, it shows that the problem of migration is pushed to Italy, the Mediterranean Sea and Turkish camps. News blocks imply that Hungary is an example to other countries that might adopt the Hungarian solution. In the final stage, news presentations frame, new conflicts that Hungary takes on for the protection of its integrity and sovereignty. In this conflict, the EU is framed as a hostile agent of power aiming to take over the authority of Hungary over its domestic politics.

The six stages of moral panic in the Hungarian political environment differ from moral panics in earlier cases. The constructed threat of migrants did not appear and disappear as the volatility category of moral panic would prescribe. Instead, MTV1 constantly kept different aspects of migration on the agenda. In these related themes, the previously constructed threatening group was periodically used as a reference in news presentations, perhaps as a reminder to the audience of the pre-constructed danger. In light of the presented threat caused by migrants, policy solutions were discussed and advocated. These solutions have been shown as exemplary and ideal, while other countries were depicted as struggling to solve the problem of migration. The EU was also shown as a new threatening actor that endangers the security of Hungary by taking over sovereignty over the question of migration.

While MTV1 constructed the first three stages of its moral panic, RTLK broadcasted a reactionary response. RTLK news presentations frame government policy on migration as dysfunctional and inhuman. First, it shows that razor wire can hardly stop migrants from entering the country, while police capacity is reaching its maximum. After capturing and charging migrants for damaging the fence, they end up in Hungarian prisons in which, after one year, they are provided a residence permit. Therefore, the policy aiming to solve the inflow of migrants is presented as dysfunctional. Second, RTLK shows the negative impact of the fence on Balkan countries where the number of migrants increased, where migrants receive minimal services or stay in inhumane conditions. Therefore, RTLK news communicates that the razor wire and the Hungarian solution did not solve the problem but simply pushed it further away to the Balkans.
While MTV1 covered migration and related topics even though migrants almost completely disappeared, RTLK news removed these topics from its agenda. The topic is almost completely removed from news from early spring 2016. Only a few blocks appear that provide an explanation for political tension in the middle-East and migration. These presentations show terrorist attacks outside of Europe, ISIS-caused threats and potential war crimes in the middle-East, as well as inhumane treatment of migrants elsewhere.

Although RTLK news does not react to the last three stages of MTV1, RTLK increases coverage on migration as the date of the upcoming referendum approaches. Topics on migration generate sympathy toward migrants and discredit, for instance, the equating of migration with terrorism. RTLK news broadcasts, for instance, a discussion with the Pope, who talks about the necessity of making a distinction between fundamentalism and religiosity. Immediately after, in the same news session, warfare as a cause of escape and migration is emphasized.

The level of consensus on the threat generated by migrants on the idealized order of society is also framed in different ways by the two poles of the Hungarian media landscape. MTV1 presented the narrative articulated of the Prime Minister of Hungary concerning the victory on the referendum. The 6 pm news presented 6 minutes of speeches in parliament exclusively held by members of the FIDESZ-KDNP party coalition. According to the narrative articulated, the referendum informally legitimized the rejection of EU quotas due to the 98.34 percent of no votes. RTLK presents a more balanced perspective on the referendum. The presentation emphasized that:

the referendum was invalid because only slightly more than 40 per cent of voters submitted a valid vote. However, from these votes 98 per cent chose to vote no.

The presentation also highlighted that the referendum cost more than any previous referendum.

In the light of the referendum, the presentation of a moral panic might have had an impact on voters. If the referendum is considered a measurement of the success of framing migration as moral panic in MTV1 news, the result can be seen as an implemented project. The political power that aimed to reach, mobilize and unify voters against the exaggerated construction of an external threat seems to have achieved its aim. This political power unified a wide spectrum of politically active voters, including possibly the entire right-wing. The 3,362,224 votes against the EU mandate to resettle non-Hungarian citizens on the territory of Hungary without the permission of the Hungarian National Assembly are significant (Hungarian Elections Office, n.d.). In comparison to the national election in 2014, the two right-wing groups, FIDESZ-KDNP and JOBBIK, received fewer votes together, which were 3,285,256 (Hungarian Elections Office, n.d.). From this perspective, presentation of moral panic achieved its intended goal of unification among supporters.

However, moral panic did not reach everyone. The referendum resulted in invalid or blank votes and also absentees. 224,668 people actively protested against the unfair question by submitting invalid votes. 56,163 people voted yes to the question of the referendum (Hungarian Elections Office, n.d.). Moreover, 4,629,570 people simply did not turn up on the day of the referendum. These people can be passive boycotters of the validity of
the referendum, which has to be enforced only if it reaches 50 percent turnout rates. The other reason for being absent might be the loss of interest in migration, moral panic or in the resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens. Consequently, the majority of people were not affected by moral panic in any way. However, it is hard to evaluate politically active voters from this pool of absentees.

**Conclusion**

To summarize, moral panic was framed and counter-framed in the Hungarian news presentation of the two main poles of the Hungarian media landscape. In all criteria of moral panic, MTV1 news presented intense hostility. Furthermore, in MTV1 news, the time spent on migration significantly increased. Even when the number of migrants arriving in Hungary significantly fell, MTV1 kept the same level of intensity in the presentation of hostility and threat. The constructed category of the migrant was repeatedly used as a reference in relation to new constructions of threats to the security and the values of Hungary. In RTLK news, on the other hand, the frame of hostility and threat was counter-framed. In RTLK news, a more humane aspect of migration was presented. This focused on the causes of escape, the difficulties of travelling and the possibility of facing death on the routes. RTLK news presented the personal aspects of all these and the emotions of migrants. Beyond generating empathy toward migrants, RTLK news also made a distinction between terrorism and migration. The time spent on the topic of migration was equal in the first peak of migration crisis, however, when the number of migrants dropped, RTLK news significantly reduced the time spent on migration.

The presentation of moral panic shows novel patterns in the political milieu of Hungary. Contrary to moral panics that usually occur and reoccur for a short period of time in order to achieve legitimacy for regulation, moral panic in the Hungarian case is constant. Moral panic and the communication of hostility were present in the whole examined period from September 5, 2015 to October 3, 2016. First, the construction of threat, hard work by authorities and the implementation of solutions were articulated. Second, although the threat became more and more distant, new agents of hostility were constructed and framed as dangerous to the implementation of security policies in Hungary. In the Hungarian case, therefore, moral panic is presented on a multidimensional level, constantly bombarding voters with a network of constructed threatening agents.

The consensus criterion, although not adequately measured, indicates the receptivity of moral panic among politically active citizens. The representation of moral panic mirrors embedded power relations in the Hungarian media landscape. Moral panic on migration and the network of newly constructed threatening agents possibly achieved consensus among politically active citizens who were hesitant about the two major competing political parties on the right in Hungary. Therefore, moral panic on migration possibly fulfilled its purpose of unification of supporters. The high number of absentees and protest voters may indicate that the communication of moral panic did not reach or had no effect on the majority. However, it is difficult to measure the number of people in this pool who are politically active.
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kiderult_milyen_feliratok_lesznek_meg_a_k
TWO SIDES NOW: ACCOUNTS AND REFLECTIONS ON RESEARCH AND THE MAKING OF A FILM

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This article reflects on research and a film that investigated media coverage of the 2015 refugee crisis by public broadcasters in Hungary and Serbia. The results were presented in a short socially engaging documentary. It consists of a coalescence of short clips from evening news reports which summarize the findings through conclusion-style narration. The documentary depicts the striking contrast in the representation of refugees and migrants in the public media of the two countries. Although the documentary focused specifically on public broadcasters, an additional aim of the project was to show how these both reflect and influence the attitude of general public opinion toward refugees. The findings are reflected through four segments in the film: 1) the discrepancies in the representation of the gravity of the situation; 2) the selective analyses of the situation by the media—namely, the focus on the security threat in Hungary on the one hand, and humanitarian and human security in Serbia on the other; 3) the justification of government policies and; 4) boasting about the merits and achievements of these policies. These four sections illustrate that in both Hungary and Serbia, the refugee crisis was processed and exploited employing the same methods and for the same purpose: essentially, the crisis was used to demonstrate the efficiency of the state’s response to the supposed ordeal it was facing. However, although the method was the same, the arguments differed: Hungarian state media presented “illegal immigrants” as a threat to Hungarian and European culture. In this narrative, Hungary—i.e. the government—presented itself as the gatekeeper of Europe. Serbian public media, on the other hand, chose to focus on the human tragedy of the “refugees” and to highlight the generosity of Belgrade’s humanitarian efforts to relieve them in their plight. Following this logic, the Serbian government could claim to be more European than Europeans themselves.
Introduction and Background

Over the course of summer 2015, the number of refugees and migrants entering Europe through the Balkans increased considerably. Each of the countries located on this migration route experienced this increase, and Serbia and Hungary were no exceptions. The number of refugees entering Serbia quadrupled within just a few months: in May 2015, Serbia registered 9,034 asylum seekers. Three months later, in August, 37,195 people were registered (UNHCR, 2015). Although practically all of these migrants only transited through the country and there were never more than ten thousand refugees in Serbia at any given moment, the increasing flow of people was quite visible in Belgrade. The neighborhoods located around train and bus station were full of large families carrying backpacks. Hundreds of people were sleeping in surrounding parks, trying to get rest before the next phase of the journey. Soon this became a hot topic not just in Belgrade, but in the entire country: numerous civic associations were hastily set up to provide help to the refugees, dozens of initiatives were organized to collect clothes, hygiene items and food, while through the media one could follow major developments in the country and the region day by day. By the end of August 2015, what had been dubbed “Europe’s biggest migration crisis since WWII” was an incessant and ever-present topic that had for the moment monopolized public discourse in the country, generating a rather surprising level of solidarity among ordinary citizens with the fate of the refugees. The overall tone of this discourse was that the refugees had not chosen to migrate to Europe but were forced into fleeing by a brutal conflict in which they were innocent victims, and “we,” the citizens of Serbia, have a duty to help them on their journey to a better and safer life in Western Europe. Far from being seen as a threat, the migrants were largely portrayed as harmless and even helpless victims. Quite frequently, the Serbian state broadcaster, Radio Television of Serbia (hereinafter RTS), would feature in the news a story of some generous individual who had offered help to the refugees, either by giving away some of his or her precious belongings, or by hosting entire refugee families. But beyond these cases of exceptional generosity that were immediately highlighted by the media, the general attitude toward the refugees was predominantly positive and benevolent. An example of this is the case of “Refugee Aid Miksalište”, a civic organization set up in the beginning of 2015 to provide help to the migrants. This ad-hoc initiative was originally intended to bring together and mobilize members of the local community in Belgrade to gather humanitarian aid. Spurred on by RTS, which publicized its initiatives, Miksalište became extremely successful in gathering and distributing clothes, food and other items. By August 2015, this ad-hoc civic initiative transformed into a permanent welcoming point for refugees, with its own sanitary facilities, kitchen, distribution and even a cultural center which organized numerous workshops and activities. In the eyes of the public Miksalište in a way became the symbol of solidarity with the refugees in Belgrade.

Over the same period, Hungary experienced a very similar process regarding the refugee crisis but with an altogether different outcome. In 2015, the number of first-time asylum seekers in Hungary was 174,000, which was four times more than in the previous year. This made Hungary a country with the second-highest number of

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1 As of October 19, there are 6300 refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Serbia (UNHCR, 2016).
applications received in the EU-28 (Eurostat, 2016).\textsuperscript{2} This unprecedented flow of people triggered controversial political reactions from the Hungarian government. In May, the government launched a “National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism,” which was a questionnaire sent to all citizens above the age of 18. It portrayed refugees as “illegal economic immigrants” who were encouraged by the EU to leave their countries and head toward Europe “to benefit from the European economic and welfare system”. Those citizens willing to participate in the decision-making were asked to mail back the questionnaire by July 31. At the same time, the government initiated a billboard campaign as well that was addressed to the migrants and displayed slogans such as “If you come to Hungary you have to respect our laws” or “If you come to Hungary you cannot take our jobs”—all in Hungarian. Meanwhile, asylum seekers who were willing to continue their routes to Germany crowded transit zones, refugee camps, railway stations, parks and borders. They were labelled as “threatening,” “violent” and even described as a harmful horde of people by the public media broadcaster’s M1 channel,\textsuperscript{3} which is one of the core recourses of our research. At the end of August refugees crowded the Budapest Keleti Railway Station—which was eventually designated a “transit zone”—because the government blocked international railway traffic in order to register every single person who entered the country. However, refugees refused to be registered in Hungary, as their final destination in the EU was either Austria or Germany. Shortly after these events, the government announced the closure of the Serbian-Hungarian border by building a 175 kilometer-long, 4 meter-high “security fence”. The fence was ready by September and with the amendment of Hungarian criminal law, illegal crossing of the fence/border became a violation of the law, and therefore a criminal act. Despite hostile political messages, civil society engaged in helping the refugees all over Hungary. Among many NGOs, MigSzol (Migrant Solidarity Group) and Menedék (Hungarian Association for Migrants) were the most active participants of the crisis: they mobilized people and collected and delivered supplies for migrants in need.

But despite the many initiatives coming from Hungarian civil society, the differences in the official attitude toward the migrants were quite startling. The discrepancy between the Serbian and Hungarian discourse was most obvious regarding the border fence, already under construction. For weeks, the Serbian and Hungarian government had been feuding, through their respective public broadcasters, over the fence and its legitimacy. The Hungarian side claimed that it was the only way to stem the tide of refugees. As a result, Hungary had taken upon itself to defend the continent from the unwelcome foreigners, since countries on the Balkan route, Serbia especially, were not doing their duty and were simply letting, or worse, encouraging people to pass through. In this scenario, Hungary appeared as the country that was bearing the brunt of the refugee crisis. The Serbian State media, on the other hand, was accusing Hungary of rash decisions and selfishness. It acted unilaterally and avoided cooperating with its neighbors to find a common and humane solution to the crisis. That was the overall tone of bilateral relations between Serbia and Hungary, as presented through the public broadcasters, when the academic semester began in September 2015.

\textsuperscript{2} It is important to highlight the fact that the vast majority of the registered asylum seekers continued their journey toward Western Europe. Therefore, just as Serbia, Hungary is mainly a transit country.

\textsuperscript{3} M1 is one of the channels owned and operated by Magyar Televízió, the Hungarian public broadcasting company.
One of the courses offered at Central European University at the time was “External and Internal Determinants of Recent Global Migration in Europe”. The course had been specifically designed in response to developments that had taken place over the summer. It appeared to be the perfect opportunity to take a step back and critically analyze the dominant discourses that had been whipped up and repeated countless times by public broadcasters in both Serbia and Hungary. The three of us were particularly interested in deconstructing the prevalent perceptions of the migration crisis, and analyzing in what specific ways these perceptions differed in the two countries. But rather than looking into these questions in a usual term paper, we were given the opportunity to choose a more innovative medium. That is when we decided to make a short amateur documentary that would present the striking contrast in the interpretation of the Hungarian and Serbian public broadcasters. After sifting through numerous Hungarian and Serbian news reports, we decided to ask the following research question: for what purposes did Serbia and Hungary politicize the migration crisis through public broadcasters?

Methodology and Mapping the Outline

Analysis of multimedia content is an emerging method in journalism, activism, social media and academia. Justification for such comes from the digital era, which is an unavoidable characteristic of our times in almost any contemporary discourse analyses. Furthermore, Uwe Flick, in his Introduction to Qualitative Research (1998) states that qualitative research uses film to tell us about the social construction of reality. In the analysis of the video footage in this research we followed the general instructions on how to conduct such non-normative action correctly. The guide most followed naturally was that described by Denzin (2004) which includes the steps of: ‘Looking and Feeling’, or regarding videos as a whole, developing a research question out of the feeling, trying to impose microstructural analyses, and in the end finding patterns.

The pattern in media reporting videos in our hands was shocking, as it seemed to justify the theory of the influence of media on the general atmosphere within a society. Our initial research stimulus concerned the differences in the general feeling about the migration crisis in Serbia and Hungary. And then, after carefully watching, mapping and categorizing dozens of hours of video footage, we were back to the same spot: mixed feelings and an almost bipolar satiety with information.

Hence, the outline we came up with to summarize our findings in the patterns very clearly showed how every political action is there for different goals, namely those of: campaign-building, economic gain, even nation-building, and all for power-building and control. It was necessary to take on an objective and a macro perspective on media reporting to see these dots connect into a clear line.

We posited that to achieve these goals, information is easily shaped and reshaped through widespread state media until it fits the desired perspective. The story is given a dimension necessary for the people or the masses to accept the truth that the state envisions in its long-term agendas.
Despite both sides ultimately turning to populism for political sustainability and other goals previously enlisted, we decided to emphasize that working for one’s goals doesn’t have to be entirely bad. There are innately good ways of achieving political goals, and bad ones. It very much seemed to still be a choice. However, this leads us only to another deadlock: The eternally human and hence academic question of who is to make this choice. Is it the people? (Barham, 2010) As there is a certain limit to one’s academic analysis capacities, and definitely limits to a short documentary style, this was left as a rhetoric puzzle for the viewers, satisfying a popular trait in activist documentary film-making in the meantime.

**Storyline (Un)covers**

In order to answer our research question, we went through all the news reports covering the migration crisis of M1 and RTS respectively, from June to August 2015. Very quickly it became obvious how contrastingly different the approach of the two broadcasters was, and that they were both in line with the official stance of their respective states. Following this initial assessment, the news reports were then categorized in main groups, in accordance with the topic of each particular report. As such, a storyline simply emerged, composed of 4 main segments: 1) the discrepancies in the representation of the gravity of the situation; 2) the selective analyses of the situation by the media—namely, the focus on the security threat in Hungary on the one hand, and the humanitarian and human ordeal in Serbia on the other; 3) the justification of government policies and; 4) the boasting about the merits and achievements of these policies. These segments also represent strong arguments leading viewers through the investigative stream of the storyline, much like an academic paper, but in images.

**Gravity of Discrepancies**

The first segment represents the first and foremost discrepancy between the Serbian and Hungarian media reports, which is the presentation of the gravity of the migration crisis. The phenomenon was labelled internationally as a “migration crisis” early on. However, this is an ambiguous term from a macro perspective and leaves much space for reshaping. In the micro perspective, everyone molds it in a certain way to justify their arguments.

The Hungarian national media mostly presented the crisis as an almost evil threat to the state by focusing on security issues and emphasizing incidents at the borders. Words often used in reporting were: “illegal,” “aggressive,” “violators,” “disobeying” and so on. Clips of dissatisfied citizens and tourists were included often, showing how the migrants were bad for Hungary and its economy.

On the other hand, the Serbian media emphasized the humanitarian side of the story, showing refugees in Serbia talking about their reasons for fleeing their country of origin and their fears. A very mild tone in the voice of the narrators is present, with emphasis on words such as: “war,” “hunger,” “security,” “children” and “shelter.”
Selective Analyses

In line with the previous segment, the second aspect goes more in-depth by representing how the media on the two sides had selected certain segments of their representation of the crisis to put the country’s agenda in focus. For Hungarian media, it was the worry of Hungary of implications that the situation would have on the security of the nation, and how the government is ready to protect the nation. This is shown through constant reporting on the plans and progress of building the fence at the Hungarian borders and taking a stand as a protector of Europe. However, the Serbian public broadcaster focused on how Serbia is reacting and calling for the international community to help the country in its humanitarian efforts for the refugees. Emphasis is still always put on the needs of refugees and how the authorities are trying the help, but risk being overwhelmed by what may turn into a “humanitarian catastrophe”. At no point are the refugees designated as those responsible for such a situation. Rather, RTS often accused Hungary as the culprit, claiming that the building of the fence makes any common solution impossible, and only aggravates the humanitarian situation.

Justification

All of these actions on both sides were often justified through media such that “the other” is also to blame. Hungary over-emphasized the so-called “European goal” of its policies on immigrants, as to protect the continent, while the Serbian media put an emphasis on how it is almost alone in this fight to find a humane solution to the crisis and how the Hungarian government is acting on its own without consulting regionally for a common policy and goal. Throughout the analysis of this segment of the research findings, it was noticeable that the media were finding scapegoats\textsuperscript{4} for their positions in their very neighbors.

Merits

As the summer was fading, and the crisis was becoming a steady news topic, the media and the governments directly started boasting about the correctness of their behavior. The Hungarian media was showing the ability of the state to handle this crisis, while the Serbian side was gloating with wonderful words from refugees themselves about the hospitality of Serbia and its citizens.

For this segment, it was also decided to include two messages for the conclusion of the video from the very websites of the two governments. The first is a video produced by the far-right mayor of the Hungarian town of Ásotthalom, located on the Serbian border. The high-production, almost action blockbuster-like video shows the measures taken by the mayor to protect the border. The second one is the video of Serbian Minister Vulin gloating about Serbia’s high standards in human rights, which he even concludes to be higher than those of the European Union.

\textsuperscript{4} A theory within psychology about the possibility of developing prejudice and/or blaming a certain group to vent one’s own anger (Gross, 2010).
Conclusions and Call for Action

This short documentary attempted to illustrate that in both Hungary and Serbia, the migration crisis of summer 2015 was equally politicized by public broadcasters, but in different ways. In Hungary, the crisis was mainly presented as a security and economic threat, and even as a threat to Hungarian and European identity. Framing the problem in this way enabled the Hungarian government to display the efficiency with which it was tackling these threats. The centerpiece of this effort to stem the tide of migrants was the border fence. Through the public broadcaster, the Hungarian government claimed that it was not just defending the country, but the entire continent, from the flood of migrants. Through state media, Hungary was presented as the gates that protect European (read Christian) civilization and identity from the migrant (read Muslim) “flood”.

In Serbia, the issue was framed in an altogether different, but equally politicized manner. Serbian public media focused on the human tragedy of the refugees and highlighted the generosity of Belgrade’s humanitarian efforts to relieve their plight. The Serbian discourse essentialized the migrant just as much as the Hungarian discourse. But rather than being the alien, the non-European or the terrorist (Szalai & Göbl, 2015), Serbian media portrayed the migrant as a helpless victim, the passive subject of our benevolence. Such a portrayal in turn enabled the government to present itself as the humane caretaker that looks after the ordinary man, even if he is not a citizen of the country. Oddly enough, we found that, just like Hungary, Serbia too used the migration crisis to display its European-ness. Public officials claimed that the policies adopted by the State were sure proof of its adherence to European and universal values of humanity, tolerance and human rights. What’s more, the Serbian authorities claimed to be more European than Europeans themselves, and to illustrate this, RTS frequently referred to the selfishness and indifference of the Hungarian attitude. This proved to be quite a successful strategy for the Serbian government, which was indeed praised for its handling of the crisis (“Za EP Srbija Pozitivan Igrač,” 2016).

More than a year has passed since the events we studied in our short documentary; what have been the major developments since that period? In particular, did the predominant discourse of the Hungarian and Serbian public broadcasters change in the meantime?

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*A report recently published by the European Parliament stated that, in spite of a poorly developed asylum system, Serbia is a positive player in the migration crisis.*
In September 2015, right after the period of time we dealt with in our short documentary, the development of a migrant quota system was suggested by some of the member states of the European Union. The system would have distributed asylum seekers among countries according to the member states’ size, population and economic situation. It originally aimed to relocate 160,000 refugees from Italy and Greece to other EU countries in the name of solidarity and sharing responsibility; however, a year later, in September 2016, Hungary, along with Slovakia, refused the implementation of the plan (“EU Stands by Unsolved Migrant Quotas”, 2016).

Meanwhile in Hungary, the quota system gained enormous political attention at the domestic level as well. Once again, the government launched a huge billboard campaign, calling on its citizens to participate in a referendum where they could vote against the mandatory quota that concerns Hungary. The question was the following: “Do you want the European Union to be able to mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the approval of the National Assembly?” (“Hungary votes on EU,” 2016) M1 and the whole of the Hungarian public service media was used by the government during the campaign period to advertise the referendum. It was held on October 2, 2016, and participation was 41.32 per cent. This means that the poll was actually invalid, because participation was below the required 50 percent threshold. However, a striking 98 percent of those who voted chose to answer no to the proposed question. Without mentioning the invalidity of the referendum, the ruling party, Fidesz, celebrated the outcome of the referendum as a major victory. The government is attempting to strengthen its position in Hungary by raising (false) awareness of the threat that migration potentially means to Europe and to the Hungarian nation. We might conclude that the Hungarian political attitude toward refugees has not changed in a year, nor has the state-funded public broadcaster’s discourses. In its discourse Hungary is using fairly Eurosceptic rhetorical elements, while in Serbia this is not echoed. However, Serbia has also started to reconsider its position towards the refugees.

In the summer of 2016, border controls became even stricter in all of Serbia’s neighboring countries, not just Hungary. Faced with the prospect of becoming a kind of “cul de sac,” a country where migrants and refugees would “pile up” without being able to continue their journey toward Western Europe, the Serbian attitude all of a sudden became much less noble. Officials stated on numerous occasions that they will not allow Serbia to become a “parking lot” for migrants (“Vulin: Srbija Neće Biti,” 2016). Slowly, the issue of “security” started to creep into the public discourse. The migrant was no longer just the helpless victim but an “illegal trespasser” (“Vulin: Smanjuje se broj,” 2016). Several thousand policemen and soldiers were sent to monitor the southern borders with Bulgaria and Macedonia in order to prevent such “undocumented migrants”—a term that only recently made its appearance in public statements—from entering the country. The authorities also began to make distinctions between “justified” and “unjustified” migrants, and to allude to their supposed violent and disrespectful character. This new attitude was best illustrated by the words of the former Serbian prime minister himself. During a joint press conference in Belgrade with his Hungarian counterpart, Viktor Orbán, Aleksandar Vucic made the following statement: “Today we have more problems (with migrants). At the (Serbian-Hungarian) border 81 percent of people are from Afghanistan, they are economic migrants, and these are people who first started to make trouble. They fight among themselves, and for the first time we caught them stealing from two commercial establishments. There is a different atmosphere compared to the one we had at the beginning of the crisis” (“Ne
možemo biti glupi’ Orban nudi,” 2016). The Minister of Labor, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs, who is in charge of managing the migration crisis, even suggested building a fence on the country’s southern border.

But despite this new element in the discourse, Serbian officials simultaneously try to maintain the image of a benevolent State, especially in the eyes of the West. During a visit to New York in late September 2016, Aleksandar Vucic assured that Serbia is treating migrants well and that it is showing a “humane face” (“Vučić: Nema političke cene koju,” 2016). Most recently, the government went so far as to send 50 tons of humanitarian aid to Aleppo, in a display of solidarity with the people of Syria (“Avion sa humanitarnom pomoći,” 2016). In essence, a kind of split in the discourse is taking place: on the one hand, Serbia still wishes to display its generosity, but at the same time the migration crisis is increasingly securitized. It remains to be seen whether this contradictory stance will last.

The main indications for our research here lie in the idea that it is the right time to repeat it and keep the topic alive in international academia. The reactions of our peers to the films, as well as the conversations it ignites with its perspectives, along with never-ending developments, set a sure justification for a higher-production remake of the film, as well as the production of a higher quality sequel that would continue and increase the outreach of the message among peoples.

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SETTING THE STAGE FOR MIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN DETROIT

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The ongoing urban regeneration in Detroit includes a variety of developments and municipal changes that seek to reposition the city within global fields of capital accumulation. Among many components of redevelopment, migrant communities become integral. To better understand the migrant role in Detroit’s revitalization, I use the theoretical perspective of migrant emplacement, which is understood as the ability of migrants to settle and build networks of connection within the opportunities and constraints of a specific locality. Placing the analytical focus on time, the shifts within the municipal governance and its efforts at urban revitalization reflect the infrastructural changes that, among others, create favorable conditions for migrant settlement. For Detroit, the recent inauguration of the Immigration Task Force and the Office of Immigrant Affairs fosters a welcoming climate and municipal inclusiveness, while simultaneously benefitting from the economic, political, and cultural capital migrant communities bring. This paper looks at the current moment in Detroit’s historical trajectory to analyze how migrant communities become part of broader municipal structures and play a role in urban revitalization.

Introduction

Attempting to move forward from a recent bankruptcy and large-scale industrial decline, Detroit is in the midst of what some call a “renaissance”. The city’s rebranding and urban regeneration strategies include local, national, and global large and small-scale development projects, whether in art, technology, or business. These developments aim to repopulate and revitalize the city, simultaneously reflecting its broader attempt to reposition itself within global economic, political and cultural networks of power. As part of global repositioning, which will be discussed by using the scalar cities perspective, Detroit is at a point in time in its trajectory whereby the municipality takes on the favorable infrastructural shifts for migrant settlement. I will argue that these attempts include Detroit’s institutional ambition to both retain, include, and draw migrant communities as reflected in the municipality’s joining the national Welcoming Cities network and creating the Immigration Task Force and the Office of Immigrant Affairs, among others. The historical trajectory will trace Detroit’s favorable position within the former global power structures as the result of its industrial strength. The research will then demonstrate the negative impact of neoliberal policies on Detroit’s current global positionality and power networks. A brief discussion related to city’s attempt to recover and jump the scalar positioning through municipal efforts and public-private investments will ensue. The paper’s final portion will demonstrate municipal efforts of attracting and retaining migrant communities that contribute to broader revitalization processes.
Theoretical Perspectives

A scalar cities approach yields a clear perspective for understanding Detroit’s current development, urbanization, and migrant related policies. Detroit’s institutional structure and governance, along with territorialized opportunity produced by contemporary economic and political conjunctions of power and its geographic positioning, make it a substantial place for inquiry (Glick Schiller & Çağlar, 2013, p. 500). The scalar cities approach states that cities are not nested in interstate or national-regional hierarchies, but are rather situated within global fields of power (Glick Schiller & Çağlar, 2011b). Thus, “… city scale [is] the differential positioning of a city, which reflects both its articulation of flows of political, cultural, and economic capital within regions, state-based, and globe-spanning histories and capacities…” (ibid., p. 74). Furthermore, cities’ placements are determined by their positionality within the global economic, political, and cultural networks and hierarchies of power (Glick Schiller & Çağlar, 2013, p. 500). The positionality of a locality is shaped by space and time and is relational to its position to others, their power in terms of influence, and reproduction and challenges vis-à-vis preexisting configurations of hierarchies (Sheppard, 2002). Thereby, positionality of cities situated within the global economy and in the globalizing world discloses their future in terms of shifting, assymmetric, and path-dependent processes linked to their interdependencies with other regional, national, and global spaces (ibid., p. 318). Thus, all cities become global because they are affected by and take part in global processes of “neoliberal restructuring and rescaling” (Glick Schiller & Çağlar, 2011a, pp. 5-7). In order to attain favorable position within the global arena, cities adopt neoliberal programs which result in urban policy to reorganize and construct “place-marketing, enterprise empowerment zones, local tax abatements, urban development corporations, public-private partnerships, and new forms of local boosterism to workfare policies, property-redevelopment schemes, business incubator projects, new strategies of social control, policies, and surveillance, and host of other institutional modifications within the local and national state apparatus” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 21). Within the context of scalar cities, Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2011b, p. 72) see migrants as “scale makers who in their multiple positionings within urban life contribute actively to facilitating, legitimizing, and contesting neoliberal restructuring and its local constitution of global process.” Incorporating the transnational and cultural reach of migrants, cities like Detroit benefit from place-making and immigrant-friendly policies. As migrant communities become factored into municipal restructuring processes and agendas, they become assets in Detroit’s repositioning efforts.

In order to reposition itself in the globalizing world, Detroit, like many other post-industrial cities, adopted neoliberal projects and urban austerity measures. Jason Hackworth notes that, “...in the Motor City, neoliberal ways of framing reality have become so pervasive that the city’s prevailing policy options particularly with respect to land management, have been restricted to “market-first” and “market only” policy regimes” (Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2015, p. xii). Detroit’s current discourse of regeneration, redevelopment, and rebranding reflects a particular space and time in its trajectory. Its efforts at place-making, empowerment zones, and other initiatives create a favorable time and space for migrant emplacement. “Emplacement is understood as a relationship between the continuing restructuring of a city within networks of power and migrants’ efforts to settle and build networks of connection within the constraints and opportunities of a specific locality” (Glick & Çağlar, 2013, p. 495). Focusing on the conjunction between time and space, emplacement considers migrants’ local and transna-
tional networks in relation to local institutions, their structures, and narratives (Schiller & Çağlar, 2013, p. 495). Here, Detroit’s institutionalized efforts create opportunities for migrant resettlement, which will simultaneously benefit the city itself. However, these efforts are results of historical and temporal processes which initially contributed to the city’s decline.

**Contextualizing Detroit**

Detroit’s large physical size and image as an are related to its manufacturing past and city’s positioning in the earlier world systems. By the mid 19th century, Detroit’s biggest industry became shipping, and the first rail connection with New York resulted in a large influx of Polish and Italian immigrants. By the late 19th century, half of Detroit’s population was born outside of the United States, with over 40 nationalities represented (Detroit Historical Society, n.d.). The 20th century saw Detroit’s population rise to 285,704 residents (12% non-English speaking) while becoming a leader in industries like ship building, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, beer brewing, rail cars, and other steel production lines (Detroit Historical Society, n.d.).

The booming manufacturing industry, technological advances, and capital made Detroit a distinguishable destination. By 1912, the Detroit Board of Commerce partnered with the immigration commissioner at Ellis Island to provide transportation costs to immigrants willing to relocate to Detroit (Peterson, 1987, p. 13). While this contributed to the arrival of new immigrants, it made Detroit attractive to their families and friends from abroad. Competitive wages drew workers, resulting in a significant shift of the city’s ethnic and racial background. Between the 1910s and 1930s, as a result of immigrant arrivals and the migration of African-American population from the South, Detroit’s population grew significantly. The Detroit Board of Commerce, like Ford Motor Company’s Sociology Department, developed “Americanization” initiatives, providing English and “cultural” classes to their foreign-born workers (Meyer, 1980). Despite federal immigration restrictions of 1921 and 1924, Detroit’s population expanded to about 1.6 million in the 1930s, becoming the fourth-largest city in the United States (Sugrue, n.d.). Migrants from Russia, Germany, Poland, and Italy took residence and established themselves throughout the city by building churches, shops, businesses, and other ethnically centered enterprises. African-Americans coming from the South were excluded from white neighborhoods and federal loan programs and were directed toward old and deteriorating districts (Sugrue, n.d.). “Real estate agents refused to show houses in “white” neighborhoods to blacks, unless they were deemed “blighted” or “transitional” neighborhoods that were expected to lose white population...The result was the creation of two separate cities, one black and one white” (Sugrue, n.d.). The in-migration to Detroit contributed to the city’s diversification and physical expansion that sought to address both the rise of population and the expansion of the manufacturing sector.

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1 Many cities of the U.S. industrial North, like Philadelphia and Detroit, enjoyed favorable national and global positioning due to its manufacturing strength and product output (Goode, 2011, pp. 143-165).
The growth of the automotive industry contributed to the bureaucratization and increase in “white collar” positions, contributing to the uneven socioeconomic spatial development of Detroit. Thousands of managers and supervisors, as well as top level officials and skilled professionals, relocated farther away from industrial centers, establishing more affluent and wealthy neighborhoods (which stand to this day). The sociopolitical consequences of the Great Depression resulted in loss of employment and production decrease, creating discriminatory hiring policies towards women and minorities (Sugrue, 2014). Roosevelt’s call to help the allied powers in Europe during World War II helped Detroit retrieve its manufacturing power and become an “Arsenal of Democracy” by producing war materials. By the end of World War II and with return of war veterans, urban sprawl was under way, aided by federal policies and the development of highway systems.

The second half of the 20th century and the beginnings of the 21st proved to be significantly detrimental for Detroit, as demonstrated in the following table (Farley, 2015):

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Population: −63%</td>
<td>Manufacturing Firms (MF): −86%</td>
<td>Per capita income: −14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed Detrotiers: −74%</td>
<td>MF Employment: −93%</td>
<td>Employed Detrotiers: −18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Homes: −51%</td>
<td>Retail stores: −88%</td>
<td>Poverty Rate: +41%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Wholesale Firms: −88%</td>
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In 1947, Detroit hosted about 3,300 outdated plants, causing manufacturers to rebuild in the suburban ring (Farley, 2015). Simultaneously, national housing policies and accessible mortgages (Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration) helped finance and facilitate the out-migration of working class, white and immigrant Detroiters. With the relocation of the manufacturing centers and population, retail businesses also fled the urban core (Farley, 2015). “This spatial separation contributed to a new national politics in which attitudes toward race were a central factor” (Tabb, 2015, p. 61). Civil rights movements and racial integration were viewed by many whites as a threat to their position in the liberal society; therefore, the liberalism of the New Deal era unraveled, securing a top-down favoritism by many white, working class Americans. Until the 1970s, revenue sharing, funded assistance and social programs created a city dependent on federal funding, thus increasing the cost of city services (Tabb, 2015). However, the stagflation of the mid-1970s enabled neoliberal and market-oriented alternatives to became more favored among the U.S. population. Re-industrialization efforts in cities like Detroit were suspended because of the political opposition towards government involvement in restructuring. Detroit's average yearly incomes decreased and the city lost more than 20% of population (Tabb, 2015). The Reagan administration cut federal aid to cities, including Detroit, in an attempt to promote local self-reliance, resulting in a decrease in spending for education, transportation, health service, and other urban services (Tabb, 2015). In the 1980s, globalized capital sought to secure investment wherever preferable and most profitable while circumscribing government and abandoning American workers. Throughout this time, the depopulation of Detroit became even more significant and the city’s decline evident, as demonstrated in the table above. The closure of manufacturing plants in a city that was built on blue-collar, industrial workers offered no
alternatives or expansion of education and other professions for the city’s mostly African-American residents. Therefore, the impact of global neoliberal, market-driven, socioeconomically selective policies is closely related to the uneven economic development and racial segregation of Detroit’s urban core in relation to its metropolitan region. Currently, the median income in Detroit is a little less than $26,000 per year with almost 40% of residents living below the poverty line (DataUsa). Positions mostly taken by Detroiters are also those that are the lowest paid, namely in the health services and administrative support sectors, while the highest paying positions of architects, physicians, and lawyers are least represented in the city (Ibid.). In addition, the city’s immigrant population is currently at a little over 6%, with most residents being of Hispanic, Middle Eastern, and South Asian descent.

Despite various attempts to counter the decline, including Mayor Dave Bing’s 2012 creation of the Detroit Future City comprehensive plan for development, Detroit was unable to sustain itself. In 2012 Michigan’s governor Rick Snyder became involved in city matters when he was informed that Detroit would soon be unable to pay its employees or debts because of the decrease in tax revenue (Farley, 2015). Although the voters removed Michigan’s Emergency Management Law by ballot, “a lame-duck legislature in December 2012 enacted a new emergency manager law that closely resembled the one the voters rejected” (Farley, 2015, p. 100). Governor Snyder intervened in local governance by appointing the Emergency Manager, Kevyn Orr, who filed for Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. During the bankruptcy, the negotiated settlement awarded some national and international banks that profitable contracts and development-ready, valuable city-owned real estate at a discounted price (Peck, 2015). Chapter 9 further enforced Detroit’s global and national image of a failed city; however, it created a favorable space for national and international economic investment at a cheap price. This contributed to uneven economic development in the city and the inequality gap between the wealthy investors and those able to reap its benefits and long-time Detroiters. Furthermore, local territorial unevenness became even more prevalent as specific neighborhoods became targeted for revitalization, redevelopment, and investment.

**Detroit Recently**

Detroit’s historical placement, coupled with its decline and diminished property values and rents, started to create a brand of its own. A lack of city services and resources prompted neighborhoods and individuals to self-organize, creating cultural and artistic spaces, advocacy and neighborhood associations, community gardens and watches. While the city resisted decline on a grassroots level, the national and international community took a different approach. Detroit came to represent a ghost-town barely living amidst its abandoned structures, a destination of ‘ruin-porn’ tourism. Many were drawn to Detroit, moving because of cheap rents, creative and artistic opportunities, and the like; thereby celebrating and simultaneously contributing to the “counterculture which has been transformed into postmodern consumer culture” (Carducci, n.d.). The underdog status became celebrated by Chrysler’s “Imported from Detroit” commercial during the 2011 Super Bowl, playing on the city’s national and international image, drawing from “America’s Great Comeback Story”. Furthermore, “Move to Detroit” or “Detroit is Hiring” campaigns from New York, are accompanied by the movement of art spaces that
are relocating to Detroit due to high rents in New York City, while other speculative investors are taking advantage of the current momentum to capitalize on real estate and the city’s ‘comeback’. Vince Carducci, Dean of Undergraduate Studies at the Center for Creative Studies in Detroit explains, “The serious efforts at gentrification have been driven more by speculative financial interests, in keeping with the rent-gap theory, and embraced by more upscale lifestyle consumers rather than working artists” (Carducci, n.d.). While there is no documented form of displacement from gentrification in one of Detroit’s neighborhoods, the ‘cultural displacement’ in which residents feel culturally isolated from others while physically remaining in their original home, prevails (Dewar, Weber, Seymour, Elliott, & Cooper-McCann, 2015).

Much of the conversations surrounding the revitalization of Detroit is attributed to the growth and redevelopment of the Greater Downtown. In the past years, Quicken Loans (mortgage company) chief officer Dan Gilbert moved his headquarters to Downtown Detroit and claimed more than eighty buildings, including offices, commercial buildings, casino, parking decks and hotels, mostly purchased in the aftermath of the great recession (Aguilar, 2016). In another part of the city, he created “Tech-town,” an incubator of technology which seeks to attract high-skilled talent to Detroit. The construction of the new Red Wings arena, largely subsidized by public funds, by the Ilitch family is a component piece for the new entertainment district, only stones throw away from their Tigers Stadium. Among others, the Q-Line, a public-private transportation project, is a street-car connecting the 3.3 miles of developments in the Greater Downtown area, side-by-side of the already present public transportation lines. Municipally established Detroit Land Bank holds online property auctions, requiring purchasers to bring the land up to code within a specific amount of time, aiming to expand the tax base and clear blight (Farley, 2015). Aforementioned projects provide only a glimpse of Detroit’s urban restructuring and interests representative of some public and private actors. Looking to become an attractive and viable place for tourism, investment, and life, Detroit’s regeneration demonstrates a favorable place and time to retain and attract migrant communities. Thereby, the introduction of initiatives for attracting and retaining migrant communities reflect the city’s interest in and need for population increase, economic investment, and diversification through transnational reach.

**Detroit: A Welcoming City**

Around 12% of Detroit’s residents over age 25 have a four-year college degree, in comparison to 36.6% of Michigan’s immigrants (Tobocman, 2014). In 2014, Governor Snyder, under the motto “Reinventing Michigan,” announced the creation of the Michigan Office for New Americans. Closely focused on Detroit, the Governor requested federal approval of an additional 50,000 employment-based visas until 2019, which would, “…seek to attract highly-skilled, entrepreneurial, legal immigrants who commit to living and working in Detroit, thereby contributing to its economic and population growth” (Snyder - Fact Sheet: Encouraging Immigration in Michigan,” n.d.). Such efforts are demonstrative of the synergies between the state and the locality. Thereby, the state comes to play an active role in the development of uneven geographies and restructuring of territories in spatially selective interventions (Glick Schiller & Çağlar, 2011a). The city’s desire to attract immigrants and foreign in-
vestment is reflected in its ability to revitalize and gentrify neighborhoods, which are favorably reflected in the city’s “competition to attract forms of state support” (Glick Schiller & Çağlar, 2011b: 72). Detroit’s regeneration synchronizes with municipal and state-led efforts in migrant retention, while simultaneously contributing to the overall accumulation of social, political, and economic capital.

Established in January 2014, “…[i]n an effort to cultivate a more diverse, inclusive, global city”, the Detroit City Council members created the first City of Detroit Immigration Task Force” (“Immigration Task Force Presentation,” n.d.) The Detroit Immigration Task Force (DITF) includes thirty members of different backgrounds, local organizations, and regions of the world. In addition to planning to release a comprehensive strategy plan, DITF is divided into six committees: Municipal Services, Immigration Rights, Economic Development and Investment, Marketing and Engagement, Re-Population, and Social Services. The municipal subcommittee aims to engage public needs in order to create an accessible virtual office central for immigrants seeking housing, education, employment, etc. It further seeks to “create a Language Access Plan for Limited English Proficient (LEP) constituents” by convening an LEP committee, hiring multilingual staff, and creating volunteer and internship programs for foreign born immigrant youth (“Immigration Task Force Presentation,” n.d.). The Economic Development and Investment (EDI) group seeks to increase exports, trade, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by establishing an International Investor and Trade Partner Collaborative in identifying EB-5 investors and secure FDI. Additionally, the EDI Committee focuses on smaller immigrant business growth and start-ups by increasing investment in incumbent and ‘untapped’ entrepreneurs through knowledge dissemination and mentor relationships. Furthermore, this subcommittee looks to municipally influence favorable business licensing and zoning regulations. The Immigration Rights Committee plans to coordinate with federal regulatory bodies and engage in issuing Municipal IDs while coordinating campaigns with various regional and national organizations. A Meeting and Engagement Plan works to promote Detroit as a Welcoming City by creating a brand, highlighting immigrant-owned businesses, promoting tourism in immigrant neighborhoods, publicizing naturalization ceremonies, and fostering cross-cultural community programing. The Repopulation Committee is designated to create a welcoming environment for refugees and immigrants by enacting immigrant-friendly policies and ordinances. Furthermore, it aims to increase affordable housing for refugees and immigrants through partnerships with HUD (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development), developers, the Board of Realtors, and MSHDA (Michigan State Housing Development Authority) and increase retention of existing immigrant groups by identifying and resolving challenges and concerns within communities. Finally, the Social Services and Education Plan aims to promote English as Second Language services and GED and connect foreign-born residents with social services in the city (“Immigration Task Force Presentation,” n.d.).

Mayor Mike Duggan solidified Detroit as an immigrant friendly city by creating the Office of Immigrant Affairs in October 2015. Following the Paris attacks in November 2015, only one month after opening the Office of Immigrant Affairs, the Mayor openly opposed Governor Snyder’s call to suspend refugee resettlement to Michigan, stating that Detroit is a place for immigrants (Warikoo, n.d.). One of the goals of the Office of Immigrant Affairs is the resettlement of Syrian and other refugees in Detroit over the next three years. Furthermore, the office will help incoming and residing communities connect with government and non-profit resources
and assist in obtaining loans and other means of financial support (Davis, n.d.). OIA will serve as a gateway in helping immigrant businesses become successful through various initiatives, such as the Motor City Match, and encourage economic investment. The inclusion of migrant communities within the municipal government, is a significant step not only in recognizing the diverse populations of Detroit, but ensuring that the needs of different communities are met.

In September 2014, Detroit became part of the Welcoming Cities and Counties national network. Welcoming America is a network of municipalities, counties, and organizations leading a movement of inclusive communities that embrace immigrants and foster opportunity for all (“Welcoming America: “Who We Are”,” n.d.). By becoming a member of the network, Detroit gains access to national and international exchanges and government leadership influencing immigration and urban policy. Welcoming cities receive support and recognition through participation and access to the creation of sustainable and effective programs. Moreover, the network connects Detroit to federal leadership, thereby providing access to national funding resources. Becoming a Welcoming City or County demonstrates that a locale is part of a national movement of locally-driven municipal efforts “to create more welcoming, immigrant-friendly environments that maximize opportunities for economic growth and cultural vitality and position communities as globally competitive, 21st century leaders” (“Welcoming America: “Who We Are”,” n.d.). The Immigration Task Force and Welcoming Michigan initiated the process that has given the city not only access to many national and international government and non-profit resources, but also visibility as an emerging city and a viable destination for migrant communities which can be used in the city’s branding and overall goals.

For Detroit, immigrants of all skill levels play a particular role in its redevelopment, thereby explaining the emerging immigrant-friendly institutional structure. Municipal initiatives such as the Immigration Task Force, establishment of the Office of Immigrant Affairs, and membership in the Welcoming Cities and Counties network demonstrate that Detroit is at a particular time for migrant emplacement. With aims of repopulation, economic development, and diversification, the city of Detroit sees migrants as actors and generators of political, economic, and cultural wealth. Retaining high-skilled immigrants suggests a flow of investment and financial capital to Detroit, consequently widening the city’s transnational reach. The municipality’s desire to retain and attract low-skilled migrants reflects the city’s need to accumulate cultural capital and materialize its welcoming image. By providing favorable conditions for migrant groups, the city will see its neighborhoods revived, tax base and property values increase and urban space diversified. The increase in immigrants would then set the stage for further in-migration, satisfying needs for repopulation, economic investment, and overall vibrancy. Therefore, the favorable infrastructure of the city intentionally creates opportunity, rather than constraining it, for establishment of migrant communities.
Conclusion

Detroit is embracing its momentum. Rapid urban development and regeneration has been carefully crafted and packaged, fitting Detroit’s brand as an emerging national and global underdog. Its historical trajectory demonstrates the negative consequences of global neoliberal structures that simultaneously attempt to rectify themselves through the same, yet disguised development and growth tactics. Thus, the city is at a particular time of urban revival whereby migrant communities are viewed as actors of change satisfying the overall municipal agenda. Municipal campaigns seeking to attract and retain migrants further reflect the city’s aim to accumulate capital and become a global destination for economic investment. At the same time, the inclusion of migrants within the municipal restructuring is an important step that would eventuate in broader benefits for the city’s migrant and overall residents and would provide them with a previously absent access to the city government. Results from political, economic, and cultural investments offer a more favorable repositioning within the global fields of power. Although the current percentage of foreign born individuals in Detroit is low, city’s efforts in setting the stage for expansion through immigration should be followed closely. Because Detroit is in the midst of a regeneration, successful or not, it becomes viable for furthering the scalar cities approach, as well as studying the impact of varying municipal strategies and migrant communities.

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IT’S ALL OVER YOUR FACE: IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AMONG SECOND-GENERATION MIGRANTS OF CHINESE DESCENT IN THE CROSS-HAIRS OF LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM

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In this paper, I discuss the conjuncture of extraterritorial nation-building intentions of the People’s Republic of China and the experience of second generation migrants. I will argue that the intention of rehoming the descendants of emigrants who might lack any sort of connection with their ancestral homeland can be very effective, especially because these young people embrace hybrid identities that serve as a fertile ground for such initiations, particularly because of their unsettled and contested nature. I will briefly look at the government-initiated Root seeking camp and its impact on one participant’s identity constructions.

Ever since the flow of migration of people, goods, ideas and capital has been maximized due to current developments in information and transportation technology, a new phase of globalization characterizes the world we live in. There is a certain anxiety—that in civil and academic society—that these new circumstances facilitate the viability of transnational practices to a high extent, which will, as never before, lead to the weakening of the nation-state.¹ This approach must be critically reviewed, as it exposes expressions of methodological nationalism: it focuses exclusively on the receiving country while neglecting that the sending country is a nation-state as well (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). In spite of weakening, as I will argue, the sending country in fact has gained a new opportunity: the opportunity for extraterritorial nation-building (Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003). “From this standpoint, the politics of belonging is about maintaining ties with emigrants; mobilizing their resources and expertise; making it easier for them to retain citizenship, even when they acquire citizenship elsewhere; and facilitating home-country involvement in such matters as voting, property ownership, and remittances” (Brubaker, 2015). What has really changed due to globalization is not the strength and capability of the nation-state as a category of (and for) practice and authority, but its territorial boundedness. However, becoming territorially unbound, nation-states are likely to exist even more vigorously than before.

The growing literature on ‘long-distance nationalism’ (Anderson, 1992; Osmanbegovi, 2001; Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003; Schiller, 2005; Brubaker, 2015) is characterized either by the uncertainty of who the agent behind this phenomenon is, or focuses exclusively on one of several agents. Existing literature lacks the analysis of the combination of possible agents, such as the nation-state (the sending country), the expatriate individuals, and the diaspora on a communal level (outstanding examples are Chiu, 2010; Louie, 2001). I would like to contribute to this less studied area with a special focus on second-generation migrants through the lens of transnationalism

¹ See for example Eriksen, 2002: “Long-distance nationalism, or politics via remote control, can be effective and illustrate how transnational connections weaken the authority of the nation-state.” Also, Appadurai, 1996; in Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003.
Research on second-generation long-distance nationalism in most cases uses the individual as the focus of analysis. The nation-state, as an actor of long-distance nationalism, is not yet studied from the point of initiations specifically targeted at the second (and subsequent) migrant generation. With this paper, through the analysis of the ‘Root-seeking camps’ organized by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), I would like to contribute to this less studied area located in the convergence of literature on long-distance nationalism and second-generation migrants.

The existence of second-generation migrants gives rise to questions that problematize our current understanding of ethnicity, cultural and national belonging to a high extent. Who are they? Where are they from? What should be named as their “place of origin”? The complexity that underlies these seemingly banal questions reveals a very important psychological drive that characterizes second-generation migrants’ identity constructions. These contested identity constructions become sites for extraterritorial nation-building that aim at establishing enduring (and potentially economically beneficial) relations with people, who do not necessarily have any sense of belonging due to the lack of any sort of experience. How can you call a place home where you never set foot before?

While analyzing identity constructions of second-generation Chinese migrants I will draw on Ang’s (2001) concept of hybridity that proved to be a useful analytical tool when it comes to simultaneously existing controversial emotions, such as the contested sense of belonging. Through juxtaposing the concept of hybridity with that of long-distance nationalism I will argue that the hybrid identity constructions of second-generation migrants serve as fertile ground for extraterritorial nation-building practices. This hypothesis will be developed through the analyses of an institution of the PRC that aims to arouse nationalist sentiments among young people of Chinese descent born outside the territorial boundaries of China: the government-organized “Root-seeking in China” camps for overseas youth. I will argue that the hybrid identity constructions of second-generation migrants stand a good target for such extraterritorial nation-building practices. The initiative of root-seeking camps draws on a racial discourse of ethnicity that coincides with the experience of racial exclusion common among second-generation Chinese migrants in Hungary, thus it is successful in shaping these contested identities. However, as we will see below, not in the way it was intended.

I will use one pilot interview to illustrate how the theoretical concepts and nationalist policies operate on the level of the individual. This paper is part of a broader thesis research project on hybrid identity construction. I have selected this interview for its special interest in studying long-distance nationalism and its impact on identity construction. In the broader research for my thesis (Beck, 2015) I have examined through the means of discourse analysis how the same person identifies him or herself in different contexts as Chinese, Non-Chinese, Hungarian, European, or explicitly as a hybrid. I have conducted in-depth interviews with 8 young people of Chinese descent from 2013-2015 in Budapest.

Before turning the focus of the analysis to these extraterritorial nation-building initiatives in particular, I would like to introduce the actors who take part in this play, namely the PRC and second-generation migrants who are in the cross-hairs of those policies.
Building the nation abroad

The PRC is an illustrative example of the nation-state that, despite weakening, has seized the opportunity that lies in emigration. In her analysis of overseas Chinese policies of the PRC Barabantseva argues that through the incorporation of overseas Chinese into the Chinese modernization strategy “Chinese leadership utilizes the global regimes of migration, trans-nationalism, media, and multiculturalism to affirm the CCP’s political legitimacy, to extend China's political standing, to reassert Chinese culture, and to benefit China's economic performance” (Barabantseva, 2005). By exercising an all-inclusive politics of belonging, the PRC has established one of the largest and probably one of the most economically successful diaspora, a diaspora of global importance (Chiu, 2010).

In 1978, the PRC decided to legitimize the already established practices of its expatriates (Nyíri at Nyíri, Fullerton, & Tóth, 2001). To signal this political shift, a new term was introduced to describe migrant subjects: xinyimin. This shift in language illustrates the general change in the attitude toward emigration (Liu, 2005). In a short while leaving the country has become celebrated as a modern, patriotic act and has been indeed encouraged through both institutional and discursive means. The image of the emigrant is that of a brave bridge builder who is instrumental in easing his or her country into the modern world (Nyíri et al., 2001; Ong & Nonini, 1997). Recognizing the economically beneficial aspect of maintaining good relationships with its expatriates, the government of China has been an effective contributor to the imagination of a transnational community of the Chinese diaspora.

Long-distance nationalism of the PRC operates through the root ideas of blood and heritage (Louie, 2001). Before the appearance of the second—not to speak of latter—generation of emigrants it was evident that national consciousness arises naturally out of Chinese racial heritage. This discourse was absolutely in sync—as Nyíri puts it, in a “honeymoon stage”—with the discourse of the first generation migrants’ desire: as racially distinct thus excluded, marginalized members of their host society, they have been eager to belong to an accepted community of high status, i.e., the highly appreciated overseas community of their loving motherland (Nyíri et al., 2001). Using traditional nationalist slogans that draw on nostalgic sentiments might work well with those who have actual experiences and memories of the motherland, but does not operate so efficiently with those who have never been outside from a Hungarian town like Esztergom, for example. The presence of the second-generation faces this sort of nation-building discourse with new challenges: it is difficult to retain nostalgic sentiments about something one has never experienced and even more difficult if she/he has no knowledge of it at all.

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2 According to Sheng Ding, the overseas population consists of 38 million “ethnic Chinese” (Ding, 2007).
3 Literal translation: new migrants.
4 For the emotional logic of diaspora building see Brettell, 2007
Hybridity: the constant state of being suspended in-between

Turning the focus of the inquiry to the subjects of the nation-building policies in particular requires a deeper understanding of who these people are: they were born and raised outside China, but their physical characteristics bear an undeniable “Chineseness”. Following Jenkins’s notion of the entangled relationship between ethnicity and race, I argue that self-identifications are inseparable from externally imposed categorizations (Jenkins, 2008). To interpret this ambiguity of the exterior (the look) and the interior (the way of thinking), hybridity is a useful analytical tool. The concept of hybridity should not be regarded as a solution, but rather a heuristic device for analyzing the complicated entanglement of being permanently suspended in-between (Ang, 2003 quoted in Árendás, 2014). Hybridity allows for the unresolvable contradictory feelings of claiming one’s difference and the wish to belong to be demonstrated simultaneously, instead of expecting them to be either united or to fall apart, as it argues the very impossibility of resolving them (Ang, 2003; Zsuzsa Árendás, György Szeljak, 2014).

Identities are always formed in contrast to certain others; they can never be seen as settled, fixed entities. The same person can define him or herself as Chinese, European, Hungarian or as a hybrid according to the changing of the reference point his or her identity is constructed against at the moment. What remains permanent throughout these discourses is the cleavage between the way persons look (Chinese) and the way they think (Hungarian, or more broadly European). This leaves them, as one of my interviewees put it, with “not having one’s own, proper nationality,” corresponding to Said’s term ‘generalized state of homelessness’ (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992). As I will argue, the state of being constantly suspended in-between serves as an ideal target for nationalist initiatives.

Demand meets supply

While growing up in countries which are not known for favoring multiculturalism, like in Hungary for example, Chinese children experience exclusion and are constantly reminded of being different. This can happen even in friendly ways, for instance, when someone praises their fluency in Hungarian language presuming that he/she is more fluent in Chinese, which is not true in many cases. Under this sort of pressure, children or youth of Chinese descent are forced to forge a Chinese identity, to “fill their face with purport”. And this is exactly the point where the PRC’s long-distance nation-building policy finds a way to enter the discourse: the discourse of the racialized body. According to Louie (2000), PRC officials believe that Chinese loyalty to native place, and therefore to the Chinese motherland/nation, is embodied in overseas Chinese through their racial heritage.

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5 This is what literature on the subject area refers to as ‘employing hybridity strategically’ (Poynting, 2004). I do not prefer the expression ‘strategic’ because it suggests a sense of purpose in the act of self-identification that is not there in many cases.

6 As surveys conducted since 1989 show, Hungarian society is extremely xenophobic, especially in relation to the proportionally small number of migrants it receives.
Therefore, the image of “Chineseness” is conceived as a racial essence connecting people through their blood to the Chinese nation regardless of which part of the globe they live in or were born in.

I argue that despite the PRC’s and Chinese folk culture’s assumption, in most cases national consciousness does not arise naturally out of Chinese racial heritage, but through the process of being repeatedly confronted with it. The necessity of searching for roots can be regarded as the (unwilling) adoption of externally imposed categorization (Jenkins, 2008). Since this demand has been produced in the “host” society, the PRC is eager to supply it. The following citation from Nam (a young man born in 1992 in Santiago, who resided in Budapest at the time the interview took place), illustrates how efficiently China engages people who face such difficulties in their self-identification.

Chinese culture is really strong, as I said, and I would say once you were born this way, you have two choices. One is just accepting that you are Chinese, and then you will definitely feel like you are part of it. The other one is just to negate the fact that you are Chinese, and I wouldn’t recommend it, because it’s all over your face. It’s just too strong, and you can never separate yourself from Chinese culture.

As Dikötter exposes in his studies about the history of race in China, the notion of race became equivalent with that of the nation when China turned from empire to nation. The colour yellow represented “a racial cohesionness that would subsume regional alliances in the face of foreign aggression” (Dikötter, 1997). I agree with Ang (2001), when she argues that the presumption of internal ethnic sameness and external ethnic distinctiveness is fundamentally proto-nationalist. The discourse of racial cohesion opposed to the foreign-other operates in reverse situations as well: i.e., when the foreigner is at home where the Chinese “other” enters through the act of migration. Confusing this discourse with the deterritorialization of ethnic identities shows that territory is of little concern in this situation. The possession of a Chinese face in itself functions as an externally imposed identity: no matter where and by whom, “once you were born this way” you have unavoidable obligations to wear it.

The appearance of the overseas youth, referred to as hua yi7 by the Overseas Affairs Committee, embodies a contradiction that challenges the discourse of equating race with nation: even though they retain the physical, racial markers of Chinese ethnicity, they lack the cultural knowledge and attachments to mainland China that are assumed to follow these physical characteristics (Louie, 2000). The initiation discussed below stems from the Chinese government’s fear concerning the future of relations with its overseas population as the political and cultural gap becomes wider with each generation of migrants. Let us turn our attention to the PRC Overseas Affairs response to this challenge: the next sections of the paper discuss the intentions and assumptions regarding the root-seeking initiative and their outcome in practice.

In Search of Roots.

7 For a detailed explanation on categories used to describe certain groups of overseas Chinese, see: Louie 2000. Huayi literally means ethnic Chinese.


**Intentions**

The root-seeking camps for overseas youth stand as a great example of how the difficulty of hybrid identity constructions intersects with extraterritorial nation-building politics. Given the certain physical characteristics second-generation migrants bare, the society of the country they reside in marks them as perpetual foreigners and constantly reminds them that they are Chinese. Yet, as it is an externally imposed identity, many of them have only a vague idea of how they *should* be Chinese. On the other hand, we have the PRC, which is eager to train them how to be Chinese. Demand meets supply. However, as we will see in the following discussion, the camps do not operate in accordance with the governmental expectations. The impact of experiencing China on the participants’ self-identification is quite contrary to the assumptions.

The motives of establishing overseas camps are expressed outright in a 1993 publication by the Guangdong Province Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, which claims:

> Members of [t]he younger generation of overseas Chinese living abroad have little understanding of their forefathers’ traditional culture, to say nothing of national consciousness. Therefore, we’ve based the camps upon Chinese national culture.8

In the same publication, the list of intended effects and main goals reveals the assumption lying beyond the initiation: if only the candidates knew their motherland, they would love it.

1. “Propagate Chinese culture and strengthen the national consciousness”;
2. “Deepen the knowledge of the motherland and strengthen the national recognition”;
3. “Foster the participants’ attachment to their native village and arouse their nostalgic emotion”;
4. “Intensify the exchange and cooperation between Chinese and foreign youths and enhance solidarity and friendship.”

Andrea Louie (2000, 2001; Louie in Levitt & Waters, 2006) conducted the most thorough ethnographic research on root-seeking camps, in the 1994-1995 ‘In Search of Roots Camp’ in particular. When studying current overseas camp activities, it is important to take into account the differences listed in the footnote,9 because

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8 Guangdong Sheng ren min zheng fu qiao ban gong shi (Guangdong Provincial Government Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs) 1993 Xin ji mu bang, gen zai hua xia (The Heart is Tied to the Motherland, Roots are Abroad). Guangzhou, China: Guangdong Provincial Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs Press. In: Louie 2001
9 The “In Search of Roots Camp” is different from those discussed here in four important aspects: 1) it is preceded by a semester-long genealogical research project by the participants; 2) there are only 10-20 “interns,” who are chosen to participate each time; 3) they are exclusively from the USA and Canada; and 4) it is organized only once a year.
they result in a much more selected and homogenized group of participants, whose motivation can be very distinct from those participating in mass summer camps running under the umbrella name of ‘Zhongguo xun gen zhi lu - Overseas Chinese Youth Summer Camp’.\(^{10}\) The candidates differ from the “In Search” candidates significantly in that most likely the majority of them see this as an opportunity for travel. They do not care so much about their Chinese roots, but they hope to have fun.\(^{11}\) The internationality—opposed to the ‘In Search’ camps national homogeneity—of the mass camps is also a significant marker, because it provides a foreground for trans-local identifications (Raffaetà, Baldassar, & Harris, 2016) and transnational third place communities (Parker & Song, 2007) that come to life as a result of the camps.

These camps of the latter kind resemble assembly-line production: they are jointly organized and sponsored by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the respective Provincial People’s Government, and are held during almost the whole year. They gather thousands of young people of Chinese descent from all over the world for 5 to 10day trips that do not aim to help the participating individuals find their own, personal roots, but rather to “experience the profound Chinese culture and civilization”\(^{12}\) in general. A great example of the shift to a more generalized term of “Chineseness” can be found on the official website of Chengdu,\(^{13}\) notably under the label “culture and tourism”, where one participant is quoted in order to explain the reason for taking part in the camp: “Although we are from different countries and speak different languages, we’re all rooted in China.”\(^{14}\)

The shift from tracing someone’s own ancestors in rural villages to finding them in China in general reflects the change in the official discourse on “Chineseness”. Until the presence of the second-generation became so apparent, ties to one’s hometown, in accordance with the historically and culturally rooted idea of “loving and strengthening one’s native place” was a key aspect of being “morally excellent” (Goodman, 1995 in Louie, 2000), which was of greater importance as it had the practical side of maintaining family relationships. As decades passed, the faces of hometowns changed dramatically: most of the actual relatives died, and the significance of native places has faded in the eyes of overseas-born Chinese youth. Therefore, the use of the idea of native places in order to arouse nostalgic, patriotic sentiments proved to be obsolete. This explains the shift in the narrative that now draws on a more general idea of “the profound Chinese culture and civilization”. Touring hastily through the vast images of Chinese cultural heritage, such as the Great Wall, in addition to the achievements of the last decades, such as meeting astronauts from the Chinese space program, are supposed to increase pride in being Chinese in general.

\(^{10}\) The Chinese name literally means “Root-seeking journeys in China”. Official website: http://summercamp.hwjyw.com/#

\(^{11}\) In this aspect, camps are notably similar to “Taglit” organized by the state of Israel.

\(^{12}\) Quoted from online recruitment material.


\(^{14}\) I am using citations from official PRC campaigns precisely because I am aware that these are not sounds of a certain personal opinion, but illustrations of the official narrative.
Adding images of China’s transformation into a modern, international country has been a recurring element of the official narrative during the past decade.\textsuperscript{15} The contribution of overseas Chinese capital to this transformation is highly emphasized in the lectures campers receive during their education in China. There has been another significant shift in the narratives of foreign capital since Louie’s research. The outright intention of encouraging future investments (Louie, 2001; Nyíri et al., 2001) is not interpreted as a truly patriotic act any longer, but the narration skillfully moves toward a give-and-take approach: “With China’s progressive integration into the world and its huge market potential, more and more people are studying Chinese to expand their job prospects,” as a quotation from Shan Chun, a senior expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences informs us in a promotional campaign that can be read on China Daily online.\textsuperscript{16} This approach resonates with a common sense among Chinese youngsters abroad, who see the largest—if not the only—benefit of being Chinese in the opportunity to do business in or with China. Adopting the individualistic attitude of Western-raised youth, the basis for encouragement is not that they should do good for the country, but do good for themselves. As the following quote from Nam reveals, this discourse proved to be successful because it draws on the participants’ experience of exclusion from the local labor market of the country in which they live.

That is the most difficult, for example, in the aspect of if you are looking for a job, I told you it has some advantages, but it has some disadvantages, too. For example, if I apply for a job, and there is someone who is competing with me, and we are exactly the same, they would take him, just because he is Chilean, because they suppose that they share the same culture. Most of the countries it would happen the same… I definitely would like to live there [in China], not permanently, but maybe for 2-5 years, to master my Chinese, and to get to know this part of our culture, which is working there and having your life there. But not in the near future, I’m not still…? …to go to China. Maybe if I get an opportunity with my job, to move on there I would be happy to consider it, but not at the moment.

**Outcome: counter-effect**

What the program engineers did not take into account is one banal aspect: the cultural shock of experiencing China for the very first time. As Nam puts it:

Yeah, it’s…. so, the Chinese culture is quite… strong, if I can say it like this. For most of the foreign people, including me, going to China is quite shocking. A lot of people, just to be on the street, it’s a sea of black haired people, that is quite shocking, especially if you don’t come from a big metropolis.

\textsuperscript{15} An interesting example of this regard is the national image video of China. “After 30 years the world has seen how much China’s profound history and cultural essence has given, giving us flexibility and unity when facing fast transformation.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KI2YHzz7bIQ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iOuqVq2LfZU&list=PLGQ21jyFnHVDPRCvLRyXQslCy4Zw583jz

\textsuperscript{16} http://www.china.org.cn/english/16706.htm
It is obvious from the quotation that the interviewee perceived himself in this context as a “foreigner,” and he experienced the same culture shock all other foreigners who set foot in China do. Except that his shock differs from other foreigners’ in a very important way: like most of his peers, with the experience of being excluded from the country he resides in, he had expectations of coming home. Instead of feeling at home, he was more alienated than ever.

I think that’s a crucial point about if I have to tell you who I am. From the very beginning, when I was in school, primary school, and I was always different to other people, because I was Chinese, but I was not Chinese too, at the same time. But therefore, I didn’t feel 100% Chilean, when I was growing up there. And then I went to China: I look Chinese, I do speak Chinese, but Chinese people treated me as a foreign person. And then I got the feeling that I wasn’t Chinese either. So mostly for the foreign people, that are half Chinese, like me, we are from nowhere. We are mixed from our country and China.

According to the quotation, despite reaching its intended aim, the camp had a rather counter-productive effect. Although, upon closer examination we can see that there is an—presumably unintended—impact: as it appears in the usage of the first-person plural (the only time it happened during our conversation), it has created a community of those people “who are from nowhere”.

I think, the most important thing to me was, how this experience for other foreign people to be in China was.

The experience of being constantly suspended in-between, being dis-embedded from everywhere is a burden difficult to deal with. Especially because in most cases it is seen as an anomaly, and individuals are left on their own with it. This is why McLennan states that the problem with hybridity is “that it does not easily produce a people” (McLennan, 1995 in; Ang, 2001), which, according to this phenomenon, I have to argue against. It is true in the sense that normally there is no occasion to gather “hybrids” together, where they can share their experiences. But as we see, the overseas camp serves as exactly such an opportunity. Youngsters—notably referred to as “other foreigners” in the quote—who share more or less the same sort of exclusion from their own host society because of their racial characteristics, set for China, where they were meant to belong, but experience being different once again. The complexity of this feeling seems to trigger the creation of friendships that can serve as a transnational network in the future, one that is viable and maintainable through the means of global social media like Facebook, Tumblr or Instagram. How viable these communities are and what use they have is a topic for future investigation. What we can see now is that Facebook groups are established for each camp, which serve as virtual places where the “alumni” can get together. Further more, root-seeking hashtags are proliferating on Instagram.

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17 The interviewee was born in Chile but resided in Hungary when the interview was conducted.

18 An outstanding illustration of how these means of globalization are used in transnational identity construction is a video, that can be found on the webpage “Friend of Roots” https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=140&v=gaaLZsV7P1g
As we see, although the outcome of the initiation is not in line with governmental assumptions, it has a certain utility in creating a sense of belonging for a transnational community of youngsters, who share the inescapable heritage of Chinese characteristics. Additionally, even though in a roundabout way, it has reached its purpose regarding the consolidation of the candidates’ ties with China.

**Conclusion**

Events of this sort intentionally confront the participants with the complexity of their ethnic and national identities, and urge them to draw a line where their Hungarian (in this special case Chilean)/European/Western part ends and where the Chinese begins. They can be seen as means of long-distance nation-building as they reflect the PRC’s ambitions about maintaining relationships with second- (and latter) generation migrants. The initiative is feeding on the participants’ experience of exclusion due to their physical appearance, which the PRC tries to fill with meaning, thereby making the participants proud “messengers of the Chinese civilization”.

As seen in the discussion, the initiation does not work in accordance with PRC governmental expectations. However, by consolidating the participants’ ties to China, it has served extraterritorial nation-building in other ways. The overseas camp catalyzed a dense, transnational network of Chinese youth that can possibly have economic manifestations. Aiming at second-generation migrants is very effective in the sense that to certain extent they all construct hybrid identities. Hybrid identities are worthy targets precisely because they are unsettled and constantly contested.

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Guangdong Provincial Government Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs (Guangdong Sheng ren min zheng fu qiao ban gong shi)
MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING: A MODEL FOR DISCUSSION

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Most studies of migration and subjective well-being analyze happiness as a result of migration. However, migrants and non-migrants may differ regarding their happiness already at the moment of making migration decisions, what poses severe methodological difficulties for researchers and suggests that efforts to find simple causal relations between the two could be misleading. The lack of a comprehensive and dynamic theory linking migration and well-being is apparent. The aim of this paper is to establish better theoretical foundations for the study of these relations by proposing an alternative model of economic behavior as an interpretive framework and a starting point for further debates on migration, development and subjective well-being. The model, designed by Fred van Raaij, accounts for the interplay of the economic, sociological as well as psychological causes and consequences of behavior in the sense of dual causation and offers a cognitive definition of subjective well-being. Van Raaij’s scheme is discussed together with the migration research context in which subjective well-being is being interpreted and some of the most important features of economic behavior models known in and outside of migration studies.

Keywords: Migration, Development, Subjective Well-being, Economic Behavior

JEL Classification: F22; O15; I31

1. Introduction

Happiness is becoming one of the key concepts of migration literature right under our noses. Since the last decade, a number of studies have been carried out on the relations of happiness and—internal as well as international—I migration (for a summary, see Simpson, 2013; IOM, 2013; Ivlevs, 2014a). Synonymously used, happiness, subjective well-being and life satisfaction appeared in academic debates on migration and development as a proxy for utility on one hand, and as a complementary element to development indices on the other. Today, research on migration and well-being has gained its own raison d’être as a specific research line within migration literature, with clear political relevance for migration policy-makers in sending and destination countries. So much so that some researchers started to speak of—instead of the migration and development nexus

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1 I do not treat internal and international movements separately.
dominant to this point—the ‘emigration intentions–subjective well-being’ (Ivlevs, 2014b) or, closely related, the ‘aspiration–migration nexus’ (Czaika & Vothknecht, 2014).

However, research on migration and happiness is still in its infancy. Despite the recent boom of investigations in this field, there is still much to do in practice as well as in theory. In these pages, I focus on the latter. Indeed, the aim of this paper is to propose Fred van Raaij’s (1981) model of economic behavior as an interpretive framework and as a starting point for further debates on migration and well-being. The model links subjective well-being to economic actions, defining it as the difference between the actual results of behavior and previous expectations. In this sense, subjective well-being implies learning processes and influences future behavior, describing a circular dynamism of macro, meso and micro-level determinants of action. Because of this dynamism, van Raaij’s scheme seems to fit well with the pluralist approach to the migration and development nexus as well. In the next section I explain the migration research context in which subjective well-being is being interpreted, pointing to the need for a dynamic behavior model. In Section 3 I briefly review some of the most important features of economic behavior models known in and outside of migration studies. In Section 4 I present and explain the model of van Raaij (1981). Finally, I conclude by suggesting possible research lines based on this model.

2. Migration, development and subjective well-being

Migration and development

Over decades, the relations of migration and development occupied the centre of debates on human mobility (for a review, see Castles & Delgado Wise, 2008; Castles, 2008; De Haas, 2008; Faist, 2008). More intense discussion emerged in relation to the developmental effects of migration on sending regions: defenders of the neoclassical approach, referring to a market equilibrium based on opposite-direction flows of labor and capital, predicted a positive relationship and a consequent deceleration of emigration; while at the other extreme, the advocates of historical structuralism, emphasizing structural imbalance and cumulative causation, stated that developmental differences between sending regions and destinations would deepen, conducing to higher levels of emigration. What both positions suggest explicitly or implicitly is that increasing socio-economic development in sending countries would reduce massive outflows; i.e., what is the same, higher development would enable the members of sending communities to be well (enough) at home, thus, ensuing that they remain at home. This argumentation became one of the cornerstones of migration policy-making in destinations (as well as of developmental aid and foreign policy, see Clemens, 2014) and still continues as such, despite pluralist researchers’ efforts to convince legislators that migration and development “are parts of the same process, therefore constantly interactive” as Castles (2008) put it.

After all, in my view somewhat surprisingly, most researchers—instead of first clarifying the effects of development on migration decision-making—turned their attention to the conditions under which migration does bring higher development to sending countries, and embarked on the study of migrants and transnational migrant
communities as ‘development agents’ responsible for the development of their home communities (Faist, 2008; Castles, 2008). I say ‘clarifying’ because research on this question would not be without precedents: transitional theorists hypothesized an inverted U-shaped relationship between development and emigration at the macro level since the seventies (for a review see De Haas, 2010), suggesting that “the economic development process itself tends in the short term to stimulate migration by raising expectations and enhancing people’s ability to migrate” (CSIMCED 1990, cited by Clemens, 2014). Clemens (2014) reviewed the most recent evidence supporting transitional theories and concluded “there is enough evidence now for researchers to be confident that the mobility transition exists, and for policymakers to move beyond »development instead of migration« policies.” Nevertheless, he lamented the lack of a theory that could jointly explain micro and macro level determinants of mobility transition.

Migration and subjective well-being

The increasingly fashionable concept of subjective well-being entered the discussion in this research context as a new policy variable (Stiglitz et al., 2009; Nowok et al., 2011; IOM, 2013; Ivlevs, 2014a, 2014b). Migrants’ happiness often appears as a condition for the development of sending countries. As the authors of the World Migration Report 2013 speculated: “the well-being of migrants affects …their ability to send home remittances, and to acquire skills and knowledge that could be useful if they choose to return to their country of origin.” (IOM, 2013; for more details on the relations of sending remittances and subjective well-being, see Akay et al., 2014.) In other instances, happy immigrants are mentioned as desirables, being healthier, more likely to find employment, more creative and productive at work, etc. (on happiness drain and happiness gain see Ivlevs, 2014a, 2014b). Again, in other instances, subjective well-being is seen as an intermediate variable between migration and development, and as a key element to understand migration decision-making (Simpson & Polgreen, 2011; Simpson, 2013; Ivlevs, 2014a). As such, subjective well-being complements transitional theories: furthermore, for policy-makers seeking ways to reduce massive immigration, it has become an inevitable variable to keep in mind.

However, we still know too little about the relationships of migration and well-being. One of the first questions that researchers pose is the direction of causation, or whether “happiness causes (or inhibits) migration, or migration affects happiness” (Simpson, 2013). Both are plausible, so it may be worthwhile to consider—adapted to the new situation—the cited answer that Castles (2008) gave to a similar question on the relations of migration and development, holding that migration (and development) and happiness are parts of the same process, therefore constantly interactive.

Most of the studies in this line focused on the post-migration well-being of movers and tried to find out if migrants are really better off at their destinations (see for example Frijters et al., 2004; Knight & Gunatilaka, 2007; Bartram, 2010, 2012; Nowok et al., 2011; Czaika & Votkhnecht, 2012; Gokdemir & Dumlu dag, 2012;
Melzer & Muffels, 2012; Olgiati et al., 2013). Many of these investigations used as a starting point the findings of happiness economics—mainly from debates on incomes and well-being—and emphasized the role of time and of social comparisons. Based on the work of Easterlin (2001), Frey & Stutzer (2002), Stutzer (2003) and others, Bartram (2010) identified three interrelated psycho-social processes to explain why the effects of higher incomes on subjective well-being may be illusory. The first is adaptation to higher incomes: as people get used to higher incomes, their initial satisfaction disappears. According to the second, aspirations and expectations may rise in parallel to adaptation to higher incomes reducing happiness. Finally, the third process involves changes in reference groups that may modify aspirations and perceptions on relative deprivation (see also Clark & Oswald, 1996; Clark et al., 2007; Melser & Muffels, 2012; Czaika & Vothknecht, 2014).

However, the question of whether migrants are better off is still hard to answer. “To answer this requires either a combination of pre- and post-migration observations on the same persons, or else matched data from the same survey applied to migrants, and a counterfactual group of non-migrants from the source area. Moreover, the counterfactual sample has to validly represent what would have happened to the migrants in the absence of migration, so there should be no self-selection bias,” or so Stillman et al (2012) assumed the most important methodological difficulties would be.

There are even fewer studies analyzing the happiness of potential migrants as a determinant of displacements. Most of these found a negative correlation between intentions to migrate and subjective well-being at the micro level (Graham & Markovitz, 2011; Cai et al., 2014; Chindarkar, 2014; Otrashchenko & Popova, 2014), while Ivlevs (2014b) found a positive relationship. At the macro level, Simpson and Polgreen (2011) observed a U-shaped relationship between the aggregate happiness levels of countries and emigration rates. As Ivlevs (2014b) explained, “…in relatively unhappy countries emigration rates fall as average country happiness increases, while the opposite is true for the relatively happy countries; the highest emigration rates are, thus, observed in the most and the least happy countries.” Even fewer studies have been carried out on the impact of emigration on the well-being of the ‘family back home,’ or in general on the well-being of stayers who may be, at the same time, potential migrants (Borraz et al., 2008).

With respect to the theory underlying most of these studies, Simpson (2013) outlined a simple model of logarithmic utilities based on relative concerns. The model, however, was criticized by Simpson herself for being too static (it considers only one period of time) and for ignoring determinants of well-being other than incomes. For this reason, she demanded “a comprehensive theory that links subjective well-being to the migration decision,” adding “the dynamic aspects of the happiness-migration relationship need to be better understood.”

2 There are several analyses comparing the happiness of different immigrant groups in destinations (see for example Amit & Litwin, 2010; Bartram, 2011; Senik, 2011) or comparing the well-being of immigrants and natives (Safi, 2010; Bartram, 2011). Nevertheless, these studies do not tell us much about the relationships between happiness and migration decision-making.

3 For a psychological point of view, see Lysgaard’s (1955) concept of psychological adjustment. For a more recent contribution to the literature on psychological adjustment see, for example, Markovizky & Samid, 2008.
This short review of the literature on migration, development and subjective well-being vindicates the warning of De Jong & Gardner (1981) holding “the difficulty in implementing policies designed to alter migration behavior in the absence of theoretically sound and empirically validated models of such behavior is apparent.” A dynamic migration model that considers subjective well-being as a cause and consequence of behavior is needed. Such a model would allow for the derivation of new hypotheses for empirical analysis and in the long run would serve as a basis for migration policy-making. Prior to proposing Fred van Raaij’s (1981) model, however, I summarize the most important features of the debates on (migration) behavior in the next section.

3. Modelling migration behavior

Reflexive behavior vs. purposeful action

Paul Albou (2004) noted that the English term ‘behavior’ has a double connotation expressed in the French language as conduite and comportement. He argued that the difference lies in the significations attributed to the action: the first refers to behavior as a manifestation of conditioned reflexes without further signification, and the second as a meaningful response to motivations and aspirations. Similarly, Szántó (1998) distinguished answers to stimuli since von Mises’ praxeology as reflexive behavior known from behavioral psychology and purposeful action as the starting point for methodological individualism.

This distinction also appears in migration literature. Findley (1977) observed the dualism of passive and active migration models. In the first sense, migration is understood as a ‘flight from misery’ or “frustration mobility’ reflecting a reaction to dissatisfaction and unhappiness, rather than a forward-looking attempt to improve one’s life” (Findley, 1977). This contextual approach, one of historical-structuralism, emphasizes the predominance of structural pressures over individual decision-making. Contrary to this, from the neoclassical point of view, migration is an active or ‘aspiring’ behavior “assumed to be a purposeful and rational search for a better place to live and work” (Findley, 1977).

Levels of analysis and rationality

Anticipating pluralist approaches on migration and the attempt to “integrate agency and structure” (De Haas, 2008), Findley (1977) concluded “the two models, or views, often blend together in practice, and research designs should incorporate aspects of both the active and passive models of migration.” However most pluralist researchers focus on the intermediate aspects of migration connecting individual and system levels, a more comprehensive theory of migration should combine all the micro, meso and macro levels of analysis, due to that a macro social phenomenon – as Szántó (1998) argued – is a function of individual behavior, while individual behavior is a function of the social context and the social context is a function of macro social phenomena. Based on these retro influences, Lea et al. (1987) proposed the ‘dual causality’ paradigm for the analysis of economic actions, according to which “certain types of economic behavior determine the entire course of economic affairs.
while the economy as a social reality is part of the environment and an important influence on human behavior” (Quintanilla & Bonavia, 2005).

Indeed, in migration literature, the consequences of displacements can be seen also as determinants of ulterior movements. This is probably best described by the classification of migration theories offered by Massey et al. (1998) that distinguishes theories explaining the beginning of migration from those explaining its perpetuation with consequences of previous movements such as the formation of migration-related institutions and social networks that reduce the costs and risks of displacements, serve as information sources or contribute to the creation of new expectations, aspirations and perceptions on relative deprivation, etc. The emigration of peers and family members is also often seen as a triggering event for new movements. What is common in most migration theories is the crucial role that economic factors play in migration decision-making. However, as Mitchell (1969) pointed out, economic determinants are only the necessary conditions for movements. The sufficient conditions are those psycho-social, he added.

Coleman (1994) explained in his model—known as ‘Coleman’s Boat’ (see Figure 1)—that neoclassical economics requires rational choice assumptions in order to be able to validly relate individual economic actions at the micro level to systemic results at the macro level (in fact, despite all criticism, neoclassical migration theory is the only theory that explains micro and macro level aspects of mobility in a coherent framework. See Arango, 2000). The boat consists of three arrows representing three kinds of relations connecting the two levels. Relation (1) represents the effects of system level phenomena on individual action—in neoclassical economics “there is assumed to be perfect information, so that relation (1) …is simply a transmission of information about prices offered and prices demanded from the system level” (Coleman, 1994). Relation (2) symbolizes the actions of supposedly rational individuals and (3) stands for the combination of these actions into systemic outcomes, i.e., assuming perfect markets, the aggregation of individual results. Coleman (1994) noted that the real world does not necessarily satisfy the model’s axioms. There may be sociological and psychological anomalies, examined by economic sociology and behavioral economics respectively (for a sociological point of view see Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Smelser & Swedberg, 1994; for a psychological perspective see Katona, 1975; Simon, 1978a; Van Raaij, 1981 and Kahneman et al.,1982).

**Figure 1:** Coleman’ Boat
The concepts of embeddedness, social networks, social capital, relative deprivation and others introduced in migration studies mainly by economic sociologists, call attention to the social determinants of behavior, or to sociological anomalies. However, sociologists such as Boswell (2008) rejected the study of psychological anomalies and defended the assumption of rational actors in migration research because of its methodological advantages. At this point I consider it important to briefly review the rationality concepts, because different positions in this regard imply different conclusions on well-being (for a review see Lindenberg, 2001)

(1) According to the basic rational choice model, perfectly informed and rational individuals make decisions based on a cost-benefit calculus that maximizes utility. Despite utilities being immeasurable, in standard neoclassical theory referring to the preferences revealed by action, well-being or utility is assumed to be higher as a result of behavior (in migration literature see Sjaastad, 1962; Borjas, 2000). (2) The theory of rational egoists is slightly different: here, the aim of behavior is the maximization of expected utilities in conditions of uncertainty. However, (rational) expectations make revealed preferences inapplicable (in migration literature see Harris & Todaro, 1970; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). (3) The concept of social rationality accounts for the social contexts underlying decision-making and emphasizes the role of psycho-social determinants such as values, expectations, perceptions, social comparison or cognitive biases. In this view, the aim of behavior is to improve conditions of life and to increase subjective well-being (physical and social). An important feature of this third concept is that subjective well-being, contrary to utilities, is measurable.

An adaptive model of behavior

Paradoxically, neoclassical rationality concepts play a similar role in modeling ‘active’ behavior to that of conditional reflexes in ‘passive’ behaviorism: its function—as psychological reductionism—is to predict human reactions to macroeconomic stimuli. Nevertheless, in reality we should not expect that the same person would always react in the same way, or that people who occupy different relative positions in the local distribution of wealth and resources would respond with the same behavior to the same stimuli—warned Katona (1951).

4 There are no psychological models that discuss the applicability of the rational choice scheme to the micro level aspects of migration phenomena. Indeed, there are no psychological models of migration at all. (Transcultural psychology, more interested in irregularities and exceptional cases, could hardly say anything about the general patterns of the mental processes that precede, accompany and follow migration decision-making.) So, somewhat paradoxically, econometrics, which Boswell (2008) referred to as the main methodological advantage of the rational choice model for sociological research on migration, is about to knock out the psychological perspective and reinforce neoclassical micro level assumptions in migration studies (in the same way the development of the very same econometrics did so with Veblen’s intentions to create more adequate psychological foundations for mainstream economics).

5 Interestingly, the criticism which Katona (1975) applied to neoclassical economics—that human beings are not simply ‘puppets’ pushed by macroeconomic forces—is quite similar to Arango’s (2003) criticism of structural views on migration, holding that migrants are more than ‘passive marionettes’ in the interplay of great structures.
Indeed, rationality has never been proven empirically. On the contrary, the assumptions of the rational choice scheme have been refuted in several ways on several occasions by behavioral economists, with Katona – according to his disciples—the first to do so (see Strümpel, 1972).

As a pioneer in the intersections of economics and psychology, Katona (1951) mixed behaviorism with the Lewinian principles of *Gestalt* on one hand (see Albou, 1984) and social psychology on the other (see Strümpel, 1972) with the purpose of creating a psychological model of economic behavior for the analysis of decisions on consumption, savings, investments, as well as on geographical mobility. He postulated that without stimuli there would be no new decisions, i.e., actors would maintain their habitual behavior, and that unobservable ‘intermediary variables’ between stimuli and reactions are the key to understanding decision-making. His adaptive (or psychological) model of economic behavior is presented in Figure 2.

**Figure 2:** The adaptive (or psychological) model of economic behavior according to Katona, illustrated by Paul Albou (1984)

In this raw model, S represents economic stimuli that are the objective economic conditions and situations of decision-making (e.g., recessions, unemployment, incomes, inflation, tax rates, etc., together with the immediate economic conditions and opportunities of the decision-making individual or household). P stands for the intermediary, psychological variables (e.g., expectations, perceptions, aspirations, lifestyle, internal and external controls of reinforcement, etc., instead of rationality) and C is behavior (in Albou’s terminology: *comportement*). The dotted line below, from C to S, symbolizes the feedback between individual behavior and economic conditions, in accordance with dual causation. Despite the obvious shortcomings and the low level of refinement of this model, it served as an important source of inspiration for a series of newer behavior models, like those of Strümpel (1972), van Raaij (1981) and Albou (1984). Among them, only those of Strümpel and of van Raaij ac-

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6 Since Friedman (1953), pure economists maintain there is no need to empirically prove the axioms of rationality, because macro level results of behavior support micro level assumptions. However, in migration literature, the macro level findings of transitional researchers contradict neoclassical predictions (see Castles, 2008; Clemens, 2014). For a critical answer to Friedman see Simon (1978b).

7 The most famous contributions to this critical literature are those of Simon (1978) who developed the concept of bounded rationality, and of Kahneman et al. (1982), whose objective was to “obtain a map of bounded rationality” (Kahneman, 2003). However, these authors paid more attention to refuting the micro level assumptions of neoclassical theory than to the construction of an alternative model of behavior.
count for subjective well-being. However, the former does not deal with dual causation. For this reason, in the next section I will trace only the latter.

4. Fred Van Faaij’s proposition

Fred van Raaij proposed his model (see Figure 3) in the very first number of the Journal of Economic Psychology in 1981, together with a review and a discussion of Katona’s and Strümpel’s models. In this article, he defined economic behavior as “the behavior of consumers/citizens that involves economic decisions, and the determinants and consequences of economic decisions.” He described economic decisions as decisions “characterized by sacrifices to be made by the actor, an evaluation of present or future benefits of one’s expenditure… an evaluation of the expected benefits of some alternatives, and a relatively concrete variable of behavior.” He added that the determinants of such decisions “include personal, cultural, situational, and general economic factors that stimulate or inhibit economic decisions” and also stressed that policy-makers “often do not know the relative efficiencies of policy measures to generate behavioral change” and expressed his intentions to present his model as “a framework for studying the effects of economic policy and… the perception and evaluation of economic well-being and satisfaction.”

Figure 1: The model of economic behavior proposed by Van Raai (1981)

![Model of Economic Behavior Proposed by Van Raai](image)

Source: Van Raaij (1981)

The meaning of the letters is as follows (also see Albou, 1984; Wärneryd, 1988; Quintanilla & Bonavia, 2005):

- GE – General economic conditions: recession or expansion, governmental economic policies, international economic relations, war, ecological conditions.
E – Immediate economic environment, consisting of personal availabilities, market situation, type of employment, incomes, etc.;

P – Personal factors: goals, values, aspirations, cognitive styles, internal and external control of reinforcement, access to information, interest in economic and political issues, socio-demographic factors;

E / P – Perceptions on economic conditions: perceptions of the environment in which economic activities take place, perceptions of prices, of the relative distribution of incomes, of opportunities;

B – Economic behavior;

S – The situation in which the individual is at the given moment, influenced by expected or unexpected events in the environment such as an accident, illness, sudden unemployment, the completion of studies, marriage or birth of a child, and so on;

SW – Subjective well-being depends on the difference between the expected benefits and the actual results of economic action, captured as individual satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) associated with the chosen behavior taking into account previous aspirations and expectations;

SD – Social climate: social perceptions, evaluations, satisfaction with societal structures and the economic system, trust in economic/political institutions.

The inner circle illustrates how economic behavior (B) determines subjective well-being (SW) and affects the immediate economic environment (E), and how this modified environment, together with the perceptions of it (E/P), influences future behavior (B). In contrast to the neoclassical model, behavior (B) is much more influenced here by the perceived environment (E/P) than by the immediate economic environment (E) or general economic conditions (GE). E/P, naturally, depends on E. However, personal factors (P), subjective well-being (SW) and indirectly the social climate (SD) also have an influence.

Differently from the traditional interpretations of subjective well-being (SW), in this model the object of satisfaction is not life (or life conditions) as a whole, but a given economic behavior—to migrate or not to migrate in our case—and is defined by the difference between previous expectations and the actual results of the economic action. It is also influenced by the social climate. Indeed, the definition given by Van Raaij is closer to what sociologist Ruut Veenhoven calls the cognitive component of happiness: the “degree to which an individual perceives his aspirations to be met” (Veenhoven, 1991). It is highly compatible with the Multiple Discrepancies Theory of Michalos (1985), according to which “reported net satisfaction is a function of perceived discrepancies between what one has and wants, relevant others have, the best one has had in the past, expected to have 3 years ago, expects to have after 5 years, deserves and needs.”

Adapted to migration phenomena, the model suggests that apart from the economic factors (GE and E), psychosocial elements such as subjective well-being (SW) and individual perceptions (E/P) are important driving forces of migration (B) that, at the same time, affect the subjective well-being (SW) and the immediate economic environment (E) of migrants themselves and of the members of sending and receiving communities in which new decisions will be made. The new environment and new well-being levels could affect migrants’ decisions to send remittances to the sending communities or consume in host economies; they could also make them return
and invest in sending regions; on the other hand, stayers could follow the example of emigrants and leave; and those receiving remittances could stop working and/or consume imported goods. These and other scenarios influencing the development of sending and receiving areas—in the sense of the migration and development nexus—could be easily interpreted with this theoretical framework.

5. Conclusions

Van Raaij’s scheme seems to be a tempting descriptive model for the analysis of migration, subjective well-being and development, dealing with micro, meso and macro level determinants and consequences of displacements. It can jointly explain general and immediate economic environments as well as the individual and social determinants of action together with a cognitive interpretation of subjective well-being that precedes and follows behavior. However, its utilization in empirical analyses is not without challenges. The reason for this is the practical incompatibility of the dual causation paradigm and positivist research designs used to study linear causal relations. That is to say, the model’s circular dynamism, which is undeniably one of its most important theoretical advantages, at the same time becomes a methodological obstacle. Due to this, the ten kinds of relations represented in it should be analyzed separately. However, such analysis would be even more complicated: while the dynamism of the inner circle—behavior, subjective well-being, immediate environment and perceptions—is described by a set of one-headed arrows representing the directions of multiple relationships, the outer elements are connected to them by double-headed arrows indicating correlations exclusively.

As a starting point, the subjective well-being of potential migrants should be analyzed as the satisfaction with the actual results of staying in the home community preceding migration decision-making, related to the social climate and to the perceptions of the well-being of those who already emigrated. The next step should be to examine the satisfaction of migrants themselves, taking into account the adaptation processes to the new socio-economic environment. From a methodological perspective, it should be noted that migration intentions and propensity do not result in displacements in all cases. However, propensity to migrate is widely accepted as a proxy for future migration decisions. On the other hand, the follow-up of actual migrants in destinations is a costly and challenging task for researchers. Moreover, asking migrants about their satisfaction with their past expectations is another source of biases.

The analysis of these relationships based on van Raaij’s model is expected to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamic relations of migration, development and well-being, and to clarify how satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation and institutions influences and is influenced by migration, offering useful insights into migration decision-making processes for the developers of migration policies in sending and in destination countries.
Bibliography


